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Introduction 
This doctoral thesis is composed by three research papers. 
The first chapter, titled "Terroir and Perceived Quality of Wine: Evidence from Tasting 
Experiments", is co-authored with Luca Nunziata.  
In this study we use experimental data in order to verify whether information about the terroir of 
a wine has a causal effect on the perceived wine quality and whether these pieces of information 
are more effective than the quality signal used for terroir products in the wine market: 
appellation (label) of origin. In order to address these issues we have carried out two wine-tasting 
experiments in three different shopping malls in Italy, using a random sample of 790 individuals. 
We used a Palizzi IGT red wine as it was awarded for its terroir expressiveness and it is an 
appellation not well known to consumers. Wine consumers in our samples are found to be able to 
use technical and detailed information about terroir to infer the quality of the wine and they 
exhibit a higher appreciation when receiving information about terroir rather than about the 
appellation of origin Palizzi IGT.  
The second chapter is titled "Criminal Firms: Exploring Negative Externalities on Non-Criminal 
Competitors" and it is co-authored with Antonio Parbonetti and Michele Fabrizi.  
The aim of this paper is to provide empirical evidence of the economic consequences due to the 
presence of firms connected with mafia-type criminal organizations located in developed areas. 
In particular, we verify for the first time how these criminal firms affect non-criminal 
competitors’ performance and we investigate the negative externalities that they inflict by using 
firm-level data. Our empirical analysis exploits exogenous shocks imposed by operations against 
Mafia (from 2008 to 2011) at municipality level to implement a difference-in-difference strategy 
that compares the change in performance of non-criminal firms with the change in performance 
of a control group of (non-criminal) firms that operate in either an industry or a municipality that 
have not been affected by these police operations. The underlying idea is that these operations 
‘clean’ the industries and the municipalities where the targeted criminal firms operate, with a 
consequent beneficial effect on non-criminal competitors located in the geographical proximity. 
Results suggest that treated competitors experience a statistically significant and sizeable 
increase in EBITDA/Total Assets and ROA after the operation, with respect to comparison 
groups that have not been exposed to this shock. Further explorations permit us to verify that this 
positive effect is not merely due to a decrease in the industry size after the operations. Organized 
crime and criminal firms bring inefficiencies in the institutional and business environment that 
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cause many distortions, such as in the access to procurement markets, especially for smaller 
firms.  
The third chapter, "Does Thinking About Death Make Us More Generous? Evidence from a 
Field Experiment in Cooperation with UNICEF", is a solo paper.  
In this study I draw on Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Terror Management Theory (TMT) to 
expand our understanding of the phenomenon of ingroup bias in charitable giving. I aim at 
investigating the effect of the use of death priming in emotive charity advertisement on potential 
donors’ decisions and ingroup bias. In particular I compare implicit and explicit priming of death 
thoughts against priming of thoughts related to disease and I explore the role of various 
dimensions of subjects' self-esteem in moderating their responses to implicit stimuli. To this 
purpose I conduct a field experiment in cooperation with UNICEF, which has involved 547 
subjects. Main findings of this study show that in the control group we observe that on average 
ingroup bias is in favor of ingroup (white-skinned - Caucasian) recipients, rather than outgroup 
(black-skinned - African) ones. When thoughts of death are activated, both implicitly and 
explicitly, discriminatory behavior emerges at the expense of donors' ingroup and favorable 
towards the outgroup. Furthermore, implicit death effects arise independently from the level of 
general self-esteem and self-esteem’s relevant domains. This study produces interesting findings 
not only for the direct field of application. The integration of SIT and TMT offers valuable 
sparks for forthcoming economic analyses of ingroup bias in different settings. 
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Introduzione 
Questa tesi di dottorato è composta da tre saggi. 
Il primo capitolo, intitolato "Terroir and Perceived Quality of Wine: Evidence from Tasting 
Experiments", è coautorato con Luca Nunziata.  
In questo studio utilizziamo dati sperimentali per verificare se le informazioni sul terroir di un 
vino hanno un effetto causale sulla qualità percepita e se queste informazioni sono più efficaci 
del segnale di qualità utilizzato per i prodotti da terroir nel mercato vinicolo: la denominazione 
(marchio) di origine. Al fine di affrontare queste questioni abbiamo condotto due esperimenti di 
degustazione in tre diversi centri commerciali in Italia, coinvolgendo un campione casuale di 790 
individui. Abbiamo utilizzato un vino rosso Palizzi IGT in quanto è stato premiato per 
l’espressività del terroir di provenienza ed è una denominazione non molto conosciuta dai 
consumatori. I consumatori di vino nei nostri campioni sono stati in grado di utilizzare 
informazioni tecniche e dettagliate sul terroir per inferire la qualità del vino e hanno mostrato un 
maggiore apprezzamento quando hanno ricevuto le informazioni sul terroir piuttosto che sulla 
denominazione di origine Palizzi IGT. 
Il secondo capitolo è intitolato "Criminal Firms: Exploring Negative Externalities on Non-
Criminal Competitors" ed è coautorato con Antonio Parbonetti e Michele Fabrizi.  
L’obiettivo di questo articolo è di fornire evidenza empirica delle conseguenze economiche 
dovute alla presenza di aziende connesse con organizzazioni criminali di tipo mafioso localizzate 
in aree sviluppate. In particolare, verifichiamo per la prima volte come le imprese criminali 
influenzano la performance dei concorrenti non criminali ed investighiamo le esternalità negative 
che infliggono ai concorrenti utilizzando dati a livello di impresa. La nostra analisi empirica 
sfrutta gli shock esogeni imposti da operazioni contro la Mafia (dal 2008 al 2011) a livello 
comunale per implementare una strategia difference-in-difference che compara il cambiamento 
nella performance delle aziende non criminali con quello di un gruppo di controllo composto da 
aziende (non criminali) che operano in settori o aree che non sono stati interessati dalle 
operazioni di polizia considerate. L’ idea sottostante è che queste operazioni ‘puliscano’ i settori 
e i comuni dove le aziende criminali colpite operano, con un conseguente effetto benefico sui 
concorrenti non criminali localizzati in prossimità geografica. I risultati suggeriscono che i 
concorrenti trattati presentano un considerevole e statisticamente significativo aumento 
dell’EBITDA/Totale Attivo e del ROA dopo l’operazione rispetto ai gruppi di controllo che non 
sono stati esposti a tale shock. Ulteriori esplorazioni ci permettono di verificare che questo 
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effetto positivo non è semplicemente dovuto ad una diminuzione della dimensione dei settori 
dopo le operazioni. Il crimine organizzato e le imprese criminali portano inefficienze nell’ 
ambiente istituzionale in cui operano le imprese che causano numerose distorsioni, come 
nell’accesso al mercato degli approvvigionamenti, soprattutto per le aziende più piccole.  
Il terzo capitolo, "Does Thinking About Death Make Us More Generous? Evidence from a Field 
Experiment in Cooperation with UNICEF", è a firma unica. 
In questo studio mi baso sulla Social Identity Theory e Terror Management Theory per espandere 
la conoscenza del fenomeno dell’ingroup bias nel comportamento altruistico. Il mio obiettivo è 
investigare l’effetto dell’induzione di pensieri di morte (death priming) nelle campagne 
caritatevoli ‘emotive’ sulle decisioni dei donatori e l’ingroup bias. In particolare, esploro 
l’effetto di priming di pensieri di morte relativi ai beneficiari di una campagna per le 
vaccinazioni contro l’attivazione di pensieri legati alla malattia ed esploro il ruolo di diverse 
dimensioni dell’autostima dei soggetti nel moderare le loro risposte agli stimoli impliciti. A tal 
fine, ho condotto un esperimento field in cooperazione con UNICEF che ha coinvolto 547 
soggetti. I principali risultati di questo studio mostrano che in media nel gruppo di controllo 
osserviamo la presenza di ingroup bias a favore di beneficiari appartenenti all’ ingroup (di pelle 
bianca - caucasici), piuttosto che all’outgroup (pelle nera - africani). Quando vengono indotti 
pensieri di morte osserviamo un comportamento discriminatorio nei confronti dell’ingroup e 
favorevole nei confronti dell’outgroup. Inoltre, gli effetti del priming implicito emergono 
indipendentemente dal livello e dai domini rilevanti dell’autostima dei soggetti. Questo studio 
produce interessanti risultati non solamente per i diretti ambiti di applicazione. L’integrazione 
della SIT con la TMT offre degli spunti per future analisi di interesse economico dell’ingroup 
bias in diversi contesti. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1 
Terroir and Perceived Quality of Wine: Evidence from 
Tasting Experiments 
 
 
Patrizia Malaspina* 
(University of Padua) 
 
Luca Nunziata 
(University of Padua, IZA) 
 
 
Abstract 
Wine is one of the most interesting product to study within the field of consumer behavior. In the last years, 
the question "does terroir really matter?" has been dominating the debate on wine quality. In this study we 
use experimental data in order to verify whether information about the terroir of a wine has a causal effect 
on the perceived wine quality and whether these pieces of information are more effective than the quality 
signal used for terroir products in the wine market: appellation (label) of origin. In order to address these 
issues we have carried out two wine-tasting experiments in three different shopping centers in Italy, using 
a random sample of 790 individuals. We used a Palizzi IGT red wine as it was awarded for its terroir 
expressiveness and it is an appellation not well known to consumers. Wine consumers in our samples are 
found to be able to use technical and detailed information about terroir to infer the quality of the wine and 
they exhibit a higher appreciation when receiving information about terroir rather than about the appellation 
of origin "Palizzi IGT". 
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1. Introduction 
In this study we explore the effect of terroir, as marketing tool, on consumers’ perceived wine 
quality. 
Nowadays, perceived quality of wine is arising a growing curiosity in the academic field. The 
rapid changes in the wine sector1 together with the complexity that characterizes the wine quality 
concept and the air of mysticism surrounding its quality perception2 have increased over time the 
interest of producers and scholars in the analysis of the wine quality dimensions.   
In the last 40 years, we have been witnessing a number of controversies about what wine is, how 
it should be understood and, in particular, about which are the strategic attributes that ultimately 
determine the quality of wine. This debate has its roots mainly in the following dilemma: does 
terroir really matter?  
Terroir is a construct regularly used to justify and endorse the wine quality, mostly in European 
countries. The OIV (Organisation Internationale de la Vigne et du Vin) defines the viticultural 
terroir as "a concept that refers to an area for which there is collective knowledge of the 
interaction between the physical and the biological environment and applied specific practices, 
which provide unique characteristics for goods originating from this specific area [that cannot be 
reproducible in wines produced in any other area]. Terroir includes specific characteristics of the 
soil, topography, climate, landscape and biodiversity". Other definitions exist and are divided into: 
"restricted" - environmental factors3 - and "expanded" - environmental factors + human factors 
(Vadour, 2005). In this work we refer to the expanded definition, in accordance with the OIV. We 
make this choice as the focus of our study is on consumers’ quality perception and the ‘expanded’ 
definition is the one that was found to fit more to the way consumers perceive terroir products in 
their mind (Aurier, Fort, Siriex, 2005).  
Extant literature remarks that the use of ‘relationship to place’ has a long history in the wine trade 
and it is seen as a core brand attribute, that can provide the winery with the opportunity to pursue 
a more niche-oriented strategy based on product differentiation (Beverland, 2006; Thode and 
Maskulka, 1998). Terroir is intended as a powerful marketing device that satisfies consumers’ 
demand for authenticity and uniqueness, conveying a symbolic idea of “genuine” rather than 
“industrial” product, and it is tightly linked to the success of wine tourism (Spielmann and 
Charters, 2013; Moulard et al., 2015).  
                                                     
1 The progressive increase and diversification of the offer and consumption motivations, the decline of consumption in traditional 
countries and the appearance of new producer and consumer countries. 
2 Consumers find evaluation of wine quality more difficult with respect to similar products (D’Alessandro and Pecotich, 2013). 
3 Soil, subsolil, topography, climate, etc, that represent the ‘technical’ terroir (Ballantyne, 2011). 
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Nevertheless, its definition and actual relevance are surrounded by ambiguity and are at the centre 
of several international debates and controversies that involve Old World (mainly European 
countries) and New World countries4 (Charters, 2010), outlining the so-called “War on Terroir” 
(Joslin, 2006). Old World countries traditionally adopt a terroir-based strategy and resort to the 
appellation (label of origin) system5 based on geographical areas to signal quality to the market. 
Differently, New World countries mainly adopt a brand-based strategy6, embracing the idea that 
the producer is the agent that ultimately determines the quality of a wine in a bottle and that terroir 
is an expedient to maintain the status quo and protect the European productions. 
In the last years, the trend of the international wine trade has been showed that New World 
countries’ productions are gaining upon Old World countries’ ones (OIV, 2013).  
Data appear to endorse the claim of those who do not support the appellation system arguments, 
suggesting that appellations alone cannot guarantee success on international wine markets and fail 
to generate the idea of uniqueness, which may derive from the terroir reality, in consumers' minds 
(e.g. Agnoli et al., 2009). However, the implementation of a place-based strategy can be effective 
only in presence of a perceptible link between the presumed quality, mystique, of the wine and its 
place of origin. This is particularly true if it is not well promoted and thereby popular among 
consumers. 
Therefore, some questions naturally arise in our mind: what about consumers’ experience and 
evaluation of the attribute terroir in its very essence? Does consumers value terroir, when they are 
provided with detailed and technical information about and/or experience it? It is for customers to 
judge!  
In this exploratory study, we conduct two wine tasting experiments to address these issues. 
Little attention has been given to terroir as quality cue in the academic literature so far. The vast 
majority of the existing studies have focused more on appellation of origin and region/country of 
origin (e.g. Al-Sulaiti and Baker, 1998; Thode and Maskulka, 1998; Koschate-Fischer et al., 2013; 
Johnson and Bruwer, 2007; Schamel and Anderson, 2003; Melnyk et al. 2012; Agnoli et al., 2009). 
The few investigations on terroir have mainly used surveys and interviews to identify the 
dimensions characterizing terroir and terroir authenticity (Aurier et al., 2005; Spielmann and 
                                                     
4 USA, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, China, Argentina, Cile, etc. 
5 Appellations are signals associated to terroir products (such as wine), so they are conceptualizations, representations 
of terroir. They are used to legally identify and certificate products that are typical from an area and possess certain 
characteristics that cannot be reproduced elsewhere (Barahm, 2003). In virtue of its appellation, a product is supposed 
to benefit from a certain reputation, as appellations are a guarantee of a product’s ‘institutional authenticity’ 
(Spielmann and Charters, 2013). The main three categories of the Italian appellation system are: DOCG, DOC and 
IGT.  
6 In the last years, some of them have attempted to mimic the terroir approach with different results (Thode and 
Maskulka, 2005). 
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Charters, 2013), verified which variables describing terroir (technologies and natural 
endowments) affect more consumers’ quality evaluation (Gergaud and Ginsburgh, 2008) or 
focused on the value of terroir in terms of value of the vineyards (Cross et al., 2011).  
In this study, the first experiment aims at verifying whether terroir does really matter from the 
consumers’ point of view. More specifically, our experimental design seeks to identify and infer 
the causal effect of terroir on perceived quality of wine, by investigating whether technical 
information about terroir can positively influence the value consumers recognize to the wine and 
their overall judgment about it. We return to the objective ‘reality’ of terroir construct in its 
"expanded" definition, without referring solely to its conceptualization (e.g. appellation of origin)7, 
and we attempt to explore whether technical information about terroir affect not only the wine 
expected quality but also the experienced one, when consumers taste it. 
Wine represents an interesting subject for such an investigation, as it is considered to be a product 
difficult to evaluate (that implies a more complex purchase choice) and its pleasantness is largely 
influenced by what consumers think to know about it (Lockshin and Hall, 2003, D’Alessandro and 
Pecotich, 2013).  
The second experiment tests the effect of terroir against appellation (label of origin). The idea is 
to investigate whether appellation is a signal informative of the quality of a terroir wine; in other 
words, we would like to test if it is a valuable and effective quality signal of a terroir wine to the 
market, independently of its popularity and reputation. This research question gains more 
relevance if we consider that, currently, label of origin is one of the few signals reported on the 
wine labels and used by non-connoisseurs in formulating their purchasing decisions. Indeed the 
larger the wine-related knowledge that consumers have, the lower the importance of appellations 
in terroir wine quality evaluations (e.g. Agnoli et al., 2009).  
The decision to collect data using tasting experiments is based on the following considerations. 
First, sensory examination of wine is of paramount importance for the evaluation/assessment of 
the quality of a wine. A number of studies has showed that wine taste is the main factor that drives 
consumers’ assessment and decisions (e.g. Keown and Casey, 1995; Charters and Pettigrew, 2007; 
Dotson et al. 2012); indeed, wine is a hedonic product and pleasure is an important dimension of 
wine consumption experience. Second, terroir is supposed to find expression in the organoleptic 
properties of the wine (e.g. Vaudour, 2002; Barham, 2003; Trubek, 2008); hence the experience 
of tasting is important when we explore the effect of terroir on perceived quality. Lastly, several 
                                                     
7 In the past, scholars have given little attention to consumers’ experience and evaluation of information, also technical 
and detail, about terroir; the literature is rich of studies about appellation of origin, region/country of origin (e.g. 
Deselnicu et al., 2011; Gergaud and Livat, 2007; Al-Sulaiti and Baker, 1998; Thode and Maskulka, 1998; Koschate-
Fischer et al., 2013; Johnson and Bruwer, 2007; Schamel and Anderson, 2003; Melnyk et al. 2012). 
5 
 
researches have demonstrated that extrinsic cues can affect the actual efficacy, the perceived 
quality and even the sensory perception of a product, (e.g. Allison and Uhl, 1964; McClure et al. 
2004; Litt and Shiv, 2012; Okamoto and Dan, 2013). In this work, the tasting experience allows 
us to test whether the availability of technical information about the terroir can affect the actual 
(experienced) quality of the wine, when the consumer tastes it. 
The two experiments were carried out within Italian shopping malls (in the province of Padua and 
Reggio Calabria), which involved 790 subjects of 18 and over, who spontaneously took part in the 
experiment. The wine we used was a prize-winning red wine (Palizzi IGT) awarded for its terroir 
expressiveness by the native wines guide “Vinibuoni d’Italia”. The appellation Palizzi IGT is not 
well known to consumers. The choice of an appellation that is not popular allows us to take the 
effect of its reputation apart. In both experiments, the treated group received technical and detailed 
information about the terroir of the wine, while the control group took part in a blind tasting in 
the first experiment and it was informed about the appellation of origin of the wine in the second 
one.  
Perceived quality was measured by participants’ willingness to pay for one bottle of the tasted 
wine in restaurants/specialized shops and hyper- or supermarkets, and by the rating that they 
assigned to it. We analyze data by running a regression analysis using a linear model and robust 
standard errors. The robustness of the estimates was checked by using different set of controls, 
possible confounding factors into the relationship between the regressands and the main regressor: 
demographical and socio-economic factors and other information concerning participants’ 
knowledge of wine and consumption habits (involvement level). These data were gathered by 
means of an anonymous questionnaire, administered during the experiment. Main results of this 
study show that consumers appreciate and value more the wine they taste when they are provided 
with information about terroir (experiment 1). Terroir is found to affect quality perception even 
against appellation of origin (experiment 2). The analysis of a dataset that combine data gathered 
through the two experiments confirm that the terroir effect is statistically similar across the two 
studies. So terroir comes out to matter irrespectively of whether the control group receive or not 
any information and to be more effective as marketing tool than appellation of origin.  
The value of this paper is to academic readers, wine industries practitioners and terroir wine and 
tourism associations alike, as it explores the importance of wine’s terroir in the consumer wine-
evaluation and the relevance of terroir in wine marketing strategies.  
To our knowledge, our study represents a first attempt to investigate experimentally whether the 
consumers value ‘technical’ terroir as quality cue and to test the effectiveness of the appellation 
system to signal it.  
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This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we briefly provide the theoretical background of 
our study. In section 3, we illustrate and discuss the methodology and the experiments’ designs. 
In section 4 we present the regression analysis and the main results we obtained. Finally, section 
5 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
Markets may die out if consumers cannot assess the quality of the goods supplied (Arkelof, 1970).  
This sentence suggests the importance of one of the most relevant issues in consumer and 
marketing research: exploring and understanding the way consumers infer and learn quality. In the 
academic literature different and field-specific perspectives on quality emerged and customers’ 
perception of quality are of paramount interest within marketing and consumer research. 
Zeithaml (1988) defines it as the consumers’ judgments about a product’s overall superiority or 
excellence and provides a conceptual model that represents the different components (attributes) 
of the consumers’ quality perception. These attributes are usually distinguished between two types: 
intrinsic and extrinsic (Olson and Jacoby; 1972). Intrinsic attributes concern the physical 
composition of the product and they cannot be changed without altering the nature of the product 
(e.g. in the case of wine, the organoleptic properties), while the extrinsic ones are related to the 
product, but are not physically part of it (such as price, brand name, advertisement, appellation of 
origin and other information reported on wine labels).  
In order to signal the quality of their products and persuade consumers to buy them, firms deliver 
these attributes, signals (cues), to the market and consumers use them to infer quality (Steenkamp, 
1989). Unfortunately what firms deliver to consumers may not correspond to what consumers 
perceive, through the lens of their measurement knowledge and motivation, expectations and 
emotion (Golder et al., 2012). Thus gaining insights on customers’ perceptions of those attributes 
(that firms consider strategic) and understanding which attributes count for consumers are 
necessary requirements for firms to formulate effective communication strategies of their 
products’ quality, and to gain and maintain a sustainable competitive advantage. According to 
Poulsen et al. (1996), the consumers' overall quality evaluation depends both on the expected and 
experienced quality of the product, which affect the quality formation process. The expected 
quality is based both on intrinsic and extrinsic quality cues, while the experienced quality derives 
from the actual consumption and sensorial experience of the product; expectations influence 
perceived experiences and experiences influence expectations in the future. Previous studies teach  
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us that consumption experiences are affected by consumers' expectations about the product. In this 
respect, an experiment by Almemberg and Dreber (2011) demonstrate that consumers rate better 
more expensive wines, which are found to really taste better, while Shiv et al. (2005) show even 
that marketing actions can influence the actual efficacy of a product. 
Perceived quality of wine requires a special attention, as it has been shown that the choice for wine 
is more difficult for consumers than for any other product, as there are several cues that can affect 
their decision (Lockshin and Hall, 2003) and that cannot be easily available to consumers. Indeed 
they quite resort to the judgment of experts in order to evaluate a wine (Verdú Jover et al., 2004).  
In this study, we are interested in the effect of the extrinsic cue terroir on wine quality perception. 
In the existing literature, direct references to the terroir construct are seldom. We find researches 
on its conceptualizations or generalizations, such as appellation of origin and region/country of 
origin (e.g. Al-Sulaiti and Baker, 1998; Thode and Maskulka, 1998; Koschate-Fischer et al., 2013; 
Johnson and Bruwer, 2007; Schamel and Anderson, 2003; Melnyk et al. 2012). 
It was found that wine region (regional brand image) is one of  the most important information 
that consumers use to predict the quality of wine and that the addition of regional information 
makes the product more reliable and increase the confidence in its quality (Johnson and Bruwer, 
2007). 
Indeed, ‘relationship to place’ is found to be one of the attributes of authenticity, a positioning 
device, which is resonating with consumers (Beverland, 2006 p.251). A number of studies show 
that consumers are willing to pay more for a favorable place/region/country of origin image in all 
those markets in which the link between the product place of origin and its presumed quality is 
perceptible (e.g. Koschate-Fischer et al., 2013).  
In addition, GI8-labeled wines received some attention in the existing literature. Demographical 
and social characteristics are found to influence the willingness to pay for them: the WTP of 
inferior wine consumers depends on their education and ties to the area of origin of the wine 
(Skuras and Vakrou, 2002).  
In general Deselnicu et al. (2013) demonstrate that price premia are lower for completely 
transformed products, with a longer offer chain and characterized by the possibility of being a 
branded company, like wine.  
From the study of Agnoli et al. (2009) we learn that there are some variables that influence the 
way consumers behave towards wine and food: intangible factors that regard environment, history 
of the area, local traditions, cultivation and elaboration techniques, all of which define terroir. It 
has emerged that the reputation of a wine brand is one of the main factors influencing consumers' 
                                                     
8 Geographical Indication. 
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choice and that the better the knowledge customers have, the less they are influenced by the 
reputation of the brand.  
As pointed out above, specific studies on terroir are seldom and developed in different directions. 
Aurier et al. (2005) explore the factor terroir from the consumer point of view, by carrying out a 
study based on interviews, focus groups and questionnaire surveys. They show that terroir product 
is a cognitive category characterized with three intrinsic dimensions: “trade-skill” (know-how, 
recipe and tradition), “time and culture” (history and ritual) and “origin” (territory, region and 
land). They find that among all these categories, the most important is “time and culture”. Gergaud 
and Ginsburgh (2008) use a "restricted" definition of terroir and verify whether the evaluation of 
quality on behalf of the experts (Parker, Bettane and Desseauve, and Broadbent) and the consumers 
(Christie’s auction prices) depends on the variables that describe natural endowments (land 
characteristics, exposure of vineyards) and technologies (all of the elements that are different from 
natural endowments). They show that technologies have an influence on the quality and the taste 
of wine, while natural endowments have a negligible effect. Cross et al. (2011) make a reference 
to a "restricted" definition of terroir and concentrate their attention on the value of terroir and, in 
particular, they explore whether the characteristics of the terroir’s area (soil types, altitude, slope, 
etc.), or designated appellation, confer an higher value to the vineyard, by increasing the sales 
price. The results of this analysis show that site attributes (reality of terroir) do not have a 
significant effect on the value of the vineyard, while the AVA appellation (concept of terroir) 
does, despite a series of robust tests and the use of precise measures for the site attributes. Rebelo 
and Caldas (2013) use an "expanded" definition of terroir and deal with the threat that Old World 
producers (whose products are based on the terroir model) face from the New World producers. 
They use a cluster approach and focus the attention on the case of the Portuguese wine Demarcated 
Douro Region, where two categories of wine are produced (Port and still wine). They propose a 
strategic solution to increase the competitiveness at an international level, passing from an 
organized cluster (the present condition in the region) to an innovative one.  
Several studies have showed that terroir factors are used mainly by professional, expert wine 
consumers (connoisseur) to represent complexity and infer quality of wine, while non-expert 
consumers (non-connoisseur) tend to give more importance to intrinsic dimensions, such as smell 
and taste (Parr et al., 2011; Dotson et al., 2012; Sáenz-Navajas et al., 2013), other information 
reported on wine labels and their own experience. Two recent studies have focused on perceived 
authenticity of terroir wines (Spielmann and Charters, 2013; Moulard et al., 2015). Spielmann and 
Charters (2013) find three dimensions of terroir concept that relate to authenticity (product, 
internalized and institutional authenticities) and they are positively correlated. Each of them can 
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be related to quality perceptions, purchase intent and satisfaction. Moulard et al. (2015) explore 
how technical terroir and country of origin (New World v. Old World countries) affect consumers’ 
authenticity perception and their willingness to pay for it. Their results suggest that Old World 
wines are perceived as more authentic and they are valued better with respect to New World 
countries and that the effect of terroir on perceived authenticity and willingness to pay is 
moderated by country of origin. 
 
3. Wine-Tasting Experiments 
To infer the causal effect of terroir on perceived quality of wine, we carried out two wine-tasting 
experiments in three shopping malls where there are hypermarkets in Italy (one of the largest wine 
producer and exporter country). Both the experiments took place in an area near the cash registers 
of the hypermarkets (outside the hypermarkets), where the experimenter positioned a tasting table. 
Participants were customers of the shopping mall who had spontaneously decided to participate in 
the experiment. They were asked to fill an anonymous questionnaire, to taste a glass of a Palizzi 
IGT red wine, to rate it on a 10-point scale and to declare their willingness to pay (in euro) for a 
bottle of the tasted wine in a restaurant/specialized shop and in an hyper- supermarket. 
We chose a Palizzi IGT red wine for two main reasons: 
- The expert guide Vinibuoni d’Italia had awarded it for its quality, agreeableness, 
drinkability and the union of wine, grape and territory – terroir expressiveness.  
- The geographical indication Palizzi IGT is almost unknown to the consumer public; even 
though it is a reality with a 100-year-long history, it is not popular and it is still in a phase 
of rediscovery. We decide to refer to an appellation that does not benefit from any 
particular fame in order to take the effect of appellation of origin reputation on perceived 
quality apart. 
Sampling Design. Our target population is represented by consumers living in the provinces of 
Padua and Reggio Calabria, two areas at the opposite ends of Italy: the first is situated in the heart 
of a region suited to wine making, characterized by a strong tie between culture and wine-making 
traditions; the second is the area where the tasted wine is produced. Considering these two 
provinces allows us to control for the hyper-regionalism that characterizes Italian preferences and 
consumption habits. Indeed we should take into account that a wine prototype9 exists in consumers' 
                                                     
9 It affects the ideal expectations of wine drinkers and, consequently, their experience and evaluation processes. 
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mind and it is built and structured according to cultural references, typical preferences, based on 
place and connection to local productions (Vaudour 2002), that represents a subjective dimension 
of terroir. In Italy this dimension exhibits a precise heterogeneity across different (wine) regions. 
Hence in this study we observe the influence of terroir on perceived quality in the region where 
the considered terroir is, as well as one which is characterized by a definite wine culture, different 
organoleptic memory and preferences. Furthermore these two areas exhibit different levels of well-
being and living standards.  
The choice of carrying out the experiments in shopping malls with hypermarkets was based on the 
idea of they being the ideal places where to find a random sample of individuals, potentially 
interested in the purchase of wine, that would be representative of the entire population. On the 
basis of this first choice, a list of strategically-positioned shopping malls with hypermarkets was 
drawn up. The experiment was carried out in those shopping malls that gave us the permission to 
use their premises: 
- “Le Brentelle”, SR11, Sarmeola di Rubano – Padua, Veneto (experiments 1 and 2); 
- “Centergross”, SS106, Bovalino Marina – Reggio di Calabria, Calabria (experiment 1); 
- “La Gru”, SS106, Siderno Marina – Reggio di Calabria, Calabria (experiments 1 and 2). 
To be qualified, participants had to be of legal drinking age (18 years). Overall the sample was 
composed of 881 individuals, but only 790 observations (389 from the second experiment and 401 
from the first one) were used (see Appendix B).  
Perceived Quality Measures. We use two dimensions to measure participants' perceived quality: 
overall rating of the wine (on a 10-point scale) and the willingness to pay (WTP) in euro for a 
bottle in a restaurant/specialized shop and hyper-supermarket. 
By doing so we want to capture not only the global quality judgment about the product, but also 
the premium that customers recognize to it and the utility they get from the consumption of terroir 
wines. In previous studies, willingness to pay was found to correspond to the real price that 
individuals actually pay for a product and to be correlated to quality perception and intention to 
purchase (e.g. Veale and Quester, 2008; Sáenz-Navajas et al., 2013). We decide to distinguish 
between WTP in restaurant/specialized and in hyper- supermarkets because it is crucial to precise 
the purchase/consumption place, otherwise all those factors that are not specified are elicited by 
the respondents10, that may have different perceptions of the quality of the same wine in different 
contexts (Martínez et al., 2006). 
 
                                                     
10 They would have imagined themselves in the habitual place where they purchase wine. 
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3.1. Experiment 1 
The aim of this experiment is to verify whether terroir information do matter for wine consumers 
and positively affect their quality assessment. 
The experiment has been conducted during six days (both weekdays and weekends) in December 
2011, from 10 a.m. to 8 p.m.. Data on 470 individuals have been collected, but only 401 
observations have been used in our analysis (see Appendix  B for further details). 
The experimental design is between-subjects mono-factorial on two levels. Each individual was 
randomly assigned to two groups (treated and control): the control group took part in a blind tasting 
(“NT” condition); the treated received technical and detailed information about the terroir (“T” 
condition), reported on a card, before to taste the wine. The card provided information about the 
main elements of Palizzi terroir: grape varieties, soil, climate, production practices utilized, 
images of the vineyards and the landscape, and the appellation Palizzi IGT, as appellations of 
origin are the ‘concept of terroir’ (Cross et al., 2011). These information were provided in a written 
form to guarantee the homogeneity of their administration (see Appendix A). 
 
Table 1 - Summary of experimental design (experiment 1) 
 Description 
TREATED (T) Information about terroir (including appellation of origin)/Wine Tasting 
CONTROL (NT) Blind Tasting 
 
We choose a between-subjects design in order to avoid carry-over and demand effects (Charnessa, 
Gneezy, Kuhn, 2012). We use a large sample and random assignment to minimize problems 
associated to this design (assignment bias and high variability within the treatment); further, we 
opt for a single-blind design to address other common threats to the internal validity of a between 
subject design.  
Randomness was guaranteed by throwing a die. The “T” condition corresponded to an even 
outcome, while “NT” corresponded to an odd one. The die was thrown at the beginning of every 
hour. The experimenter took note of the outcomes of this process on an appropriate form. 
 
3.1.1. Questionnaire and Experiment Phases 
Our experiment was divided into three phases. At the beginning the participants were provided 
with an anonymous questionnaire, that contained also the instructions and the guidelines for the 
experiment (see Appendix  A). The anonymous questionnaire was made up of 28 questions and it 
12 
 
was divided into three parts (see Appendix  A), corresponding to the experiments’ phases. The 
division into phases is meant to give each subject a homogeneous guide and to guarantee a correct 
execution of the experiment.  
The front page provided some information and instructions regarding the experiment11. First of 
all, participants were asked to read the instructions and to report date and time, so that it was 
possible to keep track of where and when they carried out the experiment and to understand the 
condition to which they had been assigned. 
 
Table 2 - Experiment phases (experiment 1) 
Experiment 
phases 
Control Group Treatment Group 
1 
Questionnaire 
Part 1 
• Demographic and socio-economic 
variables 
• Consumers habits and wine 
knowledge/level of involvement 
• Demographic and socio-economic 
variables 
• Consumers habits and wine 
knowledge/level of involvement 
2 
• No information 
• Wine Tasting 
• Information about terroir (and 
Appellation) 
• Wine Tasting 
3 
Questionnaire 
Part 2 
• Perceived Quality 
• WTP (in euro) for a bottle of the wine 
in a restaurants and super-hypermarkets 
• Knowledge and previous tastings of 
Palizzi IGT 
• Perceived Quality 
• WTP (in euro) for a bottle of the wine 
in a restaurants and super-
hypermarkets 
• Knowledge and previous tastings of 
Palizzi IGT 
 
The first part of the experiment was meant to collect individual data on the participants. In this 
phase they were asked to respond to the questionnaire, which, in turn, was divided into two parts. 
The first regarded demographic and socio-economic information (such as sex, age, education, 
household income, occupational condition). The second concerned consumption habits 
(consumption frequency, type of wine consumed, habitual place for purchase of wine12, etc.) and 
wine knowledge, in order to gather information about their involvement level13.  
                                                     
11 Participants were not informed of the exact aim of the experiment, but they could read that it was about the perceived 
quality of the wine, without any reference to terroir. 
12 Purchase place and consumption frequency were found to influence wine preferences (Martínez et al., 2006). 
13 Controlling for these factors is necessary because the wine drinkers’ perception and consumption behavior are 
substantially dependent on their involvement level: e.g., high-involved consumers (connoisseurs) place emphasis on 
terroir attribute more than low-involved ones – novices (Charters and Pettigrew, 2006 – 2007; Parr et al., 2011; D'Alessandro 
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In the second phase those who had been assigned to the treatment group received the information 
about the terroir, while those in the control group received no information at all. We decide to 
provide terroir information before the tasting because information about the product are found to 
have a significant effect on consumers' experience before the consumption (Hoch and Ha, 1986; 
Levin and Gaeth, 1988; Lee et al., 2006). At this point all the participants were required to taste 
the wine. 
In the third phase, the subjects were asked to rate the wine on a scale from 1 to 10, and to declare 
their willingness to pay (in euro) for one bottle of the wine that had been tasted in both 
restaurant/specialized shop and hype-supermarkets. At the end of this phase, participants were 
asked to answer to two questions concerning their knowledge of Palizzi IGT and any previous 
tasting experiences of it, in order to control for their level of involvement and organoleptic memory 
connected to this appellation. We asked this information at the end of this phase so that no 
indications about the nature of the wine and its origin could be provided to the respondents who 
participated in the blind tasting.  
All of the participants we required to fill the questionnaire out autonomously14. 
For the entire duration of the experiment the bottles stayed wrapped in foil so that participants 
were not exposed to other signals, that were found in previous studies to influence consumer’s 
quality evaluation and decisions, such as: label design, brand name, vintage, alcohol grade, etc. 
(e.g. Mueller et al., 2010; Litt and Shiv 2012; Okamoto and Dan, 2013; Sáenz-Navajas et al., 
2013). Participants could not even hold the bottle in their hands, as the bottle weight may 
potentially suggest information about the quality of the wine (Piqueras-Fiszman and Spence, 
2012). 
 
3.2. Experiment 2 
The aim of the second experiment is twofold. First, it is meant to verify whether the appellation of 
origin is able to capture the essence of terroir in consumers’ minds. Second, we would like to 
demonstrate that the causal effect we estimated in the first experiment is actually a pure ‘terroir 
effect’ and not a priming effect.  
The experiment has been carried out on June 2015. We replicated the same conditions of the first 
one in the same locations, and using the same facilities. The unique difference is represented by 
                                                     
and Pocotich, 2013; Torri et al., 2013). Further, technical knowledge allows expert to hold multiple judgments of evaluated 
aggregate quality, whereas novices may form one summary judgment (Golder et al., 2012, p.10). 
14 The experimenter helped subjects to fill in the questionnaire if she was asked by elderly and foreign participants. 
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the treatment administered to the control group in stage 2. Data on 411 subjects have been 
gathered, but we use only 389 observations (see Appendix B). 
As mentioned above, the experimental design is similar to the first one. The main difference 
consists in the treatment administered to the control group at stage 2. In this case control subjects 
received some neutral information about the wine plus appellation of origin. Information were 
reported on a card identical to the one handed out to the treated subjects and the quantity of the 
information provided to the two groups (both text and pictures) was equal (see Appendix 2).  
 
Table 3 - Summary of the experimental design (experiment 2) 
 Description 
TREATED (T) Information about terroir (including appellation of origin)/Wine Tasting 
CONTROL (NT) Appellation of origin and other ‘neutral’ information /Wine Tasting 
 
3.2.1. Questionnaire and Experiment Phases 
We use the same questionnaire of the experiment 1. In the figure below a synthetic description of 
the experiment phases is portrayed.  
 
Table 4 - Experiment phases (experiment 2) 
Experiment 
phases 
Control Group Treatment Group 
1 
Questionnaire 
Part 1 
• Demographic and socio-economic 
variables 
• Consumers habits and wine 
knowledge/level of involvement 
• Demographic and socio-economic 
variables 
• Consumers habits and wine 
knowledge/level of involvement 
2 
• Neutral information about the wine 
and Appellation 
• Wine Tasting 
• Information about wine terroir (and 
Appellation) 
• Wine Tasting 
3 
Questionnaire 
Part 2 
• Perceived Quality 
• WTP (in euro) for a bottle of the wine 
in a restaurants and super-hypermarkets 
• Knowledge and previous tasting of 
Palizzi IGT 
• Perceived Quality 
• WTP (in euro) for a bottle of the wine 
in a restaurants and super-
hypermarkets 
• Knowledge and previous tasting of 
Palizzi IGT 
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4. Data Analysis 
For our regression analysis we use a linear estimator (OLS) and robust standard errors. The choice 
of this estimator is based on the following considerations: we use experimental data, the treatment 
was administrated randomly and we can assume that there is no correlation between the 
independent variable and the error term. 
Although we use ordinal variables, we do not choose an ordered probit estimator since the OLS 
estimator produces consistent estimates that are easier to interpret. Furthermore ordered probit 
estimator requires assumptions of normality on the entire error distribution. 
Our dependent variable is perceived quality: overall rating and the willingness to pay in euro for 
one bottle of the tasted wine in a restaurant/specialized shop or hyper-supermarket. The 
independent variable of interest is the treatment dummy Terroir, which is equal to 1 if the 
respondents have received information about the wine terroir, 0 otherwise. 
For both the two experiments, we estimate the regressions of the three outcome variables on the 
regressor of interest (Terroir), with robust standard errors. Then we control for possible 
confounding factors in the relationship between perceived quality of wine and terroir: 
demographic controls (age, gender, nationality, Italian region of origin, education, household size, 
religiosity, smoker, number of cigarettes smoked per day), socio-economic controls (net monthly 
household income and occupation) and “wine-related” controls (levels of knowledge of wine and 
interest in it: type of consumer, knowledge of acronyms, technical terms connected to this study 
and Palizzi IGT; consumption habits, etc.). Furthermore we create a binary variable, Padua, which 
captures the effect related to the place where the experiments were held. 
The equation can be written as follows: 
Y = α + ß*T + δ*X + ε 
Where the outcome Y is perceived quality, the regressor of interest (T) is Terroir and X is the 
vector of controls. 
We include the various control blocks in the following order (see Tables 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15): 
initially only Padua variable and demographic controls are included, except for the variables that 
control for the area (region) of origin, because of multicollinearity with the variable Padua 
(column 2); subsequently, we add the socio-economic controls (column 3) and the "wine-related" 
controls (column 4), that capture the effect of the level of involvement. In column 5 Padua dummy 
is excluded, to control for the region of origin. 
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After having treated the two experiments separately, we combine the two datasets and we perform 
the same analysis controlling for a wave dummy (Wave2) in columns 6 and 7 (see Tables 16, 17, 
18).  
 
5. Results  
5.1. Experiment 1 
Even though 470 questionnaires were collected, we exclude 69 observations by following four 
criteria reported on Appendix B. 
The coefficients of the terroir variable are positive and statistically significant (p < 0.01) in all of 
the estimated regressions (column 1 of the Tables 10, 11 and 12).  
In particular we observe that, with respect to those who took part in the blind tasting, participants 
assigned to the treated group are willing to pay around €3,193 more for a bottle of tasted wine in 
restaurants/specialized shops (Table 10) and €2.24 in hypermarkets (Table 11) and they assign 
0.833 points more to the pleasantness/quality of the wine (Table 12). These results are robust to 
the inclusion of all the considered controls, as we can observe in columns (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) of 
Tables 10, 11 and 12. 
 
5.2. Experiment 2 
Even though 411 questionnaires were collected, we exclude 22 observations by following the same 
criteria mentioned above. 
Again, terroir has a statistically significant effect on the measures of wine quality perception in 
all the alternative specifications. More specifically, we find that receiving information about the 
terroir of the wine, against the appellation of origin, increases the willingness to pay of 3.578€ at 
restaurants (column 1, Table 13) and 2.229€ in hyper-supermarkets (column 1, Table 14) and the 
overall rating of 0.895 points (column 1, Table 15). These results suggest that appellation of origin 
is not able to capture the idea of terroir in consumers’ mind. Furthermore, coefficients are very 
similar to ones obtained from the first experiment, suggesting that our previous estimates were not 
driven by a priming effect. Before making this conclusion, we propose an additional analysis to 
verify directly whether the terroir effect is similar across the two experiments. 
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5.3. Experiments 1 and 2 
First, we combine the two datasets and we control for the wave dummy.  
Overall we estimate that people receiving terroir information are willing to pay 3.401€ (column 1 
of Table 16) and 2.259€ (column 1, Table 17) more, in restaurants and hyper-supermarkets 
respectively, than those in the control group. They expressed a higher overall evaluation (0.864 
points) of the quality perceived (column 1 of Table 18). As we expected, results are robust to the 
inclusion of controls and of the wave dummy, which has not a statistical significant effect. 
We can argue that independently of the treatment administered to the control group, information 
about the terroir of a wine affected consumes’ wine experience and evaluation. Furthermore, 
appellation of origin appears to not succeed in conveying to consumers information about quality 
concerning terroir. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
In this study we investigate the causal effect of terroir on perceived quality of wine using 
experimental data. 
Within the consumer behavior and marketing fields, perceived quality concept arises a particular 
interest. Wine perceived quality needs a special attention, as consumers find its quality more 
difficult to evaluate (D’Alessandro and Pecotich, 2013) because of the large number of quality 
cues that characterize it (Lockshin and Hall, 2003), which are not easily usable from non-
connoisseurs, creating an air of mysticism around the wine quality assessment process. Indeed, it 
is quite common in this market that consumers resort to the experts’ opinion for their purchase 
decisions (Verdú Jover et al., 2004). Probably this situation is favored also by the little informative 
wine labels, which report few information that consumers can use to infer the quality of a wine. 
From times immemorial, in Old World (European) countries wine quality is justified and endorsed 
by the concept of terroir, a reality that is at the base of the appellation of origin system, that can 
be briefly defined as specific environmental and human factors of an area that confer to wine 
unique characteristics. Now, when Old World producers are suffering from competition at global 
level, exploring the terroir issue from the consumers’ point of view acquires a special relevance. 
The most interesting questions are: is terroir valued by consumers, when they are provided with 
technical information about it? Wine’s terroir is ‘communicated’ to the market using appellation 
of origin reported on wine labels. But do appellations capture the idea of terroir in consumers’ 
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mind? Are they an effective quality signal? In this study, we conduct two wine tasting experiments 
to investigate these issues.  
Our results bring good news to Old World producers. We show that the consumers in our samples 
are able to use technical and detailed information about terroir to infer the quality of the wine. 
Indeed we observe that consumers provided with terroir information value the wine more than 
others and express a better overall assessment (experiment 1). Once again we demonstrate that 
expectations about a product (linked to the information about its origin, in this case) have an impact 
on quality perception and experience. In particular we learned that eliciting the information about 
terroir (without referring solely to its appellation) can make a place-based strategy effective, as 
terroir is able to recall the idea of uniqueness, authenticity and tradition in consumers' minds, by 
making the link between the quality of the wine and its origin clearer. This conclusion is 
particularly true when the appellation does not benefit from any particular popularity. 
The second experiment confirms that appellation of origin fails in creating an idea of uniqueness 
in consumers’ mind. Indeed appellation of origin could be effective as quality signal only if there 
is a clear and recognized relation between the presumed quality of a wine and its place of origin 
(i.e. if it is well-promoted). A large proportion of wine consumers are not wine connoissuers and 
even when an appellation is well-known, it is required a minimum knowledge of the relative terroir 
to use it as a quality cue useful in wine evaluation process and purchasing choices. These findings 
are in line with the work of Agnoli et al. (2009), who suggest that labels of origin are not always 
successful in conveying the idea of uniqueness of wine in consumers’ mind, even if they are 
protected by law and have a good ‘brand reputation’.   
On the offer side, the main problem that producers face is the general belief that quality of wine is 
inscrutable for the “non-experts” (the expression “I’m not a wine expert” is quite common). This 
'lay of the land' reduces the leverages that they may exploit to differentiate their products and 
attract (new) consumers. 
To conclude we suggest the importance for terroir wine producers of “educating” (non-
connoisseur) consumers to link wine sensorial characteristics (the most important quality attributes 
for non-expert consumers) to specific characteristics of wine terroir, by investing more on terroir 
communication.   
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Table 5 - Variables 
Variables Type Description 
Terroir dummy equal to 1 if information on terroir communicated; 0 otherwise 
Padua dummy place of experiment: equal to 1 if Padua; 0 otherwise 
Wave2 dummy equal to 1 if experiment 2; 0 otherwise 
Female dummy equal to 1 if female; 0 otherwise 
Age age variable age 
Age2 continous  
Foregneir dummy equal to one if foreign; 0 otherwise  
Region of origin dummy italian region of origin: dummyfied in North*, Centre and South 
Education dummy dummyfied  in Elementary *, Middle School, High School, Degree diplomas 
Household size dummy number of family members: dummyfied in 1; 2*; 3; 4; 5; more than 5 
Married dummy equal to one if married; 0 otherwise 
Religious  dummy equal to 1 if religious; 0 otherwise 
Smoker   dummy equal to 1 if smoker; 0 otherwise 
Cigarettes  nr. of 
cigarettes 
number of cigarettes smoked a day 
Net monthly household 
income 
dummy 
monthly net income of family unit in euro: dummyfied (less than or equal to 
1200*; between 1400 and 2500; more than or equal to 3000) 
Occupational situation dummy 
occupational situation: dummyfied (full-time employee*; part-time 
employee; in search of/awaiting employment; not in search of employment; 
retired; student; homemaker; other) 
Work contract qualification dummy qualification of work contract: dummyfied (self-employed; dependent) 
Type of contract dummy Type of contract: dummyfied (permanent; temporary) 
Typology of consumer dummy 
dummyfied: professional; expert; enthusiast; curious*; indifferent and non-
drinker 
Meaning of the acronyms  dummy equal to 1 if knows the acronyms: docg, doc, igt; 0 otherwise 
Meaning of autochthonous dummy equal to 1 if knows meaning of autochthonous; 0 otherwise 
Meaning of terroir dummy equal to 1 if knows the meaning of terroir; 0 otherwise 
Habitual wine purchase place dummy dummyfied: hyper/supermarkets*; wine shop; bar; restaurant; winery; others 
Wine consumption frequency dummy dummyfied: daily; 3-4 times a week*; rarely; never 
Type of wine habitually 
bought 
dummy 
dumyfied: DOCG, DOC or IGT bottled wine*; common bottled table wine; 
IGT wine in bulk (from the producer); common table wine in bulk (from the 
producer) and wine in carton or jerry can 
Palizzi IGT dummy equal to 1 if heard of Palizzi IGT before this experiment; 0 otherwise 
Tasting experience of a 
Palizzi IGT wine 
dummy equal to 1 if tasted a Plaizzi IGT wine before this experiment; 0 otherwise 
WTP in restaurant/specialized 
shop 
continous 
willingness to pay (in euro) for a bottle of tasted wine in a 
restaurant/specialized shop 
WTP in hyper/supermarket continous willingness to pay ( in euro) for a bottle of tasted wine in a hyper/supermarket  
Pleasantness/quality ordinal global rating of wine:1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
Note: in Appendix B the criterion for exclusion of variables, observations and registration methods of observations are 
recorded. Dummy variables indicated with (*) are the reference group. 
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Table 6.a - Descriptive Statistics (experiment 1) 
Variables Characteristics Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Terroir  401 .5162095 .5003615 0 1 
Padua  401 .5760599 .4947984 0 1 
Female  400 .37 .4834089 0 1 
Age  395 3.919.747 1.465.115 18 86 
Age2  395 1.750.554 1.310.755 324 7396 
Foreigner  401 .0349127 .1837881 0 1 
Region of origin 
North 391 .5038363 .5006259 0 1 
Centre 391 .0204604 .1417502 0 1 
South 391 .4757033 .5000492 0 1 
Education 
Elementary School 401 .0448878 .2073163 0 1 
Middle School 401 .1571072 .3643564 0 1 
High School 401 .4837905 .5003615 0 1 
Degree 401 .3142145 .4647821 0 1 
Net (monthly) household income in euro 
≤ 1200 401 .2793017 .4492166 0 1 
between 1400 and 2500 401 .4139651 .4931577 0 1 
≥ 3000 401 .3067332 .4617137 0 1 
Household size 
1 401 .1346633 .3417901 0 1 
2 401 .2119701 .4092143 0 1 
3 401 .2568579 .4374461 0 1 
4 401 .2568579 .4374461 0 1 
5 401 .0997506 .3000416 0 1 
5+ 401 .0399002 .1959694 0 1 
Married  389 .4652956 .4994365 0 1 
Occupational situation 
Full-time Job 401 .5336658 .4994885 0 1 
Part-time Job 401 .1221945 .3279195 0 1 
Unemployed 401 .0498753 .2179592 0 1 
Out of the workforce 401 .0099751 .0995 0 1 
Retired 401 .1072319 .3097944 0 1 
Student 401 .0972569 .2966774 0 1 
Housewife/Husband 401 .0374065 .1899928 0 1 
Other 401 .0473815 .212719 0 1 
Religious  397 .8161209 .3878744 0 1 
Smoker  399 .2631579 .4409002 0 1 
Cigarettes  396 3.222.222 7.578.775 0 50 
Consumer type 
Professional 400 .0225 .1484886 0 1 
Expert 400 .0325 .1775459 0 1 
Enthusiast 400 .3025 .4599158 0 1 
Curious 400 .555 .4975882 0 1 
Indifferent 400 .065 .2468346 0 1 
Nondrinker 400 .03 .1708009 0 1 
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Table 7.b - Descriptive Statistics (experiment 1) 
Variables Characteristics Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Meaning of acronyms Docg, Doc, Igt  386 .7331606 .4428818 0 1 
Meaning of Authoctonous  399 .7368421 .4409002 0 1 
Meaning of Terroir  395 .2151899 .4114752 0 1 
Habitual wine purchase place 
Hyper-supermarket 398 .459799 .4990085 0 1 
Restaurant 398 .1005025 .3010473 0 1 
Winery 398 .4045226 .4914172 0 1 
Wineshop 398 .2763819 .4477708 0 1 
Bar 398 .0653266 .2474123 0 1 
Other 398 .1030151 .3043612 0 1 
Wine consumption frequency 
Everyday 395 .235443 .4248135 0 1 
3/4 times a week 395 .3822785 .4865604 0 1 
Rarely 395 .3544304 .478947 0 1 
Never 395 .0278481 .1647462 0 1 
Type of wine habitually purchased 
Docg, Doc, Igt 394 .5964467 .4912336 0 1 
Common Table Wine in bottles 394 .3096447 .462935 0 1 
Igt in bulk 394 .2461929 .43134 0 1 
Common Table Wine in bulk 394 .1903553 .3930806 0 1 
Wine in cartoon or jerrycan 394 .0253807 .1574785 0 1 
Knowledge of Palizzi IGT  401 .2543641 .4360472 0 1 
Tasting experience of a Palizzi IGT wine  401 .1645885 .371272 0 1 
Perceived Quality Measures 
Rating 401 7.476.309 1.638.616 1 10 
WTP in restaurants 401 1.119.327 792.022 1 70 
WTP in hyper-supermarkets 401 6.958.155 5.132.351 .8 50 
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Table 7a - Descriptive Statistics (experiment 2) 
Variables Characteristics Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Terroir  389 .5655527 .511664 0 1 
Padua  389 .6478149 .4782664 0 1 
Female  389 .4010283 .4907379 0 1 
Age  389 3.700.514 1.389.968 13 83 
Age2  389 1.562.085 1.195.291 169 6889 
Foreigners   389 .0565553 .2312883 0 1 
Region of origin 
North 389 .5064267 .5006026 0 1 
Centre 389 .0102828 .1010112 0 1 
South 389 .4832905 .5003643 0 1 
Education 
Elementary School 389 .0308483 .1731293 0 1 
Middle School 389 .1208226 .3263408 0 1 
High School 389 .5218509 .5001656 0 1 
Degree 389 .3264781 .4695284 0 1 
Net (monthly household income in euro 
≥1200 389 .277635 .4484091 0 1 
between 1400 and 2500 389 .403599 .4912507 0 1 
≥3000 389 .3187661 .4665983 0 1 
Household size 
1 389 .1362468 .3434922 0 1 
2 389 .2082262 .4065624 0 1 
3 389 .2339332 .4238754 0 1 
4 389 .2802057 .449678 0 1 
5 389 .1182519 .323322 0 1 
5+ 389 .0231362 .1505298 0 1 
Married   386 .3860104 .4874648 0 1 
Occupational situation 
Full-time Job 389 .5167095 .5003643 0 1 
Part-time Job 389 .1285347 .3351152 0 1 
Unemployed 389 .066838 .2500629 0 1 
Out of the workforce 389 .0257069 .1584634 0 1 
Retired 389 .0539846 .2262783 0 1 
Student 389 .1105398 .3139653 0 1 
Housewife/Husband 389 .0205656 .1421074 0 1 
Other 388 .0747423 .2633146 0 1 
Religious  385 .8 .4005205 0 1 
Smoker  385 .2909091 .4547727 0 1 
Cigarettes   385 3.520.779 6.974.532 0 35 
Consumer type 
Professional 385 .0285714 .1668154 0 1 
Expert 385 .0285714 .1668154 0 1 
Enthusiast 385 .238961 .4270038 0 1 
Curious 385 .5896104 .4925445 0 1 
Indifferent 385 .0987013 .2986487 0 1 
Nondrinker 385 .0233766 .1512931 0 1 
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Table 7b - Descriptive Statistics (experiment 2) 
Variables Characteristics Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Meaning of acronyms Docg, Doc, Igt  376 .712766 .4530746 0 1 
Meaning of Authoctonous  383 .7101828 .4542709 0 1 
Meaning of Terroir   377 .1777188 .3827839 0 1 
Habitual wine purchase place 
Hyper-supermarket 383 .4438642 .4974887 0 1 
Restaurant 383 .1775457 .3826297 0 1 
Winery 383 .4020888 .490961 0 1 
Wineshop 383 .3185379 .4665187 0 1 
Bar 383 .078329 .26904 0 1 
Other 383 .0992167 .2993438 0 1 
Wine consumption frequency 
Everyday 383 .1879896 .3912149 0 1 
3/4 times a week 383 .4177546 .4938344 0 1 
Rarely 383 .381201 .4863171 0 1 
Never 383 .0130548 .113658 0 1 
Type of wine habitually purchased 
Docg, Doc, Igt 383 .6214099 .4856701 0 1 
Common Table Wine in 
bottles 
383 .2610966 .439807 0 1 
Igt in bulk 383 .1697128 .3758713 0 1 
Common Table Wine in bulk 383 .1749347 .3804082 0 1 
Wine in cartoon or jerrycan 383 .0234987 .2745225 0 5 
Knowledge of Palizzi IGT  389 .2390746 .4270676 0 1 
Tasting experience of a Palizzi IGT wine 389 .1285347 .3351152 0 1 
Perceived Quality Measures 
Rating 389 7.514.139 1.550.833 1 10 
WTP in restaurants 389 116.556 7.957.099 1 75 
WTP in hyper-supermarkets 389 7.611.748 7.482.988 0 100 
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Table 8 - Dependent variables, sample statistics by area and treatment (experiment 1) 
 
Variables Province Treatment Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
WTP in 
restaurant/ 
specialized shop 
Padua 
Control 64 8,875 5,409662 1 25 
Terroir 73 11,54178 6,461129 2 30 
Reggio Calabria 
Control 107 9,853271 6,003825 2 35 
Terroir 145 14,27021 9,881778 3 75 
WTP in hyper-
supermarket 
Padua 
Control 64 5,846875 3,816296 0 20 
Terroir 73 8,534247 9,698901 1,5 80 
Reggio Calabria 
Control 107 6,521402 4,255841 0 25 
Terroir 145 8,730897 8,954142 2 100 
Rating 
Padua 
Control 64 7,21875 1,740906 1 10 
Terroir 73 8,164384 1,518531 3 10 
Reggio Calabria 
Control 107 6,869159 1,473567 1 10 
Terroir 145 7,793103 1,327574 4 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 - Dependent variables, sample statistics by area and treatment (experiment 2) 
 
Variables Province Treatment Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
WTP in 
restaurant/ 
specialized shop 
Padua 
Control 83 10,33976 6,218833 2 35,5 
Terroir 87 11,76782 9,136847 2 70 
Reggio Calabria 
Control 111 8,95045 5,667673 1 35 
Terroir 120 13,44167 9,145689 3 65 
WTP in hyper-
supermarket 
Padua 
Control 83 6,086627 3,855622 1,5 23 
Terroir 87 7,870115 6,52703 1,9 50 
Reggio Calabria 
Control 111 5,590811 3,426149 0,8 20 
Terroir 120 8,164583 5,684131 1,5 30 
Rating 
Padua 
Control 83 7,373494 1,63581 3 10 
Terroir 87 8,666667 1,308884 5 10 
Reggio Calabria 
Control 111 6,801802 1,672341 2 10 
Terroir 120 7,308333 1,364593 1 10 
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Table 10 - Regressions of WTP in restaurants/specialized shops on terroir and controls (experiment 1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES WTP REST WTP REST WTP REST WTP REST WTP REST 
      
TERROIR 3.193*** 3.185*** 3.078*** 3.400*** 3.024*** 
 (0.766) (0.769) (0.748) (0.835) (0.857) 
PADUA  -0.633 -0.687 0.156  
  (0.797) (0.877) (1.154)  
CENTRE     1.432 
     (4.630) 
SOUTH     -2.034* 
     (1.062) 
      
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC 
CONTROLS 
NO YES YES YES YES 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
CONTROLS 
NO NO YES YES YES 
WINE-RELATED 
CONTROLS 
NO NO NO YES YES 
      
Observations 401 387 387 356 349 
      
Note: dependent variable is willingness to pay for one bottle of the tasted wine in restaurants and specialized shops. This table 
presents the estimated causal effect of the wine terroir on perceived quality, measured by WTP in restaurants and specialized 
shops. Column 2 includes the variable Padua (equal to 1 if the observation was collected in Padua) and socio-demographic 
controls (age, gender, education, nationality, region of origin, household size, religiosity, smoker, number of cigarettes smoked 
per day), except for the variables that control for the area (region) of origin, because of multicollinearity with the variable Padua; 
column 3 includes also socio-economic controls (net monthly household income, occupational situation); column 4 includes the 
“wine-related controls” (levels of knowledge of wine and interest in it: type of consumer, consumption habits, knowledge of 
acronyms, technical terms connected to this study and the appellation of origin being examined.), in order to control for the 
involvement level; column 5 excludes the variable Padua to control for the region of origin. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11 - Regressions of WTP in hyper-supermarkets on terroir and controls (experiment 1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES WTP 
HYPER 
WTP 
HYPER 
WTP 
HYPER 
WTP 
HYPER 
WTP 
HYPER 
      
TERROIR 2.238*** 2.335*** 2.312*** 2.530*** 2.323*** 
 (0.494) (0.511) (0.515) (0.545) (0.562) 
PADUA  -0.553 -0.483 -0.314  
  (0.553) (0.504) (0.736)  
CENTRE     -1.590 
     (1.419) 
SOUTH     -0.554 
     (0.667) 
      
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC 
CONTROLS 
NO YES YES YES YES 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
CONTROLS 
NO NO YES YES YES 
WINE-RELATED 
CONTROLS 
NO NO NO YES YES 
      
Observations 401 387 387 356 349 
      
Note: dependent variable is willingness to pay for one bottle of the tasted wine in hyper- supermarkets. This table presents the 
estimated causal effect of the wine terroir on perceived quality, measured by WTP in hyper- or supermarkets. Column 2 includes 
the variable Padua (equal to 1 if the observation was collected in Padua) and socio-demographic controls (age, gender, education, 
nationality, region of origin, household size, religiosity, smoker, number of cigarettes smoked per day), except for the variables 
that control for the area (region) of origin, because of multicollinearity with the variable Padua; column 3 includes also socio-
economic controls (net monthly household income, occupational situation); column 4 includes the “wine-related controls” (levels 
of knowledge of wine and interest in it: type of consumer, consumption habits, knowledge of acronyms, technical terms connected 
to this study and the appellation of origin being examined), in order to control for the involvement level; column 5 excludes the 
variable Padua to control for the region of origin. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12 - Regressions of rating on terroir and controls (experiment 1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES RATING RATING RATING RATING RATING 
      
TERROIR 0.833*** 0.736*** 0.730*** 0.820*** 0.739*** 
 (0.159) (0.156) (0.157) (0.175) (0.175) 
PADUA  -0.881*** -0.826*** -0.665***  
  (0.163) (0.184) (0.254)  
CENTRE     0.464 
     (0.509) 
SOUTH     0.146 
     (0.251) 
      
      
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC 
CONTROLS 
NO YES YES YES YES 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
CONTROLS 
NO NO YES YES YES 
WINE-RELATED 
CONTROLS 
NO NO NO YES YES 
      
Observations 401 387 387 356 349 
      
Note: dependent variable is global judgment about the quality of the tasted wine. This table presents the estimated causal effect of 
the wine terroir on perceived quality, measured by rating assigned to the wine on a 10-point scale. Column 2 includes the variable 
Padua (equal to 1 if the observation was collected in Padua) and socio-demographic controls (age, gender, education, nationality, 
region of origin, household size, religiosity, smoker, number of cigarettes smoked per day), except for the variables that control for 
the area (region) of origin, because of multicollinearity with the variable Padua; column 3 includes also socio-economic controls 
(net monthly household income, occupational situation); column 4 includes the “wine-related controls” (levels of knowledge of 
wine and interest in it: type of consumer, consumption habits, knowledge of acronyms, technical terms connected to this study and 
the appellation of origin being examined.), in order to control for the involvement level; column 5 excludes the variable Padua to 
control for the region of origin. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13 - Regressions of WTP in restaurants/specialized shops on terroir and controls (experiment 2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES WTP REST WTP REST WTP REST WTP REST WTP REST 
      
TERROIR 3.578*** 3.384*** 3.461*** 3.532*** 3.544*** 
 (0.766) (0.728) (0.750) (0.791) (0.789) 
PADUA  1.363* 1.032 0.702  
  (0.765) (0.801) (0.986)  
CENTRE     0.232 
     (5.156) 
SOUTH     -1.067 
     (1.066) 
      
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC 
CONTROLS 
NO YES YES YES YES 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
CONTROLS 
NO NO YES YES YES 
WINE RELATED 
CONTROLS 
NO NO NO YES YES 
      
Observations 389 383 382 356 356 
      
Note: dependent variable is willingness to pay for one bottle of the tasted wine in restaurants and specialized shops. This table 
presents the estimated causal effect of the wine terroir on perceived quality, measured by WTP in restaurants and specialized shops. 
Column 2 includes the variable Padua (equal to 1 if the observation was collected in Padua) and socio-demographic controls (age, 
gender, education, nationality, region of origin, household size, religiosity, smoker, number of cigarettes smoked per day), except 
for the variables that control for the area (region) of origin, because of multicollinearity with the variable Padua; column 3 includes 
also socio-economic controls (net monthly household income, occupational situation); column 4 includes the “wine-related 
controls” (levels of knowledge of wine and interest in it: type of consumer, consumption habits, knowledge of acronyms, technical 
terms connected to this study and the appellation of origin being examined), in order to control for the involvement level; column 
5 excludes the variable Padua to control for the region of origin. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Table 14 - Regressions of WTP in hyper-supermarkets on terroir and controls (experiment 2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES WTP 
HYPER 
WTP 
HYPER 
WTP 
HYPER 
WTP 
HYPER 
WTP 
HYPER 
      
TERROIR 2.229*** 2.187*** 2.275*** 2.260*** 2.176*** 
 (0.674) (0.662) (0.686) (0.750) (0.726) 
PADUA  -0.0985 -0.202 -1.125  
  (0.813) (0.747) (1.049)  
CENTRE     1.327 
     (3.154) 
SOUTH     -0.183 
     (0.864) 
      
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC 
CONTROLS 
NO YES YES YES YES 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
CONTROLS 
NO NO YES YES YES 
WINE RELATED 
CONTROLS 
NO NO NO YES YES 
      
Observations 389 383 382 356 356 
      
Note: dependent variable is willingness to pay for one bottle of the tasted wine in hyper- supermarkets. This table presents the 
estimated causal effect of the wine terroir on perceived quality, measured by WTP in hyper- or supermarkets. Column 2 includes 
the variable Padua (equal to 1 if the observation was collected in Padua) and socio-demographic controls (age, gender, education, 
nationality, region of origin, household size, religiosity, smoker, number of cigarettes smoked per day), except for the variables 
that control for the area (region) of origin, because of multicollinearity with the variable Padua; column 3 includes also socio-
economic controls (net monthly household income, occupational situation); column 4 includes the “wine-related controls” (levels 
of knowledge of wine and interest in it: type of consumer, consumption habits, knowledge of acronyms, technical terms connected 
to this study and the appellation of origin being examined), in order to control for the involvement level; column 5 excludes the 
variable Padua to control for the region of origin. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 15 - Regressions of rating on terroir and controls (experiment 2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES RATING RATING RATING RATING RATING 
      
TERROIR 0.895*** 0.895*** 0.946*** 0.949*** 0.937*** 
 (0.146) (0.141) (0.142) (0.154) (0.154) 
PADUA  -0.436*** -0.344** -0.118  
  (0.165) (0.174) (0.217)  
CENTRE     0.557 
     (0.913) 
SOUTH     -0.0728 
     (0.180) 
      
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC 
CONTROLS 
NO YES YES YES YES 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
CONTROLS 
NO NO YES YES YES 
WINE RELATED 
CONTROLS 
NO NO NO YES YES 
      
Observations 389 383 382 356 356 
      
Note: dependent variable is global judgment about the quality of the tasted wine. This table presents the estimated causal effect 
of the wine terroir on perceived quality, measured by rating assigned to the wine on a 10-point scale. Column 2 includes the 
variable Padua (equal to 1 if the observation was collected in Padua) and socio-demographic controls (age, gender, education, 
nationality, region of origin, household size, religiosity, smoker, number of cigarettes smoked per day), except for the variables 
that control for the area (region) of origin, because of multicollinearity with the variable Padua; column 3 includes also socio-
economic controls (net monthly household income, occupational situation); column 4 includes the “wine-related controls” (levels 
of knowledge of wine and interest in it: type of consumer, consumption habits, knowledge of acronyms, technical terms connected 
to this study and the appellation of origin being examined), in order to control for the involvement level; column 5 excludes the 
variable Padua to control for the region of origin. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 16 - Regressions of WTP in restaurants/specialized shops on terroir and controls (experiments1&2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES WTP REST WTP REST WTP REST WTP REST WTP REST WTP REST WTP REST 
        
TERROIR 3.401*** 3.313*** 3.294*** 3.337*** 3.209*** 3.338*** 3.200*** 
 (0.538) (0.522) (0.525) (0.552) (0.552) (0.551) (0.549) 
PADUA  0.376 0.230 0.504  0.507  
  (0.549) (0.576) (0.752)  (0.752)  
CENTRE     2.156  2.176 
     (3.258)  (3.261) 
SOUTH     -1.450*  -1.453* 
     (0.758)  (0.757) 
WAVE2      -0.0307 0.142 
      (0.627) (0.627) 
        
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC 
CONTROLS 
NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
CONTROLS 
NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
WINE RELATED 
CONTROLS 
NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
        
Observations 790 770 769 712 705 712 705 
        
Note: dependent variable is willingness to pay for one bottle of the tasted wine in restaurants and specialized shops. This table presents the estimated causal effect of the 
wine terroir on perceived quality, measured by WTP in restaurants and specialized shops. Column 2 includes the variable Padua (equal to 1 if the observation was 
collected in Padua) and socio-demographic controls (age, gender, education, nationality, region of origin, household size, religiosity, smoker, number of cigarettes 
smoked per day), except for the variables that control for the area (region) of origin, because of multicollinearity with the variable Padua; column 3 includes also socio-
economic controls (net monthly household income, occupational situation); column 4 includes the “wine-related controls” (levels of knowledge of wine and interest in 
it: type of consumer, consumption habits, knowledge of acronyms, technical terms connected to this study and the appellation of origin being examined), in order to 
control for the involvement level; column 5 excludes the variable Padua to control for the region of origin. Columns 6 and 7 add to columns 4 and 5, respectively, the 
Wave2 dummy. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 17 - Regressions of WTP in hyper-supermarkets on terroir and controls (experiments 1&2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES WTP 
HYPER 
WTP 
HYPER 
WTP 
HYPER 
WTP 
HYPER 
WTP 
HYPER 
WTP 
HYPER 
WTP 
HYPER 
        
TERROIR 2.259*** 2.264*** 2.277*** 2.380*** 2.288*** 2.351*** 2.256*** 
 (0.424) (0.430) (0.442) (0.446) (0.441) (0.440) (0.435) 
PADUA  -0.270 -0.193 -0.257  -0.308  
  (0.498) (0.431) (0.746)  (0.737)  
CENTRE     -0.877  -0.811 
     (1.450)  (1.415) 
SOUTH     -0.589  -0.600 
     (0.638)  (0.640) 
WAVE2      0.475 0.485 
      (0.566) (0.580) 
        
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC 
CONTROLS 
NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
CONTROLS 
NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
WINE RELATED 
CONTROLS 
NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
        
Observations 790 770 769 712 705 712 705 
        
Note: dependent variable is willingness to pay for one bottle of the tasted wine in hyper- supermarkets. This table presents the estimated causal effect of the wine terroir 
on perceived quality, measured by WTP in hyper- or supermarkets. Column 2 includes the variable Padua (equal to 1 if the observation was collected in Padua) and 
socio-demographic controls (age, gender, education, nationality, region of origin, household size, religiosity, smoker, number of cigarettes smoked per day), except for 
the variables that control for the area (region) of origin, because of multicollinearity with the variable Padua; column 3 includes also socio-economic controls (net 
monthly household income, occupational situation); column 4 includes the “wine-related controls” (levels of knowledge of wine and interest in it: type of consumer, 
consumption habits, knowledge of acronyms, technical terms connected to this study and the appellation of origin being examined), in order to control for the involvement 
level; column 5 excludes the variable Padua to control for the region of origin. Columns 6 and 7 add to columns 4 and 5, respectively, the Wave2 dummy. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 18 - Regressions of rating on terroir and controls (experiments 1&2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES RATING RATING RATING RATING RATING RATING RATING 
        
TERROIR 0.864*** 0.855*** 0.853*** 0.882*** 0.848*** 0.872*** 0.840*** 
 (0.108) (0.106) (0.106) (0.114) (0.114) (0.113) (0.114) 
PADUA  -0.689*** -0.616*** -0.413**  -0.431***  
  (0.117) (0.129) (0.165)  (0.166)  
CENTRE     0.402  0.418 
     (0.414)  (0.409) 
SOUTH     0.103  0.0999 
     (0.148)  (0.148) 
WAVE2      0.168 0.117 
      (0.118) (0.119) 
        
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC 
CONTROLS 
NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
CONTROLS 
NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
WINE RELATED 
CONTROLS 
NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
        
Observations 790 770 769 712 705 712 705 
        
Note: dependent variable is global judgment about the quality of the tasted wine. This table presents the estimated causal effect of the wine terroir on perceived quality, 
measured by rating assigned to the wine on a 10-point scale. Column 2 includes the variable Padua (equal to 1 if the observation was collected in Padua) and socio-
demographic controls (age, gender, education, nationality, region of origin, household size, religiosity, smoker, number of cigarettes smoked per day), except for the 
variables that control for the area (region) of origin, because of multicollinearity with the variable Padua; column 3 includes also socio-economic controls (net monthly 
household income, occupational situation); column 4 includes the “wine-related controls” (levels of knowledge of wine and interest in it: type of consumer, consumption 
habits, knowledge of acronyms, technical terms connected to this study and the appellation of origin being examined), in order to control for the involvement level; 
column 5 excludes the variable Padua to control for the region of origin. Columns 6 and 7 add to columns 4 and 5, respectively, the Wave2 dummy. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix  A 
Anonymous  Questionnaire 
 
 
ANONYMOUS QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Only people who are 18 and over can participate in this experiment 
 
The aim of the research in question is to carry out a scientific research concerning the perception of wine 
quality for my thesis. 
The compilation of this questionnaire will only take a few minutes. Please read the text carefully, follow 
the instructions and answer the questions in the order in which they are presented. Data received in the 
questionnaire are gathered in a strictly anonymous way and they will be used only for scientific research 
purposes. I will try not to take away too much of your time. 
  
Date __/__/____ 
Time __:__ 
 
PHASE 1 – Socio-demographic information 
 
1) Sex: □  Male   □ Female  
2) Age: ________ 
 
3) Title of study: 
     □ Elementary School Diploma □ High School Diploma 
     □ Middle School Diploma □ University Degree and related 
4) Nationality __________ 
 
Please, answer question 5) only if your answer to the previous question was “Italian” or you have Italian 
residency. 
 
5) What is your region of origin? _________________ 
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6) Please, indicate which figure is closest to the net monthly income of your family (sum up the total of 
income from all the members of the family). I remind you that this test is absolutely anonymous and the 
data given will only be used for scientific research. (Just one answer) 
 
□ less than 800 euro □ 2.000 euro 
□ 800 euro □ 2.500 euro 
□ 1000 euro □ 3.000 euro 
□ 1.200 euro                                                    □ 4.000 euro 
□ 1.400 euro □ 5.000 euro 
□ 1.600 euro □ more than 5.000 euro 
□ 1.800 euro 
 
7) How many people are there in your family, including yourself? 
□ single □ 4 
□ 2 □ 5 
□ 3 □ more than 5 
 
8) Are you married? □ Yes    □ No 
 
9) Indicate your professional condition: 
 □ Full-time employee 
 □ Unemployed (in search of/awaiting employment) 
 □ Not in search of employment 
 □ Retired 
 □ Student 
 □ Housewife (homemaker) 
 □ Other 
 
Please, answer questions 10) and 11) only if you are employed 
 
10) How is your work contract qualified? 
 □ Self-employed 
 □ Dependent 
 
11) What type of contract have you got? 
 □ Permanent  
 □ Temporary 
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12) Are you religious? □ Yes □ No 
 
13) Are you practicing?  □ Yes □ No 
 
14) Do you smoke? □ Yes □ No 
 
15) How many cigarettes do you smoke a day? ________ 
 
16) Based on your knowledge of wine, how would you describe yourself as a consumer? 
□ Professional (working professionally in this sector) 
□ Expert (you have a good knowledge of wine and you are a part of the sector) 
□ Enthusiast (you buy and taste wine often and you participate in wine events) 
□ Curious (occasional consumption) 
□ Indifferent 
□ Non-drinker 
 
- Information concerning the knowledge of wines and consumption habits 
17) Do you know the meaning of the acronyms DOCG, DOC or IGT? □ Yes  □ No 
 
18) Do you know the meaning of autochthonous? □ Yes  □ No 
 
19) Do you know what “terroir” is? □ Yes  □ No 
 
20) Where do you normally purchase wine? 
 □ In hyper/supermarkets  □ In restaurants 
 □ In wine shops □ At wineries 
 □ In bars □ Other 
 
21) How often do you drink wine? (tick one box only) 
 □ Every day □ Rarely 
 □ 3-4 times a week □ Never 
 
22) Which of the following types of wine do you normally buy? (two boxes are allowed) 
    □ DOCG, DOC or IGT bottled wine  
    □ Common bottled table wine 
 □ IGT wine in bulk (from the producer) 
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 □ Common table wine in bulk (from the producer) 
 □ Wine in carton or jerry can 
 
PHASE 2 – Please, taste the wine that you have been offered and then answer the questions in PHASE 3 
 
PHASE 3 – Please, answer the following questions 
 
23) Give a mark from 1 to 10 about the wine you have tasted, expressing a judgment on the sensorial 
attributes indicated below, where 1 is the lowest and 10 is the highest. 
 
a) Color 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
b) Nose 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
c) Palate 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
24) Give a mark from 1 to 10 about the wine you have tasted, expressing a global judgment on the 
pleasantness/quality, where 1 is the lowest and 10 is the highest. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
25) What price (in euro) would you be willing to pay approximately for one bottle of the wine you have 
just tasted in a restaurant/specialized shop? _____________ 
 
26) What price (in euro) would you be willing to pay for one bottle of the wine you have just tasted in a 
hyper-supermarket? _______________ 
 
27) Have you ever heard of Palizzi IGT? □ Yes  □ No 
 
28) If yes, have you ever tasted a Palizzi IGT red wine? □ Yes   □ No 
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Appellation of Origin 
Terroir Information 
Technical Cards 
 
 
 
Experimental Treatment: experiments 1&2 
 
 
 
 
RED PALIZZI IGT  
The wine that you are going to taste is a Palizzi IGT red wine, produced in Palizzi in the province of Reggio 
Calabria: a territory highly suited to the production of quality wines. 
The vineyards use the technique of espalier and “alberello”, which is a typical growing system in Palizzi, 
and are found at 500 m above sea level. They are not far from the coast, they are characterized by a discrete 
slope and face southwards.   
The climate is Mediterranean, subtype: warm with hot summers. The autochthonous cultivations are: 
Calabrese Nero, Nerello Cappuccio and Castiglione. 
The cultivation interventions are carried out mainly by hand, as is the harvest. 
Winemaking in cellars includes a gentle rasping, long maceration and fermentation at a controlled 
temperature, soft pressing, alcoholic fermentation, malolactic fermentation, aging in small barrels for 10 
months; bottling and, finally, aging in bottles for 5 months.  
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Control Treatment: experiment 2 
 
 
 
 
RED PALIZZI IGT  
The wine that you are going to taste is a Palizzi IGT red wine, produced by a family winery, which use 
grapes coming both from owned and rented vineyards. The winery produces nine wines, among which four 
reds. 
This bottle has to be opened 30 minutes before tasting. Ideal service temperature: 18°C. 
It has to be tasted in wine glasses with slightly tall and narrow opening. Bottling is mechanical: 
replenishment, corking and labelling. Bottles used for this wine have this shape (see picture). This wine 
was bottled in 2014. It has to be stored in a clean, dark place, at a temperature between 12 and 16°C and 
constant humidity at around 75%, positioning the bottles horizontally. 
This wine is packed in six bottle wine cases. 
  
Appellation of Origin  
 ‘Neutral’ Information 
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Appendix  B 
  
Criteria for exclusion from the observations  
The questionnaire observations were excluded if: 
- at least one of the answers concerning dependent variables missed; 
- the net monthly household income was omitted (as it is considered to be a relevant control); 
- the day and/or time was not registered, jeopardizing the possibility of determining where and 
when the experiment was carried out and the condition to which the respondent had been 
randomly assigned; 
 
Registration of observations 
The accepted observations were listed onto an Excel worksheet and then imported into the Stata 
Data Editor. 
Missing answers were recorded by leaving the box empty. Missing values in the question on the 
number of cigarettes smoked per day were indicated with a “0”. 
Some respondents indicated a range (instead of an exact figure) of the number of cigarettes they 
smoked per day and their willingness to pay. In this case, we used the average. 
Questions regarding nationality and the region of origin are open (see Appendix  A). Initially the 
answers to these questions were registered by using the Istat code for both the nations and the 
Italian regions. Afterwards, dummy variables were created. As far as the nations are concerned, 
given the small number of foreigners in the sample, a dummy (“Foreigner”) was created and takes 
the value of 1 if the respondent is a foreigner and 0 otherwise. The Italian regions were grouped 
into North, Centre and South. 
The answers concerning the net monthly family income were grouped into three ranges: “less than 
1200”, “between 1400 and 2500” and “more than 3000”. 
 
Criterion for variables exclusion 
Variables with at least 10 missing observations were excluded, with the exception of the variable 
that garners the effect of being married and the one that takes value 1 if the respondent knows the 
meaning of the acronyms DOCG, DOC, IGT, 0 otherwise, as they are considered relevant for this 
study.  
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According to this criterion, the dummy variable which captures the effect of practicing a religion 
and those regarding job contracts (self-employed/dependent, permanent/temporary) were 
excluded. 
 
Experiment Instruments (Setup) 
As has been highlighted before, the experiments were carried out within three shopping malls with 
hypermarkets. 
The set-up included a tasting table, covered by a white tablecloth, which was positioned near the 
cash registers of the hypermarket (outside the hypermarket), and a banner, which serves to signal 
our presence and gave greater credibility to our initiative (the logo of Padua University and the 
Department of Economics and Management and the name of the experimenter were reported). 
On the table were placed: the bottle of wine (which stayed wrapped in foil and was sealed with 
plugs after every use), the wine glasses15, the questionnaires, a spit bucket, used to rinse16 the 
glasses and for those who did not wish to swallow the wine, and a Plexiglas ballot box in which to 
put the completed and folded questionnaires. The ballot box was used to guarantee further 
anonymity.  
During the experiments the experimenter used mono-use sterile latex gloves for hygienic reasons. 
 
                                                     
15 The glasses used were made of transparent glass. 
16 All of the glasses were rinsed in wine at the time of tasting to eliminate any possible odor absorbed from the environment.  
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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to provide empirical evidence of the economic consequences due to the presence 
of firms connected with mafia-type criminal organizations located in developed areas. In particular, we 
verify for the first time how these criminal firms affect non-criminal competitors’ performance and we 
investigate the negative externalities that they inflict by using firm-level data. Our empirical analysis 
exploits exogenous shocks imposed by operations against Mafia (from 2008 to 2011) at municipality level 
to implement a difference-in-difference strategy that compares the change in performance of non-criminal 
firms with the change in performance of a control group of (non-criminal) firms that operate in either an 
industry or a municipality that have not been affected by these police operations. The underlying idea is 
that these operations ‘clean’ the industries and the municipalities where the targeted criminal firms operate, 
with a consequent beneficial effect on non-criminal competitors located in the geographical proximity. 
Results suggest that treated competitors experience a statistically significant and sizeable increase in 
EBITDA/Total Assets and ROA after the operation, with respect to comparison groups that have not been 
exposed to this shock. Further explorations permit us to verify that this positive effect is not merely due to 
a decrease in the industry size after the operations. Organized crime and criminal firms bring inefficiencies 
in the institutional and business environment that cause many distortions, such as in the access to 
procurement markets, especially for smaller firms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Authors are listed alphabetically 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to provide empirical evidence of the economic consequences of organized 
crime in developed areas, by investigating the negative externalities due to the presence of firms 
connected with mafia-type criminal organizations (from now on 'criminal firms') on legal firms. 
Economic analysis has directed attention to the strong relationship between the quality of the 
institutional environment, economic performance and growth (e.g. Pinotti, 2015a; Daniele and 
Marani, 2015; Gries and Ha, 2014; De Clercq et al., 2010; Dal Bo et al., 2006; Acemoglu et al., 
2005; Sachs and Warner, 1997). In this respect, crime, mainly organized crime, represents one of 
the most prominent dimensions related to the health of an institutional context (Daniele and 
Marani, 2015) affecting economic outcomes.  
During last decades organized crime has developed into a worldwide, widespread phenomenon 
that entails deep economic and social consequences, producing direct – i.e. racketeering – and 
indirect – undermining the institutional system - effects (Albanese and Marinelli, 2013). In such a 
context, empirical explorations of the costs that organized crime imposes on economic systems, 
by endangering business environments, are becoming always more urgent and important. 
Organized crime is traditionally described as an important obstacle to the economic development 
of Southern Italy, Latin American countries and former communist republics (e.g. Pinotti, 2011), 
areas that share two main features: poor economic performance and weak state enforcement. The 
presence of organized crime is usually related to these two conditions (Buonanno et al., 2015) and 
they are linked by spurious causal relationship (causality goes in both directions). On the one hand, 
criminal organizations seem to find ‘fertile ground’ in poorest areas with a weak institutional 
environment. On the other one, this presence has detrimental effects both in the short term, by 
harming the stock of physical and human capital, and in the long run, undermining the growth 
potential of the economy, by increasing the uncertainty and riskiness of business and political 
environments (Pinotti, 2015a; Daniele and Geys, 2015). 
The social and economic consequences due to criminal organizations arise from a broad  range of 
illegal activities committed by criminal organizations, such as supplying illicit goods and services 
to different consumers, practicing extortion and other predatory activities against other individuals 
and, finally, offering private protection in those areas where law enforcement is low (Pinotti, 
2015b).  
Criminal organizations are characterized by two distinctive features that make them a recognizable 
and sizeable phenomenon:  
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(a) the use of violence, as core business, to guarantee strong control and power on legal and illegal 
markets and extract rent from other agents in the economy (Schelling, 1971 - see Pinotti, 2015b);  
(b) the nature of organization; like large corporations, they are able to exploit a huge amount of 
resources to maintain their (criminal) enterprise, conduct more complex illicit activities and 
expand their business on a larger scale (Pinotti, 2015a). Pinotti (2015a) report that, according to 
the United Nations (2011), the 1.5% of global GDP ($1.6 trillion) derive from the profits of 
transnational organized crime and they correspond to about 70% of all criminal earnings. 
These characteristics help in understanding why for example mafia-type organizations are 
becoming more and more powerful, leaving their traditional and distinctive configuration (exerting 
territorial control, providing protection ‘services’: power syndicate 1 ) to acquire a more 
entrepreneurial identity2 , mainly in those areas where their expansion is more recent, as in 
Northern and Central Italy (Albanese and Marinelli, 2013).   
In last decades, this development has been recognized in existing literature and anecdotal evidence 
pointed out that mafia-type criminal organizations use apparently “clean” firms to enlarge the 
power of criminal organizations and launder money. 
However, there is scant literature analyzing the effects of firms connected with criminal 
organizations. Particularly, it is far from being clear whether the presence of criminal connected 
firms harms competitors located in the same geographical area. On one side, a criminal connected 
firm may use the criminal resources to spoil competitions and increase economic wealth and 
power. At the opposite, criminal connected firms supporting criminal organizations in laundering 
money may prefer to be unnoticed. It is unclear and unexplored whether criminal connected 
companies contribute to shape an institutional environment that has negative impact on 
competitors located in the same geographical area. Therefore this paper tries to answer the 
following questions: how do corporate criminal connections affect competitors’ performance? 
What are the negative externalities that corporate criminal connections impose on competitors?  
We answer to these questions by using firm-level data and we exploit exogenous shocks imposed 
by operations against mafia (from 2008 to 2011) in central and northern Italy at municipality level 
to implement a difference-in-difference strategy that explores the effects of corporate criminal 
connections on non-criminal competitors. The underlying idea is that these operations ‘clean’ the 
municipalities and the industries where the targeted criminal firms operate, with a consequent 
beneficial effect on non-criminal competitors. In order to detect non-criminal competitors, we 
started from the identification of investigative and judicial operations and criminal firms. 
                                                          
1 Sciarrone (2009); Asmundo (2011). 
2 Financial Times published an article about mafia gains in 2009: mafia business experienced an increase by 3.7% in 
turnover terms, while Italian GDP fell by 5%. 
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Afterwards, we track in the whole universe of non-criminal firms in northern and central Italy 
those that operate in municipalities that have been interested by one operation between 2008 and 
2011 and in the same industry of criminal ones. We compare our 'treated' firms with a benchmark 
of non-criminal firms operating in 'treated' municipalities but in different industries. Then we 
identify an alternative comparison group, which is composed by firms operating in ‘never-treated’ 
municipalities, but in the same industry of criminal and treated non-criminal firms. Additional 
analyses support our hypothesis and demonstrate the robustness of our results. 
We concentrate our attention on Italy, a country where some of the largest mafia-like organizations 
('Ndrangheta, Cosa Nostra and Camorra) operate (Barone and Narciso, 2012). Italy is a perfect 
setting to study the effect of criminal firms for the following reasons: 1) the Italian Penal Code 
regulates specifically mafia-related crimes and this permits us to identify unambiguously criminal 
firms connected to mafia; 2) Mafia-like organizations born in south of Italy, but in the last 30 years 
they expanded their activities capturing or establishing legal firms even in the central and northern 
part of the country. However, the presence of organized crime in this area is less pervasive than in 
southern regions: this helps us to identify more easily non-criminal competitors and explore the 
effects on their economic performance of criminal connections.  
Even though focusing the analysis on a specific country may undermine the external validity of 
our findings, one should keep in mind that Italian mafia represents the ‘prototype’ for other 
criminal organizations in other countries (Pinotti, 2015a) and then our results could offer 
interesting insights about criminal organizations at global level.  
Main results of our study show that those non-criminal firms that benefit from police and judicial 
operations targeting their criminal competitors exhibit a sizeable and statistically significant 
increase in their performance after this shock, with respect to the benchmark groups. Further 
analyses demonstrate that this result is not a mere effect of experiencing a lower competition, but 
the consequence of a more efficient and less distortive business environment. From this work we 
learn that the presence of criminal firms in a given area inflicts costs on non-criminal competitors.  
This paper enriches weak current knowledge on the relationship between institutional environment 
and firm performance. More specifically, it clarifies the microeconomic consequences of 
organized crime, intended as an entity contributing to shape a poor institutional context. Even 
though research on the economic consequences of organized crime has arisen the interest of 
economists, economic analysis from an empirical perspective has been largely neglected. Up to 
now, existing economic and social research has mainly focused on macro dimensions, while 
research at micro level is still less developed. In particular little is known about the relationship 
between organized crime and measures of economic outcomes, and even less about the 
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mechanisms and channels through which it affects performance at a micro level. Focusing on the 
effects on non-criminal firms could provide the missing evidence on how organized crime 
introduces inefficiencies into institutional environment and competitive markets. 
This study is structured as follows. In the following section we report a review of the theoretical 
background and we formulate our hypothesis. Then we describe the empirical strategy, and present 
our main results and robustness checks. The final section concludes. 
 
2. Background and Conceptual Framework  
The first economic explorations of organized crime date back to the seminal papers of Becker, 
(1968) Schelling (1971) and Ehrlich (1973).  
Following those studies, empirical literature on the economics of crime has focused on the estimate 
of the costs of organized crime through different methods (Soares, 2009) and it has little explored 
the relationship between organized crime and quality of the institutional context in both directions.  
A stream of research explores the origins of organized crime. They are largely associated to 
relative endowment of natural resources (resource curse) and weak institutional environment in 
Sicily (Gambetta, 1993; Skaperdas, 2001; Bandiera, 2003; Dimico et al., 2012; Konrad and 
Skaperdas, 2012; Buonanno et al., 2015) and Russia (Frye and Zhuravskaya, 2000). More 
specifically Dell (2011) assesses the effects of law enforcement on drug-trade related violence and 
routes. The findings suggest that organized crime emerges and develops in those areas where it 
responds to society's needs that are not satisfied by formal institutions (Pinotti, 2015a). Public 
spending represents a big piece of the story, as the presence  of weak institutions allows the spread 
of organized crime (and no other kinds of violent crimes) to be predicted by the increase in public 
spending (Gennaioli and Onorato, 2010).  
A second stream of research looks at poor economic performance, along different outcomes, as 
the result of unfavorable institutional environment originated by the presence of organized crime. 
Large evidence exists on the effects of organized crime on government efficiency (Godson and 
Williams, 1998; Allum and Siebert, 2003), money laundering (Schneider, 2010), and economic 
development and productivity through different channels (e.g. Felli and Fria, 1999; Tullio and 
Quarella, 1999; Felli and Fria, 2000; Peri, 2004; Centorrino and Ofria, 2008; Barone and Narciso, 
2015; Pinotti, 2015a).  
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The main idea is that the activity of organized crime imposes negative externalities, as it 
contributes to worsen the institutional environment, which, in turns, represents a source of 
inefficiencies and of low productivity growth (Felli and Tria, 2000).  
Peri (2004) shows the existence of a strong relationship between organized crime (proxied by 
murder rate) and low economic development, even after controlling for other economic and 
geographic dimensions. The presence of criminal organizations makes markets less transparent as 
they operate through apparently clean (legal) firms in order to have access to more, even public, 
resources with the use of violence rather than because of higher competitiveness (Felli and Fria, 
1999). Organized crime is found to divert the allocation of public subsidies to business at 
municipality level (Barone and Narciso, 2015): the presence of criminal organizations enhances 
the probability of obtaining funding and the relative amounts of public funds and it leads to 
episodes of corruption in the public administration. Explorations of the joint effect of organized 
crime and government expenditures on Southern Italy convergence demonstrate that the latter 
increases the financial strength of organized crime and its control over the territory, with strong 
negative consequences on GDP per capita and growth rate (Tullio and Quarella, 1999). Pinotti 
(2015a) demonstrates that the impact on GDP per capita reflects a net economic loss due to the 
replacement of private capital with less productive public investments, rather than a reallocation 
of activity from the official to the unofficial sector, arguing that this 'finding is consistent with 
theoretical models of political capture, in which criminal organizations secure profit opportunities 
with the public sector by either threatening or corrupting politicians' (p. F172). In this regard, 
other studies concern specifically, the relation with the political environment, as a measure of the 
institutional quality. It is found that, for the period 1946-1992 in Sicily, organized crime negatively 
affects electoral competitions, by 'supporting' those political parties that secure mafia services in 
exchange of economic advantage for their activities in the construction industry (De Feo and De 
Luca, 2013). This study points out that the strongest party is the one more willing to pay for mafia 
services and that the higher the political competition and the efficiency of the mafia, the larger the 
volume of electoral trade. Consequently, negative effects are found on the quality of the political 
class (Pinotti, 2013; Daniele and Geys, 2015). Indeed corruption and crime are found to be 
systematically related across countries, but criminal organizations may exercise control over 
politicians' decisions also through means of threat (Pinotti, 2005a). 
Negative effects on labor productivity are identified in southern Italy regions mainly in the 
building sector, one of the most infiltrated by Italian mafia, and with some approximations also in 
other industries, such as:  agriculture, forestry and fisheries; trade; hotels and restaurants; 
transports and communications; manufacturing (Centorrino and Ofria, 2008).  
53 
Another channel through which crime contributes to worsen the institutional environment and 
economic outcomes is the labor market, with a lower employment rate identified in regions mostly 
ridden by mafia (Tullio and Quarella, 1999). Furthermore, signals of unfavorable socio-
institutional environment, which derive from high level of some crimes (such as organized crime), 
represent a strong deterrent for foreign direct investments and economic development (Daniele 
and Marani, 2011).  
At a more micro level, Albanese and Marinelli (2013) estimate production function over a stratified 
sample of Italian firms and they find a negative effect on their productivity. In another study 
(Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2009), organized crime is found to influence access to credit and evidence is 
brought on the effects on bank loans pricing: crime-related risk turns out to impact on the cost of 
short-term credit and to increase the demand for collateral. 
Recently a study of the Bank of Italy (Donato et al., 2013) investigates the relationship between 
sequestrated and confiscated firms and the bank system. They find that after this legal measure, 
firms are not penalized under the credit profile with respect to other firms operating within the 
same industry, same geographical areas or exhibiting similar mode of governance.  
Finally, Matrobuoni (2015) analyzes the economic value of criminal network connections inside 
the American-Italian ‘Cosa Nostra’, between the 50s and 60s, and uses this particular setting to 
point out the importance of networks for economic success. 
As we can easily observe, up to this point scholars focused more on the macroeconomic 
consequences of organized crime, while few studies attempted to assess at a micro level the costs 
imposed on socio-economic systems, in terms of poor institutional environment and economic 
performance.   
 
2.1. Hypothesis 
Organized crime is largely found to influence the quality of institutions (e.g. Centorrino and Ofria, 
2008; Peri, 2004; Pinotti, 2015a).  
The presence of cartels imposed by criminal organizations may represent a source of negative 
externalities, as they undermine the economic activities of non-criminal firms and, at the same 
time, they bring inefficiencies as they do not have to respond to competition pressures (Felli and 
Tria, 2000). Furthermore, they are capable to divert public resources (Barone and Narciso, 2015) 
with the use of violence and by systematically resorting to corruption. Such an institutional 
environment represents a source of low productivity growth.  
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Overall effects on local economic and noneconomic systems of the pervasiveness of organize 
crime damage directly all the firms, regardless of their size and sector (Albanese and Marinelli, 
2013). 
Starting from these considerations, we develop the following hypothesis.  
Hp: Criminal firms negatively affect the performance of non-criminal competitors. 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1. Identifying criminal firms 
To empirically investigate our research question, we construct an innovative and hand-collected 
dataset on firms connected to mafia-type organizations.  
Since, it is not possible to recognize and observe criminal firms until investigation activities and 
legal procedures unmask them, we identify ex post our sample by relying on official investigative 
reports and trials’ sentences.  
Although the presence of firms connected with a criminal organization is a worldwide 
phenomenon, we focus on Italy (in particular, northern and central Italy) for several reasons. First, 
some of the largest mafia-like organizations, such as Cosa Nostra, 'Ndrangheta, and Camorra, 
operate in this country and their presence is particularly accentuated. According to the Italian 
national agency for the administration of assets confiscated to the organized crime (ANBSC), in 
December 2012 Italy counted more than 1,700 firms confiscated to the Mafia or other mafia-like 
organizations. This sizable number is due to the huge investments that Mafia has been making in 
Italian firms to launder the enormous financial liquidity it accumulates from drug trafficking and 
extortion rackets, and to increase their power. For this reason, these criminal organizations are 
heavily contaminating the economy by entering legitimate businesses. Second, central and 
northern part of Italy is an economically developed area where mafia-type organizations 
systematically infiltrate apparently legal firms. This feature is particularly relevant because it 
allows us to estimate Mafia's impact on microeconomic outcomes in a relatively rich area and, at 
the same time, to deal with type I error, as we clarify later in this section. Third, another essential 
aspect of this research setting, that greatly improves our ability of identifying criminal firms, is the 
presence of a specific crime for individuals which are part of Mafia-type organizations. As 
explained below, the possibility of identifying from public sources those individuals convicted 
because they were part of a Mafia-type organization is an essential feature of our research strategy. 
Lastly, focusing our analysis on Italy does not undermine the external validity of our findings, as 
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Italian mafia represents the ‘prototype’ for (other) criminal organizations in other countries 
(Pinotti, 2015a) and for this reason it is the most explored setting in the academic literature on 
organized crime. 
The criteria we set up to identify criminal firms in our sample are in line with the definition of 
politically connected firms (Faccio, 2006). In particular, we define a firm as criminal if either: (i) 
it has been confiscated or sequestrated by Italian authorities because of connections with mafia-
type organizations; (ii) a person convicted because of connections with mafia-type organizations 
sits on the board of directors; (iii) a person convicted because of connections with mafia-type 
organizations is a large shareholder; (iv) it is a subsidiary or parent company of a criminal firm. 
In order to track our sample of criminal firms, we proceeded in a systematic way using official 
sources of information and moving from the major operations against mafia. 
We started by analyzing the investigative and judicial operations in northern and central Italy 
against Mafia for the period 2005-2014. We decide to exclude previous operations for two main 
reasons: (a) information about the operations and financial data of firms are not easily available 
before 2004; (b) data older than 10 years cannot be straightly comparable to more recent ones, and 
this condition would undermine the ceteris paribus condition and the strength of this study’s policy 
implications. The sources we drew on to retrieve investigative and judicial operations were mainly 
reports of anti-mafia commissions of the Italian Parliament; web sites of anti-mafia organizations; 
national and international press; books dealing with mafia-linked topics. We drop operations for 
which the first instance trial has not been concluded and, overall, we identified and analyzed 120 
official investigations over the period 2005-2014. From these official documents, we gathered data 
(full name, date and place of birth, address) of all people convicted because of connections to 
mafia organizations. We subsequently excluded those individuals who have been found innocent 
at second or third instances. On the whole, we retrieved information for 1,567 individuals.  
After we obtained demographic information of people convicted because of connections with 
Mafia-type organizations, we searched them in the database Telemaco, which collects financial 
and governance information from the Italian Chambers of Commerce on the universe of all Italian 
firms. This procedure allowed us to identify all limited companies in which a person convicted 
because of connections with Mafia-type organizations sits in the board of directors and/or is a large 
shareholder3. Once, we obtained our sample of criminal firms, by using the database Aida, offered 
through Bureau Van Dijk, we retrieved financial data for these firms for their full infiltration 
period, which spans from the date in which the person convicted because of connections with 
                                                          
3 An interesting finding of this search was that around 25% of the convicted subjects were shareholders, managers 
and entrepreneurs in Italian limited companies. 
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Mafia-type organizations started her position as director in the company (or became a shareholder) 
until the investigative activity unmasked the criminal firm (or the individual left her position as 
director or shareholders in the company). Since the database Aida only provides financial data on 
Italian limited companies starting from 2005, this is the first year in which we observe a criminal 
firm. We hand-collected financial data from Telemaco if they were not available in Aida. The final 
sample is composed by 2,412 firm-year observations generated from 597 unique criminal limited 
companies located in Northern-Central Italy. 
It is important to clarify that the procedure to identify criminal firms is designed to minimize both 
type I and II errors. In our setting, type I error refers to the possibility of identifying as criminal 
firms that actually are not. To deal with this problem, the identification of criminal companies is 
based on official rulings issued by Italian Courts and not on noisy proxies, such as press reports or 
rumours. In contrast, type II error consists in considering as non-criminal firms that are actually 
criminal and not yet unmasked by Italian authorities. In order to cope with this problem, we restrict 
the analysis on central and northern Italy, as in these areas mafia expansion is more recent and its 
presence is less pervasive. To appreciate the difference between Northern-Central Italy and 
Southern Italy in this regard, one could consider that, putting equal to 1 an index of the average 
presence of Mafia-type organizations in Italy, this index is equals to 0.17 (2.52) for the Northern-
Central (Southern) Italian Provinces (Asmundo, 2013). Furthermore, Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the 
geographical distribution across Italian provinces of organized crime measured with alternative 
dimensions. 
 
<< Insert Figures 1, 2 and 3 about here>> 
 
3.2. Difference-in-difference Approach 
In our empirical analysis, we do not directly compare the performance of criminal and non-
criminal firms to examine the effect of the presence of criminal firms on competitors' performance, 
because endogeneity concerns would not allow us to draw any causal inference from our results. 
Indeed, Mafia's decision to leak in certain companies instead of others is entirely endogenous, and 
unobservable characteristics that induce Mafia-type organizations to choose the target firms could 
determine observed differences in the performance of criminal and non-criminal companies. In 
contrast, we use as natural experiment the exogenous shock provided by police operations that in 
a specific year unmasked criminal firms and therefore eliminate from a given area and industry 
the presence of firms linked to criminal organizations. If our hypothesis holds true, we should 
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observe that after such police operations, the performance of non-criminal competitors improve. 
In order to identify the effect of the presence of criminal firms, we employ a difference-in-
difference approach in which we compare the change in performance of non-criminal firms with 
the change in performance of a control group of firms that are not affected by the police operation. 
In the following, we first describe how we identify the treated firms (i.e. the non-criminal 
competitors) and second we discuss how we define the control group. Finally, we present our 
regression model and robustness checks. 
 
3.2.1. Treated firms 
For each criminal firm we have available the following information: i) the geographical area and 
the industry in which it operates; ii) the year in which it has been targeted/detected by the police 
operation; iii) the infiltration period. Using these pieces of information, we could identify all 
companies in the same geographical area and industry of at least one criminal company, while they 
were actually criminal (infiltrated). We outline the geographical areas in terms of municipalities 
and consider the two-digit industry code to define the industry. This group of companies represents 
our treatment group, which is non-criminal companies operating in the same geographical area 
and industry than a criminal one and that at a certain point in time have experienced the elimination 
of a criminal competitor. To improve our identification strategy we imposed the following 
requirements: 
- We considered only police operations that took place from 2008 until 2011, in order to 
observe our sample for at least three years before and after the shock. All the firms 
operating in municipalities that have been affected by a police operation in years 2005-
2007 and 2012-2014 were excluded from the analysis.  
- We deleted companies operating in municipalities targeted/shocked by more than one 
operation over our sample period, as in these cases it is not possible to uniquely identify a 
pre- and post- infiltration period. 
This sample selection procedure resulted in 29,758 treated observations over the period 2005-2014 
generated from 5,998 unique firms. 
 
3.2.2. Control group 
In our empirical strategy, we use a difference in difference approach in which we compare the 
change in performance of non-criminal competitors after the police operation with the change in 
performance of a group of companies not affected by such police operation. In our main analyses, 
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we use as control group all the firms operating in the same municipality but in different industries 
than the treated ones. In other words, we compare the change in performance of non-criminal 
competitors with the change in performance of non-criminal non-competitor companies that 
operate exactly in the same geographical area. This choice allows us to keep constant the 
(geographical) institutional environment in which treated and control firms are, thereby reducing 
the probability that other unobservable factors drive our results. It is important to notice that we 
are testing our research hypothesis in a conservative setting: indeed, the removal of criminal firms 
might positively affect not only non-criminal competitors but also all non-criminal firms that 
operate in a given geographical area, regardless of the industry, because of positive spillover 
effects.  If this is true, it is more difficult to find a result on the treated firms. In additional analyses, 
we verify whether our results are robust to using a different control group. 
This sample selection procedure resulted in 150,714 control observations over the period 2005-
2014 generated from 31,119 unique firms. Since in additional analyses we focus on the effect of 
criminal firms on procurement costs, we excluded from the analysis firms with a ratio of raw 
material to total assets above 100%4.  
 
3.2.3. Regression model 
The following regression model is used to investigate the effect of the presence of criminal firms 
on non-criminal competitors' performance (firm and year subscripts   omitted): 
 
Performance = β0 + β1 Post + β2 Competitors + β3 Competitors*Post + ∑ Controls + ∑ Year Fixed 
Effects + ∑ Industry Fixed Effects + ∑ Municipality Fixed Effects + ε                (1) 
 
In the above model, Performance is computed as firm’s EBITDA standardized by total assets 
measuring the firm’s operating performance. We choose EBITDA because it is not affected by 
firms’ accounting policies in terms of depreciation and amortization. Moreover, it is a good proxy 
for the operating cash generated by the company. As alternative measure we use ROA, which is 
computed as operating performance divided by total assets. Post is a dummy variable that takes 
value 1 (0) for the period after (before) the police operation affected a given municipality. 
Competitors is a dummy variable that takes value 1 (0) for the treated (control) firms defined as in 
sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, respectively. The coefficient on the interaction term (β3) tests our research 
                                                          
4 To make sure that this restriction does not alter our inferences, we estimated model (1) including those observations 
and results are unchanged. Results are available upon request. 
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hypothesis and examines whether the performance of non-criminal competitors improves after 
criminal firms are removed from an industry in a certain geographical area.  
The regression model includes a vector of control variables. lnRevenues is the log transformation 
of the firm’s annual revenues and it controls for differences in size that might drive operating 
performance; Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets and controls for the firm’s 
capital structure; Liquidity is the ratio of the firm’s cash to total assets and it controls for differences 
in the amount of cash holdings across firms; Fixed Assets is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets 
and controls for the composition of the firm’s assets; and Labor Costs is the ratio of costs for 
wages and salary to total operating costs and it controls for the company’s business model. Finally, 
our empirical strategy relies on an extensive structure of fixed effects included in the regression. 
Specifically, we include year fixed effects, industry fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. 
To mitigate the undue influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and year level.  
 
4. Main Results 
4.1. Criminal Firms: Industry composition and descriptive statistics 
In Table 1, we report the industry composition of our sample of criminal firms. In the analysis, we 
define the industry using the 2-digit Italian Industry classification. For the sake of clarity, Table 1 
groups the different industries into 17 macro-categories, which represent the top-tier industry 
classification. As it is possible to observe, construction and real estate are the industries with the 
largest number of criminal firms in our sample (about 45%). Nonetheless, Table 1 allows to 
appreciate how the presence of criminal firms is not restricted to just few industries, but it spreads 
over several different industries. Manufacturing, Water and waste management, Wholesale and 
retail, Professional activities are all industries with a non-trivial presence of criminal firms.  
 
<< Insert Table 1 about here>> 
 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the sample of criminal firms. On average, criminal firms 
have annual revenues of € 4.30 million and total assets equal to € 7.69 million. Median values for 
revenues and total assets are much smaller, thus suggesting that there is a lot of variability among 
the identified criminal firms. The mean (median) revenues for the universe of Italian firms that 
operate in Northern-Central Italy is € 1.70 (0.27) million while the mean (median) total assets is € 
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2.51 (0.54) million5. Consequently, regardless of whether one considers mean or median value, 
criminal firms appear to be larger than other non-criminal firms. This testifies further the 
importance of the phenomenon under investigation. The mean (median) EBITDA of criminal firms 
is 2.1% (3.2%), ROA is -2.5%(1.4%), and leverage is extremely high. Indeed, the average criminal 
firms has a leverage ratio of 88.9% which implies a capital structure which highly unbalanced 
towards debt. On average, criminal firms hold the 10.39% of their assets as cash. Finally, fixed 
assets represents on average the 29.04% of criminal firms’ assets, while 9.71% of operating costs 
are made by salaries and wages.  
 
<< Insert Table 2 about here>> 
 
4.2. Difference in difference analysis 
As previously explained, the estimation of model (1) does not consider directly the sample of 
criminal firms described in the previous paragraph, whilst it is estimated on a sample of  29,758 
treated observations from companies that have experienced the elimination of at least one criminal 
firm from the geographical area and the industry in which they operate, and 150,714 control 
observations belonging to firms that are in the same geographical area but in a different industry 
of the treated companies. Overall, model (1) is estimated on a sample of 180,472 firm-year 
observations. Table 3 and 4 report descriptive statistics and correlations for variable included in 
model (1), respectively. 
The mean (median) revenues of the sample firm is 1.269 (0. 237) million with a highly skewed 
distribution. In the regression analysis, we use the log transformation of firm’s sales, which is more 
uniformly distributed (mean: 4.889, median: 5.475). On average, sample firms are profitable with 
mean (median) EBITDA over assets of 4.10% (4.58%) and ROA 0.8% (2.3%). Companies in our 
sample are highly levered with mean (median) leverage ratio of 75.87% (74.80%) and their cash 
holdings represent, on average, the 10.65% of total assets (median cash holding: 3.02%). Fixed 
assets represent the 31.00% of total assets for the average firm (median fixed assets: 18.75%), 
while labor costs are the 10.14% of total operating costs (median labor costs: 4.04%). 
 
<< Insert Table 3 about here>> 
 
                                                          
5 Statistics for the sample of Norther-Central Italian firms are computed on 5,196,737 observations retrieved from the 
database Aida over the period 2005-2014. 
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Correlations among variables included in the regression model show that larger firms have higher 
operating performance than smaller ones. Moreover, companies that rely on debt largely 
underperform those companies with low leverage. The correlation between operating performance 
and liquidity indicates that, as firms’ cash holding increases, operating performance improves. 
Interestingly, small companies tend to maintain larger cash holdings than big firms, possibly 
because of lower investment opportunities. 
 
<< Insert Table 4 about here>> 
 
Table 5 presents regression results from estimating model (1). As previously discussed, our 
variable of interest is the interaction term between Competitors and Post. Therefore, H1 is tested 
by examining the sign and statistical significance of β3. Column 1 in Table 5 presents our main 
inferences in which performance is measured using EBITDA and we control for municipality fixed 
effect. Column 2, replicates model (1) measuring performance using ROA. Finally, the last column 
of Table 5 estimates model (1) including province level fixed effects: provinces are a broader 
definition of the geographical areas than municipalities and this alternative approach implies 
including a lower number of fixed effects in the model. Regardless of the model specification we 
used, the interaction coefficient between Post and Competitors is positive and statistically 
significant. These results indicates that when a criminal firm is eliminated from an industry, the 
performance of non-criminal competitors significantly increases, compared to a group of firms 
that operate in same geographical area but in different industries. Importantly, estimates reported 
in Table 5 are not only statistically but also economically significant. Indeed, considering that the 
average EBITDA/Assets for treated firms in the sample is 0.0288, the coefficient β3 in column 1 
implies that after a police operation that eliminates a criminal company from an industry, the 
performance of non-criminal competitors increase by 23.14% compared to non-competitor firms 
that operate in the same geographical area. 
 
<< Insert Table 5 about here>> 
 
5. Additional Analyses 
5.1. An alternative control group 
The use of a difference in difference analysis allows us to have a clean identification strategy in 
which we can compare the increase in performance for a group of treated firms with increases in 
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performance of un-treated firms. This approach allows us to tease out the effect of the elimination 
of a criminal company from general time trends affecting our sample firms over the investigated 
period. Nonetheless, results from such an analysis may be sensitive to the definition of the control 
group. In this section, we investigate whether our main inferences are robust to the definition of a 
different control group. Specifically, in the next estimation, we no longer use as control group all 
companies that operate in the same geographical area but in different industries than the treated 
firms; rather we compare the increase in performance of the non-criminal competitors with a 
matched sample of firms that operate in the same industry but in a different municipality that has 
never been affected by the police operation. The main difference between the analysis reported in 
Table 5 and this one lies in the institutional level we consider: in the first case, treated and control 
firms are exposed to the same institutional environment intended as geographically defined; in this 
second analysis, we consider the institutional dimension at industry level. This test is particularly 
relevant, since we have observed that our main result appears to be industry specific. 
In order to identify our control group, we performed a one-to-one Nearest Neighbour Matching 
matching6, requiring the closest match possible for Revenues, Leverage, Liquidity, Fixed Assets 
and Labor Costs (all computed the year before the police operation), and exact matching on 
industry. Results from the estimation of model (1) on this matched sample are reported in Table 6. 
The model specifications reported in Table 6 mirror those delivered in Table 5. Specifically, 
column 1 reports results estimated using the new control group; column 2 proxies for performance 
using ROA and column 3 reports results from including in the model province fixed effects rather 
than municipality fixed effects. In Table 6, the coefficient on the interaction term between Post 
and Competitors is positive and statistically significant across all the reported model 
specifications. Overall, results from using a different control group consistently provide support 
for our research question.  
 
 << Insert Table 6 about here>> 
 
5.2. Is the estimated effect due to a less competitive environment? 
This work mainly claims that investigative operations against mafia 'clean' a given industry by the 
presence of criminal firms and that this change brings positive spillovers on the performance of 
non-criminal competitors operating in the geographical proximity. Our story, through our results, 
suggests that treated competitors benefit from this positive shock in their competitive environment, 
                                                          
6 Computations are based on the algorithm introduced by Abadie and Imbens (2006).  
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as they are no longer or less exposed to the negative externalities imposed by organized crime and 
criminally connected firms. 
At the same time, since sequestrated firms can no longer operate,  it could be argued that the 
estimated improvement in treated firms' performance, documented in Table 5 (and Table 6), is not 
necessarily unique to criminal firms since, after their elimination, the number of firms operating 
in the industry decreases and thus competition pressure diminishes. Consequently, our main results 
might be the mechanic effect of reducing the number of firms that compete in the same industry.  
As we extensively discussed in the theoretical development, the effect of the presence of a criminal 
firm is well beyond the one of having an additional firm that competes in the market: firms 
connected with a criminal organization subtracts resources to sound and clean firms and introduces 
distortions in the market. Therefore, we expect that the benefit of eliminating a criminal firm from 
an industry is not limited to a mere reduction in the number of competitors. 
In order to better investigate this issue and rule out this possibility, we verify the robustness of our 
main results using a subsample of treated firms that compete in an industry and geographical area 
that have not experienced a decrease in the number of competitors, after the removal of the criminal 
competitor. This case is observable either because of new firms entering the market or because the 
arrest and conviction of managers do not necessarily come along with the sequestration of the firm.  
Excluding, from both treatment and control groups, firms that operate in industries and 
geographical areas in which competition decreased after the police operation, significantly affects 
the sample size, which is reduced to 123,442 firm-year observations. Table 7 presents results from 
this analysis. As it is possible to notice, the coefficient on the interaction term Post*Competitors 
is still positive and statistically significant across all the estimated specifications. This result 
suggests that the positive effect of the elimination of a criminal firm is also present in those 
industries in which competition does not decrease after a police operation. The idea is that the 
negative effect on non-criminal competitors of the presence of a criminal firm is not simply due to 
having one more competitor in the market, rather having a competitor that operate in a given 
industry with the support of a criminal organization.  
So, we demonstrate that our results are not driven by a simple reduction of competitive pressure 
and, again, our hypothesis is met. 
 
<< Insert Table 7 about here>> 
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5.3. Procurement costs 
Finally, to investigate better the channels through which performance of non-criminal competitors 
increase after the removal of a criminal firm, we verify whether criminal firms introduce 
distortions on procurements. To tackle this issue, in Table 8, we analyze how the cost for raw 
materials changes for non-criminal competitors, after criminal companies are removed from the 
industry. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 estimate model (1) using as dependent variable the cost of 
raw material standardized by total assets. Sample mean and median values for the variable Raw 
Material are 21.26% and 5.12%, respectively, with a standard deviation of 0.2995. Results reported 
in Table 8 suggest that, after the removal of the criminal firm, the costs for row material of non-
criminal competitors significantly decrease compared to the control group. We expect this result 
to be stronger for small firms that rely more on the local market for their procurement needs. In 
column (3) and (4) of Table 8, we generate a dummy which takes value 1 (0) for firms with total 
sales above (below) the sample median, and we let it to interact with the variables Post and 
Competitors.  This three-way interaction term investigates whether the decrease in procurement 
costs after the elimination of the criminal firm is stronger for small firms compared to large firms. 
Results strongly support this conjecture and show that the effect on procurement costs is 
significantly higher for small firms.  
 
<< Insert Table 8 about here>> 
 
6. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper is to provide empirical evidence of the economic consequences due to the 
presence of firms connected with mafia-type criminal organizations located in developed areas. In 
particular, we verify for the first time how corporate criminal connections affect non-criminal 
competitors’ performance by harming the institutional and business environment in which they 
operate, and we explore the negative externalities that these connections impose on competitors 
by using firm-level data.  
To this purpose, we use an innovative, hand-collected and representative panel dataset with yearly 
firm-level observations from 2005 to 2014 on non-criminal firms from northern and central Italy 
that operate in the same industry of criminal ones.  
Our empirical analysis exploits exogenous shocks imposed by operations against mafia from 2008 
to 2011 at municipality level to implement a difference-in-difference strategy that explores the 
effects of corporate criminal connections on non-criminal competitors. The underlying idea is that 
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these operations ‘clean’ the municipalities and the relative industries where the targeted criminal 
firms operate, with a consequent beneficial effect on non-criminal competitors' performance. In 
order to detect treated competitors, we started from the identification of investigative and judicial 
operations and criminal firms. To this purpose we adopt an ex post analysis approach, we rely on 
official order for pretrial detention and attachments and court trial sentences and we set up criteria 
to identify criminal firms in line with the one adopted in studies on politically connected firms 
(Faccio, 2006). After having identified our sample of criminal firms, we track in the whole 
universe of non-criminal firms in northern and central Italy those that operate in municipalities 
that have been interested by at least one operation between 2008 and 2011 and in the same industry 
of criminal ones. For our main analysis, we rely on a benchmark composed by firms located in the 
same municipality of criminal firms and their competitors, but operating in different industries.  
In our diff-in-diff model we include firm-level characteristics and municipality, industry and year 
fixed effects. We implement the analysis only on those municipalities that have been “treated” 
only one time in the considered period. Alternative robustness checks are performed to test the 
reliability of our results. First, we used an alternative control group of non-criminal firms operating 
in ‘never-treated’ municipalities, but in the same industry of criminal and treated competitors. This 
analysis enables us to consider institutional environment at industry level, rather than at a local 
level. Results from the estimation of our model using both control groups suggest that the shock 
imposed by police operations affect non-criminal competitors’ performance. Non-criminal 
competitors operating in 'cleaned' municipalities and industries exhibit a statistically significant 
and sizeable increase EBITDA/Total Assets and ROA after the operation, with respect to 
benchmarks that do not benefit from this shock.  
It seems that organized crime, through infiltrated firms, clearly injures the local business 
environment. These results are found to be robust to analyses conducted to rule out the possibility 
that the estimated effect is driven by a simple lower competitive pressure to which treated firms 
are exposed, once a (criminal) competitor disappears from the industry in which they operate. Our 
findings turn out to not be sensitive to a reduction in the number of competitors in a given industry. 
The negative effects of being exposed to a criminal competitor go well beyond experiencing a 
(higher) competition. Mafia's firms impose strong distortions as they do not operate 'fairly', 
bringing inefficiencies and affecting market transparency. When we look at the impact of 
competing against a criminal firm on our treated sample's procurement costs, it comes out negative 
with a strong evidence, and it is larger especially for smaller firms that are more forced to rely on 
local markets.  
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This work sheds light on the unexplored mechanisms through which the presence of organized 
crime imposes negative externalities on economic outcomes. From this study we learn that the 
presence of criminal firms in a given area inflicts costs on non-criminal competitors, in terms of 
lower operating performance. Furthermore, our innovative and representative dataset offered us 
the possibility to quantify empirically the costs that organized crime inflicts on economic systems. 
 
 
 
References 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. A. (2005). Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-
run growth. Handbook of economic growth, 1, 385-472. 
Albanese, J. S.  (1996). Organized crime in America (pp. 193-95). Anderson Publishing Company.  
Albanese, G., Marinelli, G. (2013). Organized crime and productivity: Evidence from firm-level 
data. Rivista Italiana degli Economisti, 18 (December), 367-394.  
Allum, F., Siebert, R. (2003). Conclusion: organized crime and democracy. Organised Crime and 
the Challenge to Democracy, 195. 
Asmundo, A. (2011). Indicatori e costi di criminalità mafiosa. Analisi ed evidenze empiriche 
(2004-2007), in R. Sciarrone (ed.), Alleanze nell’ombra. Mafie ed economie locali in Sicilia 
e nel Mezzogiorno, Bari, Donzelli. 
Bandiera, O. (2003). Land reform, the market for protection, and the origins of the Sicilian mafia: 
theory and evidence. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 19(1), 218-244. 
Barone G., Narciso G. (2012). The Effect of Mafia on Public Transfers, mimeo  
Barone, G., Narciso, G. (2013). The effect of organized crime on public funds. Bank of Italy, Temi 
di Discussione (Working Paper) No, 916. 
Barone, G., Narciso, G. (2015). Organized crime and business subsidies: Where does the money 
go? Journal of Urban Economics, 86, 98-110. 
Becker, G.S. (1968). Crime and punishment: an economic approach, Journal of Political Economy, 
76(2), 169–217. 
67 
Bonaccorsi di Patti, E. (2009). Weak institutions and credit availability: the impact of crime on 
bank loans. Bank of Italy Occasional Paper, (52). 
Buonanno, P., Durante, R., Prarolo, G., Vanin, P. (2015). Poor institutions, rich mines: resource 
curse in the origins of the Sicilian mafia. The Economic Journal, 125(586), F175-F202. 
Centorrino, M., Ofria, F. (2008). Criminalità organizzata e produttività del lavoro nel 
Mezzogiorno: un’applicazione del modello Kaldor-Verdoorn. Rivista Economica del 
Mezzogiorno: 163-189.  
Council of Europe (2002).  Crime Analysis: Organized crime – Best practice survey no. 4, 
Strasbourg, France. 
Dal Bó, E., Dal Bó, P., Di Tella, R. (2006). “Plata o Plomo?”: Bribe and Punishment in a Theory 
of Political Influence. American Political Science Review, 100(01), 41-53. 
Daniele, V., Marani, U. (2011). Organized crime, the quality of local institutions and FDI in Italy: 
A panel data analysis, European Journal of Political Economy, 27, 132-142. 
Daniele, G., Geys, B. (2015). Organized crime, institutions and political quality: empirical 
evidence from Italian municipalities, The Economic Journal, 125(586), F233–55. 
De Clercq, D., Danis, W. M., Dakhli, M. (2010). The moderating effect of institutional context on 
the relationship between associational activity and new business activity in emerging 
economies. International Business Review, 19(1), 85-101. 
Dell, M. (2011). Trafficking networks and the Mexican drug war, Working Paper, Harvard 
University. 
De Feo, G., De Luca, G. (2013). Mafia in the ballot box, Working Paper No. 57, DEM, University 
of Pavia.  
Dimico, A., Isopi, A. Olsson, O. (2012). Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: the market for lemons, 
Gothenburg University, Department of Economics. 
Donato, L., Saporito, A., Scognamiglio, A. (2013). Aziende Sequestrate Alla Criminalità 
Organizzata: Le Relazioni Con Il Sistema Bancario (Businesses Seized from Organized Crime 
Groups: Their Relations with the Banking System). Bank of Italy Occasional Paper, (202). 
Ehrlich, I. (1973). Participation in illegitimate activities: a theoretical and empirical investigation, 
Journal of Political Economy, 81(3), 521–65. 
68 
Faccio, M. (2006). Politically connected firms, The American Economic Review, 96 (1), 369-386.  
Felli E., Tria G. (2000). Produttività e crimine organizzato: un’analisi delle regioni italiane. 
Sviluppo Economico 1, 79-101.  
Frye, T., Zhuravskaya, E. (2000). Rackets, regulation, and the rule of law, Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organization, 16(2), 478–502.  
Gambetta, D. (1993). The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Gennaioli, C. Onotato, M. (2010). Public spending and organized crime: The Case of the 1997 
Marche and Umbria Earthquake. Mimeo.  
Godson, R., Williams, P. (1998). Strengthening cooperation against transnational crime: a new 
security imperative, in (P. Williams and D. Vlassis, eds.), Combating Transnational Crime: 
Concepts, Activities and Responses, 256–62, London: Frank Cass. 
Gries, T., Ha, V. D. (2014). Institutional environment, human capital, and firm growth: Evidence 
from Vietnam (No. 83). University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics. 
Konrad, K., Skaperdas, S. (2012). The market for protection and the origin of the state, Economic 
Theory, 50, 417–43. 
Marshall, C., Yeager, P. (1980). Corporate Crime. 
Mastrobuoni, G. (2015). The value of connection: evidence from the Italian-American mafia, 
Economic Journal, 125(586), F256–88. 
Mian, A. R., Khwaja, A. I. (2005). Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision 
in an Emerging Financial Market. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(4), 1371-1411. Print. 
Peri, G. (2004). Socio-cultural variables and economic success: Evidence from Italian Provinces 
1951-1991. The BE Journal of Macroeconomics. Topics in Macroeconomics, 4, 1-34.  
Pinotti, P. (2011). The Economic Consequences of Organized Crime: Evidence from Southern 
Italy. Bank of Italy.  
Pinotti, P. (2013). Organized crime, violence and the quality of politicians: evidence from 
Southern Italy, in (P. Cook, S. Machin, O. Marie and G. Mastrobuoni, eds.), Lessons from the 
69 
Economics of Crime: What Works in Reducing Offending? pp. 175–200, Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Pinotti, P. (2015a). The Causes and Consequences of Organised Crime: Preliminary Evidence 
Across Countries. The Economic Journal, 125(586), F158-F174.  
Pinotti, P. (2015b). The economic costs of organized crime: evidence from southern Italy, The 
Economic Journal, 125(586), F203–32.  
Sachs, J. D., Warner, A. M. (1997). Fundamental sources of long-run growth. The American 
economic review, 87(2), 184-188. 
Schelling, T.C. (1971). What is the Business of Organized Crime? Journal of Public Law, 20, 71-
84.  
Schneider, F. (2010). Turnover of organized crime and money laundering: some preliminary 
empirical findings. Public Choice, 144(3-4), 473-486.  
Sciarrone, R. (2009). Mafie vecchie, mafie nuove: Radicamento ed espansione [New mafias, old 
mafias. Settlement and expansion]. Roma: Donzelli.  
Simpson, S. S. (2002). Corporate crime, law, and social control. Cambridge University Press.  
Skaperdas, S. (2001). The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the 
state does not. Economics of Governance, 2(3), 173-202.  
Soares, R.R. (2009). Welfare costs of crime and common violence: a critical review, Working 
Paper, The World Bank. 
Tullio G., Quarella S. (1999). Convergenza economica tra le regioni italiane: il ruolo della 
criminalità e della spesa pubblica 1960-1993. Rivista di Politica Economica, 89, 77-128.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70 
 
Figure 1 - Mafia Association Index at province level (average 2004 - 2007) 
 
Source: Report Res 2010, "Alleanze nell’ombra. Mafie ed economie locali in Sicilia e nel Mezzogiorno”,  
 Ch. 2: Indicatori e costi di criminalità mafiosa. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Confiscated firms at province level 
 
Source: National Agency for the Sequestrated and Confiscated Properties (ANBSC) 
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Figure 3 - Confiscated properties at province level 
 
Source: National Agency for the Sequestrated and Confiscated Properties (ANBSC) 
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Table 1. Industry Composition of Criminal Firms 
Industry Codes # obs % 
Agriculture from 01 to 03 18 0.7% 
Manufacturing from 10 to 33 184 7.6% 
Electricity and Gas 35 41 1.7% 
Water and Waste Management from 36 to 39 168 7.0% 
Constructions  from 41 to 43 553 22.9% 
Wholesale and Retail from 45 to 47 209 8.7% 
Transportation and Warehousing from 49 to 53 137 5.7% 
Hospitality from 55 to 56 61 2.5% 
Information and communication from 58 to 63 49 2.0% 
Financial firms from to 64 to 66 59 2.4% 
Real Estate 68 488 20.2% 
Professional activities from to 69 to 75 187 7.8% 
Leasing, Travelling and Service firms from 77 to 82 125 5.2% 
Education 85 19 0.8% 
Healthcare from 86 to 88 19 0.8% 
Sport and Entraitment from 90 to 93 76 3.2% 
Other services from 94 to 96 19 0.8% 
    2412 100% 
Note: the table reports the industry distribution of the criminal sample. Two-digit industry codes are grouped 
by macro-categories. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Criminal Firms 
  N Mean SD p25 p50 p75 
Revenues (/000) 2412 4,303.7 13,117 1.1180 293.77 1,886.8 
Total Assets (/000) 2412 7,689.8 26,381 225.52 952.04 3,841.9 
EBITDA/Assets 2412 0.0211 0.1983 -0.0099 0.0316 0.0904 
ROA 2412 -0.0247 0.2761 -0.0257 0.0142 0.0587 
Leverage  2412 0.8886 0.9397 0.5859 0.8385 0.9562 
Liquidity 2412 0.1039 0.1977 0.0028 0.0219 0.0901 
Fixed Assets  2412 0.2904 0.3184 0.0218 0.1434 0.5188 
Labor Costs  2412 0.0971 0.1411 0.0000 0.0204 0.1573 
Note: the table reports descriptive statistics for the sample of criminal firms. Revenues is the euro amount of the firm’s sales; Total Assets is 
the euro amount of the firm’s total assets; EBITDA/Assets is Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization standardized by 
total assets; Leverage is the ratio total liabilities over total assets; Liquidity is the firm’s cash holding standardized by total assets; Fixed 
Assets is fixed assets divided by total assets; Labor Costs is salary and wages divided by operating costs. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Treated and Control Firms 
  N Mean SD p25 p50 p75 
Revenues (/000) 180472 1,269.7 3,503 32.3080 237.53 889.5 
lnRevenues 180472 4.8885 2.7292 3.5058 5.4745 6.7918 
EBITDA/Assets 180472 0.0410 0.1887 -0.0027 0.0458 0.1078 
ROA 180472 0.0080 0.1964 -0.0126 0.0235 0.0685 
Leverage  180472 0.7587 0.6586 0.4688 0.7480 0.9147 
Liquidity 180472 0.1065 0.1701 0.0043 0.0302 0.1307 
Fixed Assets  180472 0.3100 0.3159 0.0388 0.1875 0.5287 
Labor Costs  180472 0.1014 0.1344 0.0000 0.0404 0.1678 
Note: the table reports descriptive statistics for variables included in model (1). Revenues is the euro amount of the firm’s sales; lnRevenues 
is the log transformation of Revenues; EBITDA/Assets is Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization standardized by 
total assets; Leverage is the ratio total liabilities over total assets; Liquidity is the firm’s cash holding standardized by total assets; Fixed 
Assets is fixed assets divided by total assets; Labor Costs is salary and wages divided by operating costs. 
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Table 4. Correlation Matrix 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 EBITDA/Assets 1      
2 ROA 0.962*** 1     
3 lnRevenues 0.298*** 0.258*** 1    
4 Leverage  -0.386*** -0.403*** -0.169*** 1   
5 Liquidity 0.034*** 0.024*** -0.092*** -0.072*** 1  
6 Fixed Assets  0.012*** -0.025*** -0.061*** -0.119*** -0.240*** 1 
7 Labor Costs  0.095*** 0.062*** 0.386*** -0.084*** -0.002 -0.062*** 
 
Note: the table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients among the variables included in model (1). EBITDA/Assets is Earnings before 
Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization standardized by total assets; lnRevenues is the log transformation of firm’s revenues; 
Leverage is the ratio total liabilities over total assets; Liquidity is the firm’s cash holding standardized by total assets; Fixed Assets is fixed 
assets divided by total assets; Labor Costs is salary and wages divided by operating costs. N: 202,715. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance 
at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 5. Results from a difference in difference approach 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES EBITDA/Assets ROA EBITDA/Assets 
    
Post 0.0024 0.0011 0.0013 
 [0.972] [0.415] [0.549] 
Competitors -0.0043*** -0.0027* -0.0044*** 
 [-2.734] [-1.661] [-2.896] 
Post*Competitors 0.0067*** 0.0061*** 0.0067*** 
 [3.387] [2.955] [3.390] 
LnRevenues 0.0183*** 0.0167*** 0.0183*** 
 [96.427] [82.135] [96.481] 
Leverage -0.0963*** -0.1092*** -0.0963*** 
 [-61.171] [-62.068] [-61.197] 
Liquidity 0.0298*** 0.0074* 0.0298*** 
 [7.988] [1.882] [7.987] 
Fixed Assets -0.0037*** -0.0351*** -0.0039*** 
 [-2.884] [-25.445] [-3.016] 
Labor Costs -0.0730*** -0.0854*** -0.0733*** 
 [-18.053] [-20.435] [-18.112] 
Constant 0.0581 0.0490 0.0477 
 [1.354] [0.911] [1.121] 
    
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Municipality Fixed Effects YES YES NO 
Province Fixed Effects NO NO YES 
    
Observations 180,472 180,472 180,472 
R-squared 0.225 0.221 0.224 
Note: the table reports obtained by estimating model (1) through OLS. In this analysis, the control group is 
made by all companies that operate in the same municipality than the non-criminal competitors but in a 
different industry. EBITDA/Assets is Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization 
standardized by total assets; ROA is operating income over total assets, Post is a dummy variable equal to 
one for firm-year observations subsequent an investigative operation that removed a criminal company from 
a municipality, zero otherwise; Competitors is a dummy variable equal to one for firms operating in the same 
municipality and the same industry than a criminal firm; lnRevenues is the log transformation of firm’s 
revenues; Leverage is the ratio total liabilities over total assets; Liquidity is the firm’s cash holding 
standardized by total assets; Fixed Assets is fixed assets divided by total assets; Labor Costs is salary and 
wages divided by operating costs. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, 
respectively. t-statistics are reported in brackets. Firm-year clustered standard errors. 
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Table 6. Difference-in-difference estimation: an alternative control group 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES EBITDA/Assets ROA EBITDA/Assets 
    
Post -0.0042 -0.0033 -0.0030 
 [-0.953] [-0.735] [-0.688] 
Competitors 0.0374 0.0299 -0.0049 
 [1.523] [1.168] [-0.832] 
Post*Competitors 0.0065*** 0.0059** 0.0055** 
 [2.829] [2.471] [2.353] 
LnRevenues 0.0147*** 0.0137*** 0.0146*** 
 [52.874] [46.962] [54.981] 
Leverage -0.0967*** -0.1064*** -0.0964*** 
 [-33.836] [-34.102] [-34.648] 
Liquidity 0.0253*** -0.0024 0.0274*** 
 [3.739] [-0.339] [4.183] 
Fixed Assets 0.0051*** -0.0190*** 0.0051*** 
 [2.771] [-9.864] [3.000] 
Labor Costs -0.0645*** -0.1031*** -0.0574*** 
 [-6.825] [-10.695] [-6.360] 
Constant 0.0047 -0.0126 0.0492*** 
 [0.153] [-0.395] [3.486] 
    
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Municipality Fixed Effects YES YES NO 
Province Fixed Effects NO NO YES 
    
Observations 54,711 54,711 54,711 
R-squared 0.250 0.241 0.209 
Note: the table reports obtained by estimating model (1) through OLS. In this analysis, the control 
group is composed by a one-to-one matched sample with companies that operate in the same 
industry than the non-criminal competitors but in a different municipality.  EBITDA/Assets is 
Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization standardized by total assets; ROA 
is operating income over total assets, Post is a dummy variable equal to one for firm-year 
observations subsequent an investigative operation that removed a criminal company from a 
municipality, zero otherwise; Competitors is a dummy variable equal to one for firms operating in 
the same municipality and the same industry than a criminal firm; lnRevenues is the log 
transformation of firm’s revenues; Leverage is the ratio total liabilities over total assets; Liquidity 
is the firm’s cash holding standardized by total assets; Fixed Assets is fixed assets divided by total 
assets; Labor Costs is salary and wages divided by operating costs. *,**,*** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. t-statistics are reported in brackets. Firm-year 
clustered standard errors. 
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Table 7. Difference-in-difference estimation under an unaffected competitive environment 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES EBITDA/Assets ROA EBITDA/Assets 
        
Post 0.0012 0.0009 -0.0007 
 [0.340] [0.238] [-0.203] 
Competitors -0.0070*** -0.0059*** -0.0072*** 
 [-3.825] [-3.108] [-3.946] 
Post*Competitors 0.0071*** 0.0062*** 0.0073*** 
 [3.270] [2.740] [3.358] 
LnRevenues 0.0181*** 0.0166*** 0.0181*** 
 [79.113] [67.625] [79.173] 
Leverage -0.0975*** -0.1100*** -0.0976*** 
 [-51.957] [-52.528] [-51.986] 
Liquidity 0.0285*** 0.0065 0.0285*** 
 [6.362] [1.382] [6.359] 
Fixed Assets -0.0034** -0.0346*** -0.0035** 
 [-2.209] [-21.046] [-2.241] 
Labor Costs -0.0669*** -0.0794*** -0.0672*** 
 [-13.657] [-15.654] [-13.720] 
Constant 0.0333 0.0321 0.0273 
 [0.930] [0.799] [0.769] 
    
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Municipality Fixed Effects YES YES NO 
Province Fixed Effects NO NO YES 
    
Observations 123,442 123,442 123,442 
R-squared 0.231 0.229 0.231 
Note: the table reports regression results obtained by estimating model (1) through OLS. The sample is 
restricted to firms in industries and geographic areas in which the number of firms in the market did not 
decrease after the elimination of the criminal firm. The control group is the one used in table 5. 
EBITDA/Assets is Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization standardized by total 
assets; ROA is operating income over total assets, Post is a dummy variable equal to one for firm-year 
observations subsequent an investigative operation that removed a criminal company from a 
municipality, zero otherwise; Competitors is a dummy variable equal to one for firms operating in the 
same municipality and the same industry than a criminal firm; lnRevenues is the log transformation of 
firm’s revenues; Leverage is the ratio total liabilities over total assets; Liquidity is the firm’s cash 
holding standardized by total assets; Fixed Assets is fixed assets divided by total assets; Labor Costs is 
salary and wages divided by operating costs. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% 
level, respectively. t-statistics are reported in brackets. Firm-year clustered standard errors. 
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Table 8. Analysis on procurement costs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Raw Material Raw Material Raw Material Raw Material 
        
Post 0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0016 -0.0026 
 [0.084] [-0.186] [-0.477] [-0.774] 
Competitors 0.0132*** 0.0127*** 0.0145*** 0.0140*** 
 [4.804] [4.665] [5.261] [5.120] 
Post*Competitors -0.0110*** -0.0108*** 0.0068 0.0070 
 [-3.400] [-3.353] [1.355] [1.389] 
Post*Competitors*Small   -0.0287*** -0.0289*** 
   [-5.839] [-5.888] 
Small   -0.1813*** -0.1816*** 
   [-118.577] [-118.725] 
LnRevenues 0.0410*** 0.0410***   
 [144.800] [145.193]   
Leverage 0.0174*** 0.0174*** 0.0030* 0.0030* 
 [10.141] [10.151] [1.733] [1.722] 
Liquidity -0.0392*** -0.0394*** -0.0538*** -0.0539*** 
 [-9.272] [-9.308] [-12.389] [-12.426] 
Fixed Assets -0.1751*** -0.1752*** -0.1572*** -0.1572*** 
 [-92.507] [-92.507] [-82.454] [-82.404] 
Labor Costs -0.2894*** -0.2897*** -0.2359*** -0.2361*** 
 [-68.265] [-68.297] [-54.082] [-54.095] 
Constant 0.0690 0.0511 0.3812*** 0.3635*** 
 [1.379] [1.037] [7.791] [7.514] 
     
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Municipality Fixed Effects YES NO YES NO 
Province Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES 
     
Observations 180,472 180,472 180,472 180,472 
R-squared 0.377 0.377 0.352 0.351 
Note: the table reports regression results obtained by estimating model (1) through OLS using the cost of raw material 
purchases standardized by total assets as dependent variable (Raw Material). The control group is the one used in table 
5. EBITDA/Assets is Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization standardized by total assets; ROA 
is operating income over total assets, Post is a dummy variable equal to one for firm-year observations subsequent an 
investigative operation that removed a criminal company from a municipality, zero otherwise; Competitors is a dummy 
variable equal to one for firms operating in the same municipality and the same industry than a criminal firm; 
lnRevenues is the log transformation of firm’s revenues; Small is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 (0) for 
firms with sales below (above) the sample median; Leverage is the ratio total liabilities over total assets; Liquidity is 
the firm’s cash holding standardized by total assets; Fixed Assets is fixed assets divided by total assets; Labor Costs is 
salary and wages divided by operating costs. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, 
respectively. t-statistics are reported in brackets. Firm-year clustered standard errors. 
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Chapter 3 
Does Thinking about Death make us more Generous?  
It depends! An Experimental Approach in Cooperation 
with UNICEF. 
 
 
Patrizia Malaspina 
(University of Padova) 
    
 
Abstract 
In this study I draw on Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Terror Management Theory (TMT) to expand 
our understanding of the phenomenon of ingroup bias in charitable giving. I aim at investigating the effect 
of the use of death priming in emotive charity advertisement on potential donors’ decisions and ingroup 
bias. In particular I compare implicit and explicit priming of death thoughts against priming of thoughts 
related to disease and I explore the role of various dimensions of subjects' self-esteem in moderating their 
responses to implicit stimuli. To this purpose I conduct a field experiment in cooperation with UNICEF, 
which has involved 547 subjects. Main findings of this study show that in the control group we observe 
that on average ingroup bias is in favor of ingroup (white-skinned - Caucasian) recipients, rather than 
outgroup (black-skinned - African) ones. When thoughts of death are activated, both implicitly and 
explicitly, discriminatory behavior emerges at the expense of donors' ingroup and favorable towards the 
outgroup. Furthermore, implicit death effects arise independently from the level of general self-esteem 
and self-esteem’s relevant domains. This study produces interesting findings not only for the direct field 
of application. The integration of SIT and TMT offers valuable sparks for forthcoming economic analyses 
of ingroup bias in different settings. 
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1. Introduction  
In the economic literature on Social Identity Theory (Tajifel and Turner, 1979), the presence of 
an ingroup bias in social preferences, such as charitable giving behavior, is well documented and 
has reached broad consensus (e.g. Darity et al., 2006; Ben-Ner et al., 2009; Chen and Li, 2009; 
Ockenfels and Werner, 2014). Ingroup bias is observed when people tend to be more generous 
towards those that they perceive as similar (ingroup favoritism) at the expense of those they 
perceive as dissimilar (outgroup discrimination).  
This evidence suggests strong negative implications on the marketing of charities and large 
humanitarian organizations, which aim at fundraising money in help of disadvantaged people 
that can be easily perceived by potential donors as members of their outgroup. In real world 
fundraising campaigns, different communication strategies attempt to reduce the psychological 
distance between donors and recipients and some of them are explored in existing economic 
literature, such as identifying a specific victim versus statistical ones (e.g. Small and 
Loewenstein, 2003; Kogut and Ritov, 2005; Charness and Gneezy, 2008)1, whereas little is 
known about the use of death priming in charity fundraising campaigns. Indeed almost every day 
we are exposed to media "assail" with images and videos depicting dying children, whose 
possibility to survive depends entirely on generosity of more advantaged people. What are the 
effects of this death priming on donors’ behavior and ingroup bias? A well-known socio-
psychological theory, Terror Management Theory (Greenberg, Pyszczynski and Solomon, 1986), 
suggests that when people are forced to think about their own death (under mortality salience 
stimuli - from now on "MS"), ingroup bias in charitable giving gets larger (e.g. Jonas et al., 
2013)2, in particular when these thoughts of mortality are induced implicitly.  
Although TMT experiments on prosocial behavior produce interesting findings, they do not bring 
direct and valuable policy implications. Hence some questions naturally arise: does priming of 
recipients’ death affect donors' behavior? Are fundraising campaigns using this death priming 
actually more effective with respect to the ones that do not emphasize death thoughts, as they 
signal a more grave and urgent need? Would we observe an effect on ingroup bias in charitable 
giving also when mortality salience stimuli are related to third-party victims? 
I use data gathered through a field experiment run to address all these issues. In particular this 
investigation aims at:  
                                                          
1 These research works do not directly explore the effects on ingroup bias. 
2 More precisely ingroup favoritism increases and outgroup discrimination remains unchanged when subjects are 
asked to allocate money between national or international charities and both increase when they are asked to donate 
either to an ‘ingroup charity’ or an ‘outgroup’ one. 
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1. verifying whether the use of death priming (MS stimuli) in charity campaigns affects donors’ 
decision, even if primed death thoughts are related to third-party victims (charity recipients) 
rather than to donors (decision makers); 
2. exploring and comparing the effects on donors’ decisions of both explicit and implicit death 
priming, in other words, two different communication strategies of conveying thoughts of 
death; 
3. verifying death priming effects on ingroup bias in donors' choices; 
3. assessing the role of donors’ self-esteem in moderating implicit death priming effects; in 
particular the focus is on giving and money based self-esteems, as giving and having money 
may represent two relevant self-esteem domains in (monetary) giving behavior. 
To this purpose, I conduct an experiment in cooperation with one of the largest charitable 
organizations in the world: UNICEF. Subjects are economics undergraduate students that are 
assigned to six different treatments in a between-subjects factorial design. In each group, they 
are exposed to a charity advertisement used to manipulate death thoughts and operationalize 
ingroup bias. Afterwards they are asked to declare their willingness to donate and to actual deliver 
their monetary donations to UNICEF volunteers.  
This work extends the understanding of research on ingroup bias by putting together Social 
Identity Theory (SIT) and Terror Management Theory (TMT). 
I draw on SIT to gather knowledge on group identity formation, useful to find a proper identity 
attribute along which intergroup discrimination arises. TMT fundamentals assist me in designing 
an experiment that induces death priming and explores the effects on ingroup bias under death 
thoughts priming. 
Indeed this integration in an experimental setting enriches existing knowledge offered by SIT 
studies by exploring the effect of death priming on social distance and ingroup bias in charitable 
giving contexts and the role of self-esteem in this process. With respect to previous TMT studies 
on prosocial behavior (e.g. Jones et al., 2008; Jones et al., 2013; Hirschberger et al., 2008; 
Zaleskiewicz et al., 2015), I introduce a number of novelties to produce more reliable results, 
better and direct policy implications for the marketing of charities and, more in general, prosocial 
behavior under death priming. First, thoughts of death are related to charity recipients (third party 
victims) rather than to donors (decision makers): in other words givers are not forced to think 
about their own death, but the charity cause represents the source of mortality awareness 
activation. This implies that thoughts of death are activated within a natural occurring scenario, 
rather than in an "artificial” context unrelated to charity donation. Second, I investigate for the 
first time donors’ responses to explicit death priming used in charity campaigns, which represents 
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a tool that we observe in real world situations, and I compare such effect with the one of implicit 
death priming. 9Lastly, I analyze for the first time the role of self-esteem and self-esteem relevant 
domains (giving and money) as moderating dimensions of implicit death priming in prosocial 
processes. 
From this study we learn that, even when related to charity recipients, death thoughts affect 
donors' decisions and ingroup bias, but in an unexpected direction: discrimination is at the 
expense of the donors’ ingroup and favoritism is toward outgroup and no statistically significant 
difference is estimated between implicit and explicit death priming. Furthermore, implicit death 
effects arise independently from the level of general self-esteem and self-esteem’s relevant 
domains.  
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the theoretical background this 
experiment is built on. Section 3 describes the experimental design. Section 4 explores the results 
and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
In the last decades economic and psycho-sociological research on prosocial and charitable 
behaviors has flourished. The analysis has focused both on donors (supply side) and fundraisers 
(demand side). Research on the demand side has been challenged by the increasing sophistication 
in charitable organizations’ activity of money raising and the need of understanding how they 
choose their fundraising strategies and how givers respond (e.g. Andreoni, 2006; Rege and Telle, 
2004; Landry et al., 2006). On the offer side, since a sizable part of income for charities is 
provided by individuals (Hibbert and Horne, 1996), investigations focused mainly on individuals' 
socio-economic and psychological characteristics in order to identify and explore drivers of 
assignment of financial resources to prosocial initiatives.  
One of the most important issues that scholars have been addressing is the presence of social 
preferences in people's economic decision-making and the willingness of economic agents to 
share their material assets with other agents, even anonymous (Camerer, 2003; Cartwright, 
2014). People often engage in activities that are costly for themselves but beneficial to others 
(e.g. Buraschi and Cornelli, 2014). Why should self-interested agents donate fraction of their 
income for the benefit of strangers? Among all, the most prominent models that capture 
individuals’ preferences over others’ payoffs are inequality aversion (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), various forms of altruism (e.g. Charness and Rabin, 2002), 
and reciprocity (e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 2000).  
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Being generous and less selfish, sharing personal endowments with others more in need are 
commonly considered to be the result of personality, good intention and genuine altruism of the 
helper. Anyway, decades of research have demonstrated that important aspects of phenomena 
related to donations cannot be explained simply by other-regard preferences (Bénabou and 
Tirole, 2005) and pure altruism (Andreoni, 1998, 2007). This altruistic nature quite often hides 
more egoistic and self-interested motives and reveals the ambivalence nature of prosocial 
behavior: acting unselfishly is often in givers' self-interest. Some models suggest that public 
benefits of the charity enter givers' utility functions and charity can be identified as a privately 
provided public good. Economists commonly justify the direct private utility that people get from 
the act of giving with the model of warm-glow of giving (Andreoni, 1989), that captures the data 
better then 'pure altruism' models (Andreoni, 2007). People's actions may derive from a mixture 
of social or self-image concern, altruistic motivation, material self-interest and this mix varies 
across situations and individuals (Bénabou and Tirole, 2005). In particular, egotistical aspects 
are reflected in concerns for self-protection and self-promotion (Hirschberger et al., 2008). For 
example self-efficacy (Basil et al., 2008; Chueng and Chan, 2000), self-esteem, recognition 
(Bennet, 2003, Sargeant, 1999) are found to be important motivations and drivers for giving.  
Egoistical motives may positively affect prosocial behavior in those subjects with high 
developmental needs, such as self-esteem (Snyder and Omoto, 1992) or when being generous 
may repair self-esteem after failures (Brown and Smart, 1991).  
In more recent times, economic analysis has been going beyond a focus on individual-level 
incentives in decision making and it is widely exploring group identity, as central concept to 
understand dynamics behind a number of intergroup interactions.  
All these considerations pave the road to the importance and the understanding of the role of 
social norms and group identity in prosocial behavior.  
In this regard, two socio-psychological theories provide interesting insights: Social Identity 
Theory and Terror Management Theory. 
 
2.1. Social Identity Theory and charitable giving 
Tajifel and Turner (1986) introduce a distinction between personal and social (group) identity, 
recognizing the second one as a person’s sense of self derived from perceived membership in 
social groups (Chen and Li, 2009). Tajifel and Turner (1979) develop the Social Identity Theory 
(SIT) to explain and describe the psychological basis for ingroup bias (outgroup discrimination), 
which is recognized as one of several identity maintenance strategy. They suggest that group 
membership is a source of identity and self-esteem boosting. Hence people strive to achieve and 
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maintain a positive group identity, which largely derives from favorable comparisons between 
their ingroup and relevant outgroup and the consequent adoption of behaviors consistent with 
stereotypes and relative social norms associated with their group identity. It follows that people 
act more favorably towards individuals that belong to their ingroup compared to persons that are 
perceived as different (outgroup).  
Tajifel and Turner (1986) identify three major components necessary for social identity to 
emerge: categorization, identification and comparison. The first one (categorization) is the 
process of labelling people and the self with categories or attributes. A large variety of identity 
categories exist and are explored in the existing literature: gender (e.g. Akerlof and Kranton, 
2000; Wade, 2001), race, ethnicity (Alderfer, 1997; Wade, 2001), nationality (Wade, 2001), 
socio-economic status (Cartwright et al., 1978; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000) and so on. In order 
to be relevant for group identity, a category must be a one people identify with and along which 
they do not identify themselves with outgroup members (identification). Finally, people have to 
be able to compare and evaluate similarities and dissimilarities between their group members and 
others (comparison). 
Whether an individual is recognized as ingroup or outgroup member may vary over time, across 
situational social contexts and extension of interactions, all factors that contribute to determine 
which categorization is salient. For example, ethnicity gets more important in presence of 
multiple ethnic groups at the expense of other attributes (e.g. political philosophy), and, as other 
surface-level attributes (e.g. gender and race), it is relevant also in less extended interactions 
(Ben-Ner et al., 2009). So, the way people perceive their group with respect to others’ one, in 
terms multiple characteristics, depends on which comparative domain prevails (Ellemmers et al., 
2002). Furthermore sources of group identity must be relevant in order the other group to be 
considered as important and ingroup bias to emerge. At the same time, in order to enhance a 
positive identity (sense of self) of ingroup members, the other group must be compared 
unfavorably. 
This process is context-dependent till the point that even an arbitrary assignment (artificial 
induction) of identity in experimental settings can elicit discriminatory behavior, as in minimal 
groups experiments (Tajifel and Turner,1986; Cheng and Li, 2009). In these experiments, groups 
are created using trivial and almost meaningless tasks, such as preference for either Klee’s 
paintings or Kandinsky’s ones. 
The recognition of social identity in various interactions as relevant for economic theory and 
policies leads to its systematic introduction into economic literature, starting with the works of 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2002, 2005). Social identity theory was applied to the study of social 
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preferences (Chend and Li, 2009) and a large deal of evidence shows the existence of ingroup 
bias in other-regarding behavior and charity (Brown, 1978; Winterich et al., 2009).  
Chen and Li (2009) conduct a laboratory experiment using the minimal group paradigm to 
explore the effects of induced group identity on social preferences. They find that participants 
are more altruistic toward their ingroup: when matched with an ingroup member, subjects 
increase charity concerns, decrease in envy, and are more likely to reward for good behavior and 
to choose social-welfare-maximizing actions. 
Ben-Ner et al. (2009) verify the existence of favoritism for ingroup and discrimination against 
outgroup and their relative strength, considering multiple identity categories, such as body type, 
nationality, religion, political views. Their investigations concern different contexts: giving 
money in a dictator game, sharing office, commuting and work. In the first study, situations are 
hypothetical and people imaginary, while, in the second one, dictator game is incentivized by 
introducing actual money and real receivers. Results from this work supports SIT’s claims: 
subjects’ behaviors towards others are influenced by their identities and they exhibit a more 
favorable behavior towards those who belong to their ingroup in almost all categories and 
contexts considered in this exploration. Furthermore, they find that participants act in similar 
ways in both hypothetical and incentivized dictator games.  
Fong and Luttmer (2011) conduct a dictator game experiment to explore whether fairness and 
race matter in generosity. Donors are participants from a nationally representative sample, while 
recipients are local charities that serve the poor. They find a significant racial discrimination in 
giving operating through racially biased perceptions of the worthiness of recipients, rather than 
their real racial composition.  
The following paragraphs extensively introduce Terror Management Theory, offering a review 
of the main literature on TMT and giving behavior, highlighting the role of social norms and 
identity and the shared perspectives with SIT. 
 
2.2. Terror Management Theory and charitable giving 
TMT is a quite popular theory that has been giving birth to a long tradition of research since its 
introduction by Greenberg, Pyszczynski and Solomon in 1986: more than 400 studies have been 
produced in 16 countries until 2011 (Burke et al., 2010; Greenberg and Arndt, 2011). It has found 
large evidence and applications within psychology (even consumer psychology), sociology and 
anthropology. Even though TMT bears relevant implications in a number of fields, it received 
little attention in economic research. At this time, I identified only two marketing papers (Mandel 
and Heine, 1999; Ferraro et al., 2005).  
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TMT offers insights into a large range of human behaviors. Existing literature provides evidence 
of the importance of TMT for peace process (e.g. Niesta et al., 2008), understanding of prejudice 
and intergroup conflicts (e.g. Hirschberger et al., 2009), political attitude (e.g. Greenberg and 
Kosloff, 2008), consumer behavior (e.g. Mandel and Heine, 1999), religiosity (e.g. Jonas and 
Fischer, 2006) and so on. One of the most important TMT applications concerns individuals' 
prosocial behavior.  
TMT is based on the simple idea that the unconscious thoughts of death affect every human 
behavior and generate a status of anxiety and terror that must be managed continuously 
(Greenberg and Arndt, 2011). The potential for anxiety results from the juxtaposition of death 
awareness and the instinct of self-preservation. 
TMT describes a dual process model: (1) when thoughts of death are activated explicitly and are 
still conscious, proximal defenses are observed: people act to suppress, either consciously or 
unconsciously, death-related thoughts and concern, in an effort to distract themselves with either 
avoidant or proactive strategies; 
(2) when death thoughts are activated implicitly (either supraliminally or subliminally) and death 
concern is not in focal attention (it is unconscious), individuals tend to reduce anxiety by 
believing that some valued parts of themselves will continue after their biological cessation, 
either literally or symbolically (distal defenses).  
In particular, in this latter case, culture is found to provide people with protection from death-
related fear, as it enables them to perceive themselves as a valuable contributor to a meaningful 
realty and provide them with a sense of meaning (Jonas et al., 2013). More specifically culture 
offers two anxiety-buffering functions:  
(a) a cultural worldview of standards and values that enables those who live up to it to feel 
valuable and achieving death transcendence, either literal (e.g. heaven, nirvana) or symbolical 
(e.g. artworks, publications);  
(b) self-esteem, which is the belief of how well one is meeting those standards.  
Thus, death reminders motivate people to maintain faith in their cultural worldviews (cultural 
prescriptions) and live up to them, by bolstering their self-esteem in those domains (such as 
smoking, risky driving, healthy habits) that are relevant for their self-worth, in order to 
overwhelm potential anxiety (e.g. Greenberg et al. 1997; Solomon et al., 1991; Jonas et al., 2002). 
Self-esteem serves as a defense against unconscious concern about mortality and moderates the 
effects of implicit death priming (Jones et al., 2002). TMT posits that reminders of death 
(mortality salience stimuli) pose a threat and increase the importance of social norms and 
conformity to them as they represent a source of protection.  
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To the extent that prosocial behaviors are valued by one’ culture and group, they are a primary 
mean of worldview validation and self-esteem attainment. In other words, acting prosocial could 
serve as defense against the threat of (unconscious) mortality awareness.  
Within the field of prosocial behavior, previous researchers find that making human mortality 
salient leads people to become more generous and less selfish in their choices and, then, it induces 
an increase of prosocial attitude and charitable behaviors (Zaleskiewicz et al., 2015). Jonas et al. 
(2002) demonstrate that subjects that are interviewed directly in front of a funeral home (a 
supraliminal mortality stimulus) exhibit a more positive attitude towards charity. They find also 
that making people to think about their own death increases the amount of money they donate, 
but this response occurs only in favor of charitable organizations that benefit donors’ own culture 
(national charity). This finding is justified by the fact that people protect themselves by adhering 
to their cultural worldview, hence they are more willing to support those who share their culture 
and social norms (ingroup), rather than those who challenge their worldview. Hence, death 
increases prosocial behavior towards nonthreatening worldview-consistent causes. Social 
Identity Theory has already provided evidence of ingroup bias in helping behavior, but 
unconscious mortality salience (MS) enhances this reaction, leading to larger ingroup bias (Jones 
et al., 2002). The nature of the prosocial cause is found to matter: implicit death stimuli may have 
negative effects on donors’ decisions when the prosocial cause rekindles conscious death 
thoughts, such as signing organ donations card, helping to a wheelchair bound person 
(Hirschberger et al., 2008). A more recent study (Jones at al., 2013) combines TMT with the 
focus theory of normative conduct (Cialdini et al., 1991) in order to identify further conditions 
under which death reminders lead to prosocial shift, mainly towards outgroup beneficiaries. 
Consistently with previous researches, they find that unconscious MS reduces donations to a 
foreign charity, but this negative effect is eliminated when generosity and fairness social norms 
are primed. Results from this study confirm that culture matters in moderating death thoughts 
effects on prosocial behavior. Given the importance of fairness in contributing to a more safe and 
controllable social environment (Fehr and Schimdt, 1999), it provides defense against death 
anxiety. In summary, considerable evidence suggests that mortality thoughts lead to more 
prosocial attitudes and behaviors, especially towards givers' ingroup.  
Zaleskiewicz et al. (2015) further investigate the drivers of this effect, using dictator game, 
ultimatum game and a quasi-naturalistic giving situation. They demonstrate that not only 
unconscious MS increases prosocial acts, but also satisfaction associated with helping actions. 
They argue that generosity can fulfil psychological needs (such as self-esteem, belongingness 
and competence), which reduce the sense of vulnerability and finiteness. They also find that the 
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joy derived from giving is higher in presence of death thoughts (in absence of death priming 
being generous came at a personal psychological cost). They conclude that unconscious MS acts 
in a way that are more conductive to happiness, an intrinsic determinant of donation decision 
making process that is found to matter also in previous studies (e.g. Dunn et al., 2014). 
 
2.3. Terror Management and Social Identity Theories: an integration 
In this paper I suggest that Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Terror Management Theory (TMT) 
share some fundamentals and predict the same phenomena, where the latter specifically predict 
subjects responses to death priming.  
Both of them identify and describe the presence of ingroup bias in giving behavior. 
Social Identity Theory argues that people tend to favor a member of their (contingent) ingroup 
at the expense of their outgroup, to satisfy an identity need and to increase their (and maintaining 
high) self-esteem levels. Terror Management Theory states that in presence of death priming, 
preference for protection of the self increases in order to deal with the threat posed by death 
related thoughts. Consequently, people increase their defenses by adopting behaviors that are 
coherent with social norms shared within their culture and to bolster their self-esteem in those 
domains that are fundamental for their self-worth.  
On one side, SIT suggests that ingroup bias is the result of a preference for social identity, linked 
to self-esteem needs, and clearly describes how group identity arises. Need for self-esteem is 
presumed as ultimate development need, without explaining the reason. On the other hand, TMT 
refers to a generic group identity, but it clarifies why people need self-esteem and its role in 
ingroup favoritism processes. Furthermore, while SIT focuses on the need of social identity 
(defined as sense of positive self derived from group membership), self-protection is the main 
motif in TMT.  
Anyways, it is easy to detect common elements to integrate these two theories. In both of them, 
favorable behavior with respect to decision makers' ingroup derives by a need of adhering to 
cultural prescriptions of the reference group. Since prosocial behavior is endorsed and valued in 
many cultures and it is widely represented in social norms, it follows that: (i) decision makers 
direct their prosocial actions mainly at the benefit of their ingroup members, that are those who 
share their same social values and they identify with (SIT): (ii) this favorable behavior is 
enhanced when people are exposed to death stimuli that exacerbate their need for self-protection 
(TMT). 
To conclude, the virtue of SIT is that it offers instruments to understand how groups are defined 
and why ingroup bias is observable in several settings. TMT theoretical and experimental settings 
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do not explain how social identity emerges (its existence is taken for granted), but they permit to 
explain the desire to enhance self-esteem and explore the effects on intergroup discrimination 
(intragroup favoritism) under mortality stimuli. Hence, in this study I rely on SIT to identify the 
conditions and the group identity attribute along which manipulating ingroup favoritism and 
outgroup discrimination, and on TMT to design an experiment that permits me to assess the 
effects of the use of death priming in emotive charity advertising on donors’ decision and ingroup 
bias.  
 
3. The Experiment 
My experiment is designed to explore the effect of two different forms of death priming on 
givers’ decisions and ingroup bias in charitable behavior. 
It has been conducted in cooperation with UNICEF at the beginning of December 2015. The 
experimental setting is designed as a real UNICEF immunization campaign in favor of children 
living in the Third World. Subjects are exposed to alternative vaccination campaigns, used to 
manipulate experimental treatments. Experimental campaign material is displayed using power 
point presentations and it is based on real and publicly available UNICEF advertisements. It has 
been approved and its distribution during the experiment has been authorized by the chief of the 
local UNICEF Committee. 
After being exposed to the experimental treatments, participants are asked to contribute with 
monetary donations. I opt for voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) as it is adopted by 
UNICEF and it is one of the most common mechanism used in face-to-face fundraising races 
(Onderstal et al., 2014). 
In order to make the campaign more reliable, volunteers exhibiting UNICEF logo have been 
present during the entire duration of the experiment. 
It involves 547 economics undergraduate students at the University of Padua. Participants are 
not aware of taking part in an experiment. Before the beginning of the experiment, they are told 
that UNICEF is fundraising money in favor of children in need of vaccination and that a PhD 
student interested in the cause and some volunteers are hosted to present the campaign and 
explain how to contribute. 
The experiment is divided into two parts: the first (Campaign Presentation) takes place at the end 
of regular classes and the second (Fundraising) on the day after, in the nearby of the buildings of 
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the Department of Economics and Management where UNICEF volunteers collected subjects’ 
donations.  
I select classes of Mathematics and Macroeconomics, for the following reasons: (i) they are 
mandatory for both business and economics students; (ii) students are split into three groups 
according to the first letter of their family name (namely, A-E; F-O; P-Z); (iii) lectures are held 
on the same day at different hours; (iii) lectures are scheduled on three consecutive days, and this 
allows me to divide the experiment into the two main phases. 
 
3.1. Experiment treatments 
Overall I implement six different treatments, as shown in Table 1 and Table 3. 
Subjects are randomly assigned to conditions in a 3 (mortality salience manipulations – MSC; 
MS1; MS2) x 2 (Ingroup/Outgroup) between-subjects factorial design (Table 1). 
The six visual presentations are designed to be identical, except for the experimental 
manipulations.  
I choose race as group identity attribute and group identity is manipulated using images: subjects 
assigned to the Ingroup conditions are exposed to pictures of white-skinned (Caucasian) children, 
while Outgroup treatments show pictures depicting black-skinned (African) children3.  
Death priming (mortality salience) treatments are varied by changing salient words in the 
explanatory texts.  Explicit Death (MS1) treatment exploits an adaptation of real texts of UNICEF 
vaccination campaign that employ and emphasize words connected to death (“death”, “dying”, 
“lethal diseases”, “passing”) and prime death thoughts at a conscious level. In the Implicit Death 
(MS2) condition, same words related to death are flashed for 30ms every 3 seconds on the screen 
during the entire duration of the visual presentations. For ceteris paribus, neutral words of the 
same length (“abcde”, “abcdef”, “abcdefg”) are flashed also during the other treatments. The 
campaign material is the same as the one showed to the control group (MSC). 
The control treatment (MSC - Disease) is modified by substituting death-related words with 
others related to disease (“disease”, “getting sick”, “risky diseases”, “pathologies”).  
  
                                                          
3 Original UNICEF pictures are used. 
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Table 1 - Experiment Treatments 
 INGROUP RECIPIENTS OUTGROUP RECIPIENTS 
CONTROL – DISEASE  (MSC)   Group 1 Group 2 
EXPLICIT DEATH  (MS1) Group 3 Group 4 
IMPLICIT DEATH  (MS2) Group 5  Group 6 
Note: by comparing groups 1 and 2, I identify a ‘baseline’ ingroup bias, as predicted by Social Identity Theory.  
Comparisons among groups 1,3,5 and 2,4,6 allow me to answer to the first research question, while by comparing 
groups 3 v. 5 and 4 v. 6 I address the second question. By comparing groups 3 v. 4 and 5 v. 6, it is possible to identify 
ingroup bias under death priming and answer to the third research question. In order to address the last one, I compare 
groups 1 v. 5 and 2 v. 6 by exploring interactions with observed self-esteem dimensions. 
 
In the following part, I provide explanations and clarifications about the main choices behind the 
experiment treatments. 
Race as group identity attribute. The choice to prime race, a natural social category, to induce 
social identity follows several considerations. First, it is recognized in existing literature as one 
of the most important category for group identity (Ben-Ner, 2009; Brown, 2000). Second, it 
satisfies the three main mechanisms outlined by Tajifel and Turner (1986): categorization, 
identification and comparison. As surface-level attribute, it is easily identifiable and comparable 
in a context such as charity campaign. Third, it is coherent with this experimental setting, it 
contributes to make the experiment more credible and it does not compromise the reliability of 
my findings. Current TMT experiments identify ingroup/outgroup with national and foreign 
charities. This option is not exempt from criticisms. Indeed the estimated effect could be driven 
by a greater familiarity with a national organization rather than with a foreign one, by 
organizations’ reputation or attitudes towards them (for example, organizational values, donors’ 
religiosity, identification or past experience with the organization). Fourth, it has been preferred 
over other attributes related to charity setting, such as nationality (e.g. Italian v. Eritrean), to 
avoid donors’ perception of victims worthiness to drive the effect: e.g. Italian children in need 
may be perceived as more privileged, as they can benefit from better networks and 
infrastructures, or African children as in a more desperate situation and less likely to be saved. 
In order to reduce this risk, in all the presentations a list of the recipients countries is displayed, 
not only to make the campaign more reliable, but also to clarify that white-skinned children do 
not live in Western economies, possibility that again might alter potential givers perceptions of 
recipients’ worthiness. Furthermore, it is not specified in which country children live, in order to 
avoid unobservable individual preferences and prejudice to affect their choices. In addition, 
countries where terroristic groups actively operate have been excluded.  
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Campaign pictures show both male and female children, as gender could be a relevant group 
identity attribute. For this reason and to avoid that the specific characteristics that must be made 
salient in the presentation of an identifiable victim represent relevant identity categories for 
potential donors, this experimental cause is designed to assist statistical victims rather than 
identifiable ones. Furthermore, for policy implication concerns, I decide to use a setting that 
could be as generic as possible. 
Control (Disease) treatment. Usually, in TMT experiments the control group is primed with 
negative treatments (e.g. dental pain) unrelated to the experimental setting. In this case, control 
treatment has to be more realistic, in order to make the experiment more credible and to produce 
indications about good practices. It is sufficient to watch charity advertisements on TV to figure 
out that disease and death represent the main motifs in emotive charity advertising and they are 
quite often alternatively used. Hence, coherently with many campaigns of large charitable 
organizations, the focus is on disease rather than death.   
Explicit Death treatment. Victims are not depicted as gravely ill and dying. They are described 
as in risk of dying (getting sick in the control conditions), without emphasizing a different 
urgency or need that could affect givers’ perception of recipients’ worthiness and, subsequently, 
their donation decisions. Furthermore, individual unobservable (e.g. generosity) could drive 
estimates. Then in this setting vaccination is the perfect charity cause to this purpose. 
Implicit Death treatment. Even though implicit induction used in this experiment seems not 
easily doable in charity campaigns, it represents a proper experimental manipulation and it may 
be transposed into the real world through the use of images, small print texts or introducing an 
element of distraction able to push death thoughts out of consciousness.    
 
3.2. Experiment Phases 
 
Table 2 – Experiment Phases 
DAY 1 DAY 2 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
Vaccination Campaign 
Presentation 
Donation Decision (part 1) 
Willingness to Donate 
Anonymous 
Questionnaire 
Donation Decision (part 2) 
Fundraising 
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Phase 1. The experimenter introduces and presents the campaign, while displaying the power 
point presentations. In this stage, request appeal is crucial and the presenter uses always the same 
mode of ask and techniques that are found to increase donors' compliance in face-to-face forms 
of solicitation: e.g. legitimizing contributions, using sentences like "every penny will help" 
(Sargeant, 1999). The presentation contains also the relevant information about donation 
procedure and transparency (subjects are apprised that a brief report about the campaign’s results 
would have been uploaded by professors on the University e-learning platform).   
Phase 2. Subjects are provided with a sheet, on which they have to write the amount in euro they 
would like to donate, an empty envelope and a questionnaire. They are asked to fill the sheet and 
to drop it in apposite boxes and, at the same time, they are told to take the envelope home, put 
the cash corresponding to the amount they have declared inside, seal and deliver it before or after 
classes to UNICEF volunteers positioned in the nearby of Department’s buildings on the day 
after. This procedure contributes to confer a sense of privacy and anonymity, and to avoid 
distortive effects on subjects' decisions (Hirschberger, 2008). Furthermore, asking givers to leave 
their donations into an envelope permits to keep track of individual choices. Indeed both the sheet 
and the envelope report the same serial number, necessary to identify subjects, along with 
UNICEF logo.  
Phase 3. Anonymous questionnaires are used to collect information on individual characteristics 
(background and attitude), that can potentially confound the relationship between treatments and 
outcomes of interest. They are tagged with the same serial number reported on the other 
experimental material. The experimenter justified the administration of the questionnaire (in 
Phase 1, during the presentation) as part of a study on charitable giving conducted by the 
Department of Economics and Management of the University of Padua in cooperation with 
UNICEF. 
Information requested in the questionnaire are reported below:  
(a) Demographic and socio-economic factors: age, gender, area of origin and where they are 
currently living, net monthly household income. Existing research suggests that gender, age, 
income, geographic characteristics have some effects on prosocial behavior and in particular 
monetary contributions (e.g. Schlegelmilch et al., 1997; Bennett, 2003; Lee and Chang, 2007). 
(b) Past giving behavior: whether donated in the past, type of donation, frequency of giving, last 
donation time, last and average amount in euro of their donations (if they donated money before), 
previous donations to UNICEF and/or to other organizations. Past donation experience deserves 
particular attention, as it matters in shaping donors' future behavior (e.g. Sargeant, 1999). In 
particular it has been emphasized the importance for charities of creating and maintaining good 
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relationship with their donors, as: i) donors prefer to develop relationship with organizations they 
decide to support; ii) once the donors have been recruited, they will be more likely to give again 
in the future; iii) giving regularly strengthens the norm attached to the role and donors' 
satisfaction with their decisions. Furthermore the effect of past donation experiences (decisions) 
on future ones may be explained by behavioral spillovers. For example, if behaving prosocially 
has a positive weight attached to it, giving today (wearing a charity pin) can boost one's self-
image and then favor other generous decisions in the future (e.g. monetary donations). At the 
same time, altruistic choice today may lead to permitting spillovers tomorrow in two cases: i) 
utility from self-image is a substitute for direct satisfaction from donating money and this may 
lead to subsequent lower donations to charity; ii) accomplishing or attending to a pro-sociality 
motive leaves lower resources that can be, consciously or unconsciously, redirected toward other 
accounts and it results in donating less to charity in the immediate future (Dolan and Galizzi, 
2015). 
(c) Implicit death priming moderating variables: general self-esteem, giving and money based 
self-esteem. General self-esteem is measured using the Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scale. The 
scales used to assess giving and money based self-esteem (Table 5 and Table 6) are adapted from 
Rosenberg (1965), Hansen et al.(2010), Ben Ari et al. (1999), Shehryar and Hunt (2005).  
(d) Perceived closeness to charity recipients. Participants are asked to declare on a 10-point scale 
how close they perceive themselves to campaign recipients. Even though past research suggests 
that monetary contributions are more likely to be predicted by demographic and socio-economic 
conditions than psychographic and attitudinal-based factors (Lee and Chang, 2007), social and 
psychological distance has been found to affect giving decisions and ingroup bias (e.g. Fong and 
Luttmer, 2011). 
(e) Other Controls. Even though vaccination is the proper cause for the sake of death priming 
manipulations, it is not exempt from other concerns. In the last years, disputes and controversies 
about vaccination efficacy and alleged detrimental effects arose and they could affect potential 
givers’ opinion and their giving behavior. Hence, questions that capture participants’ opinion 
about vaccination are included in the questionnaire, along with others asking for the reason why 
they eventually decided to not donate. 
Phase 4. The following day, UNICEF volunteers position themselves close to the main accesses 
to the Department buildings where classes are held and collect (in anonymous form) the 
envelopes containing students’ donation.   
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I decide to separate the time in which subjects declare their willingness to donate and the one in 
which they materially deliver money in order to avoid their contributions to be affected by the 
amount of cash they have in their wallets, which represents an unobservable budget constraint 
that cannot be captured by any dimension of their socio-economic status. 
Informing the students about the event the day before, in order they take extra cash with them, is 
not an option. Their preconception and other factors could affect their decision prior to the 
treatments administration in a non-random way, according to unobservable individual 
preferences and characteristics. Furthermore, this procedure mimics the one that UNICEF 
actually implements in street fundraising: potential donors are informed and asked to declare 
their willingness to donate and to provide contacts (including bank account or credit card 
number); a couple of days later they are contacted to authorize the money transfer. Lastly, this 
choice enables me to explore both potential donors’ intention to donate (hypothetical measure) 
and their real donation. In previous studies (e.g. Ben-Ner et al., 2009), subjects are found to 
contribute with similar amounts and discriminate between ingroup and outgroup in similar 
degrees in the hypothetical and incentivized dictator games. 
It is important to highlight that, in this experiment, variations among the six treatments are 
designed to reduce the likelihood of ‘contamination’ across experimental groups: differences are 
minimal and concern only the relevant words that have been highlighted and pictures depicting 
children, to manipulate treatments.  
 
4. Data Analysis and Results 
In presenting my results I proceed as follows. First, I describe the construction of the self-esteem 
scores. Second, I define criteria for observations and variable exclusion. Finally, I report results 
of the main data exploration and analysis.  
 
4.1. Self-esteem scores construction 
Table 4 reports the Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scale. Since it is a validated instrument to 
measure individuals’ self-esteem, self-esteem total score is the sum of the ten items’ score.  
Conversely, scales used do assess giving and money based self-esteems (Table 5 and Table 6 
respectively) are not validated. They are adapted from Rosemberg (1965) and other scales used 
to assess self-esteem based on: smoking (Hansen et al., 2010), drinking (Shehryar and Hunt, 
2005), and risky driving (Ben Ari et al., 1999). 
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In this case, before generating the score, a valid approach is to perform a confirmatory factor 
analysis in order to verify scale construction and operationalization. 
Table 7 and Table 8 report the results of the confirmatory factor analysis for each scale. Both the 
two tables show that scales items map together in one factor. Only seven items from giving self-
esteem scales load, while all the money based self-esteem’s items do. Then, for each scale, raw 
scores corresponding to all the items loading on the factor are summed (items with negative 
loadings are subtracted). 
Before the construction of the scores, I verified the presence of missing items. The observations 
for which more than the half of the row items are missing are not used in the construction of the 
scales. In the other cases I replace them with the average of the available row items’ scores, since 
items are missing at random. Randomness is verified by running a logistic regression of a dummy 
that takes value 1 if at least one row item is missing (0 otherwise) on all the available variables 
that could affect the probability of not answering. None of the observable variables has a 
statistical significant effect on the outcome dummy.   
 
4.2. Observations and variables exclusion 
Next to the construction of the self-esteem scores, I perform some checks to clean my dataset. 
After a first exploratory analysis, I set some criteria for both observations and variables 
exclusion.  
Observations are excluded if missing observations are on at least one dependent variable. 
According to this criterion, 10 observations are dropped. 
Variables with more than 10 missing observations are not considered in the analysis, with the 
exception of variables that are relevant for this study, such as household income dummies. 
Control variables that survive this selection are: age, male, previous donation (binary), closeness 
to victims, household income, and variables capturing the effect of subjects’ opinion about 
vaccination (see Table 9). Furthermore, I decide to exclude the variable measuring the amount 
participants declare to be willing to donate, as it is not a reliable measure. By asking to subjects 
this information, I meant to create the pretext to capture the intention to donate and the interest 
in the presented charity cause. 
  
4.3. Data Analysis and Results 
Starting with Table 12, that reports sample statistics of the dependent variables by treatment, we 
observe that a very small fraction of participants actually decide to contribute to the charity cause 
with a monetary donation. Table 13 delivers the number (and relative percentage) of subjects that 
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declare to be willing to donate and that actually donate and we can observe that very few subjects 
actually give. Table 14 shows that 2 subjects assigned to the DE-Outgroup condition and 4 to the 
ED-Outgroup one declare to not be willing to donate, but then they contribute in some extent. 
Because of the few observations of Donation Choice dummy, I am forced to rely on the outcome 
variable Willing to Donate only. Data are analyzed and presented as follows. First, I explore 
ingroup bias in the base group (MSC – Disease), also in Donation Choice and Donation Amount. 
Then I run alternative specifications of logistic regressions of the outcome variable Willing to 
Donate on the main treatment variables and controls to explore how mortality treatments affect 
subjects’ decisions towards ingroup and outgroup and whether these effects are different in a 
statistical significant way. Finally, I add interaction terms to assess the role of subjects’ self-
esteem in responses to implicit death priming. 
 
4.3.1. Results 
First I explore the presence of ingroup bias in the control group (Disease – MSc). I perform a t-
test for each dependent variable (Table 15) and, as predicted by Social Identity Theory, I find a 
statistical significant favoritism in intention to donate at the benefit of ingroup recipients with 
respect to those that belong to the outgroup. Since a very small fraction of participants actually 
donates, I perform also a Mann Whitney Wilcoxon test (Table 16), as it does not require the 
assumption of normal distribution, and also this test delivers similar results.  
Table 17 shows exactly the opposite path: when pushed to think about recipients’ death, donors 
in the sample are less willing to donate to ingroup recipients and more likely to donate to 
outgroup beneficiaries under both explicit and implicit death priming (MS1 and MS2) with respect 
to those exposed to the “disease” (MSC) treatment. These effects are robust to the inclusion of 
controls capturing the effects of self-esteem and other variables gathered through the 
questionnaire, with a loss of statistical significance on the effects of implicit and explicit death 
priming on willingness to donate to ingroup (WTDI) and outgroup (WTDO) respectively when 
all the controls are included (probably because of a huge drop in the observations).  
The bottom part of Table 17 shows that the difference between the coefficients of explicit and 
implicit death priming is not statistically significant. Postestimation tests in Table demonstrate 
that, under death priming, ingroup bias is still there but with reversed sign: we observe outgroup 
favoritism and ingroup discrimination. Again, the result is robust to the inclusion of all the 
controls (Table 19). 
Table 20 answers to the fourth research question by reporting interactions effects between 
Implicit Death and Self-esteem dummies plus demographic controls. If we look at the subsample 
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of subjects with high level of self-esteem (top part of the table) that are not exposed to any death 
priming, we observe that they are less willing to give to ingroup recipients with respect to those 
in the control group, while the negative effect on WTDO is not statistically significant. Subjects 
in the control groups high in giving based self-esteem exhibit a different behavior: both the 
effects on WTDI and WTDO are positive, but only the latter is statistically significant. The 
opposite is find when we focus on those that highly base their self-esteem on money: negative 
attitude is statistically significant only towards ingroup, not towards outgroup. 
When exposed to Implicit Death we observe that subjects are less willing to donate to their 
experimental ingroup and more willing to donate to the outgroup (negative sign of non-
statistically significant effects on WTDO turns positive and statistically different from zero) 
regardless of self-esteem levels and domains. Postestimation tests reported at the bottom part of 
each group of regressions show that, given high level of general, giving and money based self-
esteems, Implicit Death priming exacerbates negative attitude towards ingroup and positive 
attitude towards outgroup. Subjects are less (more) willing to donate to their ingroup (outgroup) 
in a statistically significant way when implicitly exposed to death thoughts rather than to ones 
related to disease. At the same time, under Implicit Death priming, no difference is observed at 
different levels of self-esteem. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
In this study I draw on Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Terror Management Theory (TMT) to 
expand our understanding of ingroup bias in charitable giving. I aim at investigating the effect 
of the use of death priming in emotive charity advertisement on potential donors’ decisions and 
ingroup bias. In particular I compare implicit and explicit priming of death thoughts against 
priming of thoughts related to disease and I explore the role of various dimensions of subjects’ 
self-esteem in moderating their responses to implicit stimuli. To this purpose I conduct a field 
experiment in cooperation with one of the largest and most reliable charities: UNICEF. The 
experiment involves 547 undergraduate economics students that are assigned to six conditions in 
a 3 (death priming) x 2 (ingroup/outgroup) between subjects design. They are exposed to six 
different charity advertising of an immunization campaign, which are used to manipulate 
experimental treatments. Group identity is operationalized through images of beneficiaries using 
race as identity attribute. Thoughts of death are manipulated in the explanatory texts. 
From this study we learn that:  
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(i) in the base (control) group, ingroup bias emerges in the intention to donate in a way coherent 
with SIT predictions and we observe ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination;  
(ii) level and domains of self-esteem moderate subjects’ responses to the control treatment;  
(iii) when death thoughts are primed in relation to charity recipients, discrimination is at the 
expense of the ingroup (Caucasian children) and favoritism toward the outgroup (African 
children);  
(iv) implicit death effects arise independently from the level of general self-esteem and self-
esteem’s relevant domains;  
(v) difference in the effects of explicit and implicit death priming on intention to donate is not 
statistically significant when death thoughts are related to third party victims (charity 
beneficiaries). 
Some of these findings deserve particular attention.  
(ii) Level and domains of self-esteem moderate subjects’ responses to the control treatment. 
In the base group, ingroup bias emerges at the expenses of the outgroup, as predicted by SIT. 
When we look at the subgroup of subjects with high levels of general self-esteem, we note that 
they are less willing to donate to the ingroup and no difference is observed in their intention to 
donate to the outgroup. 
Why? The answer lies on simple explanation: ingroup is composed by low socio-economic status 
(low-SES) individuals. Ingroup distancing effect assists us in understanding this phenomenon, 
suggesting that Whites negatively react to low-socio economic status racial ingroup, as they 
represent a threat to their personal and group-level status (Kunstman et al., 2016). Coherently 
with this prediction, SIT suggests that one favors his own ingroup as long as it confers a positive 
identity. In this study this is not the case: ingroup is composed by victims, poor people in need 
of help, that obstacle the construction of potential donors’ positive image of the self. But why 
does this reaction happen only when self-esteem is high? People high in self-esteem do not 
identify themselves with their salient ingroup in the experiment in larger extent with respect to 
those with low self-esteem. When self-esteem is low, the need of identity is higher and it is harder 
to take distance (psychologically) with respect to the ingroup without proper incentives.  
At the same time, decrease in the intention to donate to outgroup is not statistically significant. 
Again the ingroup distancing effect (Kunstman et al., 2016) provides us a valuable explanation: 
participants explicitly perceive low-SES ingroup (Whites) as greater status and prestige threats 
of their racial ingroup than low-SES Blacks. 
If we look at the specific self-esteem domains we observe effects in the predicted direction: high 
self-esteem in giving corresponds to higher intention to donate, high self-esteem in money leads 
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to a decrease in willingness to give. The first effect is significant on willingness to donate to 
outgroup, the second to the ingroup. The evidence is stronger where the ‘natural’ tendency to be 
generous or materialistic is coherent with subjects’ attitude towards their experimental ingroup 
and outgroup: one is generous and he gives more to outgroup recipients, as they do not represent 
a threat to his positive identity; one is more materialistic and he gives less to the ingroup 
beneficiaries, as they endanger his positive self-image. The effect of giving based self-esteem is 
stronger probably because giving less to the ingroup comes at a psychological cost for the donors 
in absence of death priming (Zaleskiewicz et al., 2015), even if they are high in money-based 
self-esteem. 
(iii) When death thoughts are related to charity recipients, discrimination is at the expense of the 
ingroup (Caucasian children) and favoritism is toward the outgroup (African children). 
These results do not replicate main findings of previous TMT studies under different perspectives 
(Jones et al., 2002; Jones et al., 2013), likely because priming of death thoughts is related to third 
party victims rather than to donors. In the discussion of this finding, I keep self-esteem hypothesis 
apart for a while and I offer some explanations starting from the estimated negative effect of both 
implicit and explicit death priming on willingness to donate to ingroup. TMT states that mortality 
awareness increases the need to have a positive image of the ingroup and consequently 
participants negatively overreact towards ingroup members that represent a menace to their 
positive self-image (ingroup distancing effect). Furthermore, participants can take distance from 
ingroup as a tactic to avoid death thoughts (less willing to donate), as these thoughts are related 
to their ingroup. As concerns the positive effect on willingness to donate to outgroup, I can argue 
that participants may not feel a direct threat of death stimuli, as these stimuli are not related to 
them or their relevant ingroup. I identify two possibilities. First, death thoughts related to 
outgroup victims do not represent a threat at all and participants react with a proactive strategy 
(more willing to donate) to the more urgent need of help posed by death with respect to disease. 
Second, death thoughts associated to the low SES outgroup satisfy the need to have a positive 
image of the contingent relevant ingroup (e.g. other classmates, friends) and the self in 
comparison to the experimental outgroup. Consequently death stimuli positively affect intention 
to donate to the outgroup, as in this case giving may underline ‘superiority’ of the donors. 
 (iv) Implicit death effects arise independently from the level of general self-esteem and self-
esteem’s relevant domains. 
I consider the self-esteem hypothesis again. Implicit death priming exacerbates subjects' 
reactions towards ingroup and outgroup with respect to the control conditions, independently 
from the level of their self-esteem. 
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In this case, ingroup discrimination and outgroup favoritism emerge also for low self-esteem 
people: under implicit death priming, detachment from the ingroup and favorable attitude 
towards outgroup do not come at a psychological cost (Zaleskiewicz et al., 2015). 
It is interesting to notice that both giving and money based self-esteems measures exhibit similar 
paths, under implicit death priming. Under this treatment, also highly materialistic people are 
more willing to donate to the outgroup and the more generous are less willing to donate to the 
ingroup. 
So neither the level nor the domains of subjects' self-esteem moderate people reactions to implicit 
death priming. 
Even though willingness to donate is «cheap talks», I obtain results that are robust and coherent 
with theoretical predictions. This study offers interesting intuitions for the marketing of charities 
and large humanitarian organizations. Caution is recommended in the use of death priming in the 
advertising campaigns supporting victims that can be perceived by donors as members of their 
ingroup. Given the distortions we observe in the attitudes towards ingroup, further explorations 
about the role of self-esteem is suggested in order to identify a strategy to deal with them. 
Conversely, when charity recipients clearly belong to a donors’ relevant outgroup, activation of 
death thoughts is suggested.  
To conclude, the integration between SIT and TMT is of particular interest for economic analysis, 
as it allows a better understanding of the fundamentals of ingroup bias in social preferences, the 
role of self-esteem and responses to one of the most common real world stimuli: death. Besides 
prosocial and charity behaviour, a further development of this integration could assist in the study 
of decision makers’ reactions to phenomena such as terroristic attacks, large environment 
disasters, and wars. 
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Table 3 - Summary of experimental design 
Treatments Description 
DE-Ingroup (Control) Disease/Ingroup recipients 
DE-Outgroup (Control) Disease/Outgroup recipients 
ED-Ingroup Explicit Death/Ingroup recipients 
ED-Outgroup Explicit Death/Outgroup recipients 
ID-Ingroup Implicit Death/Ingroup recipients 
ID-Outgroup Implicit Death/Outgroup recipients 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 – Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale, Rosenberg (1965) 
Variable Item Statements Range 
Self-esteem 
Item1 On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 0-3 
Item2 At times I think I am no good at all. * 0-3 
Item3 I feel that I have a number of good qualities. 0-3 
Item4 I am able to do things as well as most other people. 0-3 
Item5 I feel I do not have much to be proud of. * 0-3 
Item6 I certainly feel useless at times. *  0-3 
Item7 
I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal plane 
with others. 0-3 
Item8 I wish I could have more respect for myself. * 0-3 
Item9 All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. * 0-3 
Item10 I take a positive attitude toward myself. 0-3 
Note: validated scale; self-esteem measure equals the sum of the ten items’ scores; * items reversed for scoring. 
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Table 5 – Giving based Self-esteem scale 
Variable Item Statements Range 
Giving based  
Self-esteem 
ItemG1 Giving brings out unwanted aspects of my character. 1-7 
ItemG2 Giving hurts my social relationships. 1-7 
ItemG3 Giving allows me to be one of the group *, # 1-7 
ItemG4 Giving allows others to derogate me. 1-7 
ItemG5 Giving allows me to make a good impression on others. *, # 1-7 
ItemG6 Giving allows me to feel valued by others. *, # 1-7 
ItemG7 Giving damages my positive self-image. 1-7 
ItemG8 While Giving, I feel uncomfortable being with others. * 1-7 
ItemG9 Giving allows me to feel worthy. *, # 1-7 
ItemG10 Giving allows me to feel useful. *, # 1-7 
 ItemG11 Giving allows me to be proud of myself. *, # 1-7 
 ItemG12 Giving allows me to be satisfied with myself. *, # 1-7 
Note: adapted from Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965), Driving-based Self-Esteem scale (Ben-Ari et 
al., 1999), Drinking-based Self-Esteem scale (Shehryar and Hunt, 2005), and Smoking-based Self-Esteem scale 
(Hansen et al., 2010); scale validated through Confirmatory Factor Analysis; * items reversed for scoring; # loading 
factors (Eigenvalue > 2.5) 
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Table 6 - Money based Self-esteem scale 
Variable Item Statements Range 
Money based  
Self-esteem 
ItemM1 Having money brings out unwanted aspects of my character. # 1-7 
ItemM2 Having money hurts my social relationships. # 1-7 
ItemM3 Having money allows me to be one of the group. *, # 1-7 
ItemM4 Having money allows others to derogate me. # 1-7 
ItemM5 
Having money allows me to make a good impression on 
others. *, # 1-7 
ItemM6 Having money allows me to feel valued by others. *, # 1-7 
ItemM7 Having money damages my positive self-image. # 1-7 
ItemM8 
Having money showing to have money, I feel uncomfortable 
being with others. *, # 1-7 
ItemM9 Having money allows me to feel worthy. *, # 1-7 
ItemM10 Having money allows me to feel useful.  *, # 1-7 
 ItemM11 Having money allows me to be proud of myself. *, # 1-7 
 ItemM12 Having money allows me to be satisfied with myself. *, # 1-7 
Note: adapted from Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965), Driving-based Self-Esteem scale (Ben-Ari et 
al., 1999), Drinking-based Self-Esteem scale (Shehryar and Hunt, 2005), and Smoking-based Self-Esteem scale 
(Hansen et al., 2010); scale validated through Confirmatory Factor Analysis; * items reversed for scoring; # loading 
factors (Eigenvalue > 2.5) 
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Table 7 – Giving based self-esteem, factor analysis 
Items Loading Uniqueness 
Giving allows me to be one of the group.  0.5302 0.7189 
Giving allows me to make a good impression on others. 0.6854 0.5302 
Giving allows me to feel valued by others. 0.7476 0.4411 
Giving allows me to feel worthy.  0.6977 0.5132 
Giving allows me to feel useful.  0.6302 0.6029 
Giving allows me to be proud of myself.  0.8164 0.3335 
Giving allows me to be satisfied with myself.  0.8250 0.3193 
Note: observations 514; number of item in the scale 7; Cronbach’s alpha 0.8664; loading threshold 0.3 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 - Money based self-esteem, factor analysis 
Items Loading Uniqueness 
Having money brings out unwanted aspects of my character.  -0.4407 0.8058 
Having money hurts my social relationships.  -0.4378 0.8083 
Having money allows me to be one of the group.  0.7218 0.4789 
Having money allows others to derogate me.  -0.5655 0.6803 
Having money allows me to make a good impression on others.  0.7209 0.4803 
Having money allows me to feel valued by others.  0.7742 0.4006 
Having money damages my positive self-image.  -0.4878 0.7621 
While showing to have money, I feel uncomfortable being with others. 0.3022 0.9087 
Having money allows me to feel worthy.  0.7886 0.3782 
Having money allows me to feel useful.   0.6937 0.5188 
Having money allows me to be proud of myself.  0.7898 0.3761 
Having money allows me to be satisfied with myself.  0.7431 0.4477 
Note: observations 522; number of item in the scale 12; Cronbach’s alpha 0.8772; loading threshold 0.3 
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Table 9 - Variables description 
Variables Type Description 
Willingn to Donate Dummy Equal to 1 if willing to donate; 0 otherwise 
Donation Choice Dummy Equal to 1 if actually willing to donate; 0 otherwise 
Donation Amount Continous Amount of donations in euro 
Disease* Dummy Treatment: equal to 1 if disease; 0 otherwise 
Explicit Death Dummy Treatment: equal to 1 if explicit death; 0 otherwise 
Implicit Death Dummy Treatment: equal to 1 if implicit death; 0 otherwise 
Ingroup Dummy Treatment: equal to 1 if ingroup recipients; 0 otherwise 
Self-Esteem Continous Self-esteem score 
Self-Esteem High Dummy Equal to 1 if high self-esteem; 0 otherwise 
Giving Self-Esteem Continous Giving-based self-esteem score 
Giving Self-Esteem High Dummy Equal to 1 if high giving-based self-esteem; 0 otherwise 
Money Self-Esteem Continous Money-based self-esteem score 
Money Self-Esteem High Dummy Equal to 1 if high money-based self-esteem; 0 otherwise 
Age Age  
Male Dummy Equal to 1 if male; 0 otherwise 
Previous Donation Dummy Equal to 1 if donated before; 0 otherwise 
Closeness to victims Ordinal Perceived closeness to campaign’s recipients on 10-point scale 
Vaccinated Dummy Equal to 1 if vaccinated; 0 otherwise 
Vaccination effective Dummy Opinion about vaccination: equal to 1 if considered effective; 0 otherwise 
Vaccination necessary Dummy Opinion about vaccination: equal to 1 if considered necessary; 0 otherwise 
Vaccination detrimental - yes* Dummy Opinion about vaccination: equal to 1 if considered detrimental; 0 otherwise 
Vaccination detrimental - no Dummy 
Opinion about vaccination: equal to 1 if not considered detrimental; 0 
otherwise 
Vaccination detrimental - not 
know 
Dummy Opinion about vaccination: equal to 1 if not known if detrimental; 0 otherwise 
Vaccine children Dummy 
Opinion about vaccination: equal to 1 if intention to vaccine children; 0 
otherwise 
Household income Dummy 
Monthly net household income in euro: dummyfied (less than or equal to 1200; 
between 1400 and 1800; 2000; 2500; 3000*; 4000; 5000 more than or equal to 
5000) 
Note: * base group 
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Table 10 – Summary statistics 
 
 
Characteristics Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Willing to Donate  537 0.325885 0.469141 0 1 
Donation Choice  537 0.098697 0.298532 0 1 
Donation Amount  537 0.489274 2.376714 0 40 
Disease  537 0.428305 0.495295 0 1 
Explicit Death  537 0.277467 0.448167 0 1 
Implicit Death   537 0.294227 0.45612 0 1 
Ingroup  537 0.400372 0.490431 0 1 
Self-Esteem  533 20.80847 4.419163 8 30 
Self-Esteem (dummy)  533 0.532833 0.499389 0 1 
Giving Self-Esteem  530 30.55641 8.637957 7 49 
Giving Self-Esteem (dummy)  530 0.526415 0.499773 0 1 
Money Self-Esteem  521 -2.12685 12.37734 -20 50 
Money Self-Esteem (dummy)  521 0.518234 0.500148 0 1 
Age  532 19.82707 1.552648 18 44 
Male  534 0.490637 0.500381 0 1 
Previous Donation  535 0.691589 0.46227 0 1 
Closeness to victims  420 5.588095 2.094282 1 10 
Vaccination 
Vaccinated 517 0.947776 0.222695 0 1 
Vaccination effective 515 0.809709 0.392913 0 1 
Vaccination necessary 516 0.850775 0.356656 0 1 
Vaccination detrimental - yes 514 0.052529 0.223309 0 1 
Vaccination detrimental - no 514 0.702335 0.457677 0 1 
Vaccination detrimental - not known 514 0.245136 0.430587 0 1 
Vaccine children 516 0.844961 0.362293 0 1 
Net (monthly) household 
income  
Less than 1200 409 0.0978 0.297407 0 1 
Between 1400 and 1800 409 0.100245 0.300694 0 1 
2000 409 0.129584 0.336257 0 1 
2500 409 0.161369 0.368322 0 1 
3000 409 0.176039 0.38132 0 1 
4000 409 0.151589 0.359062 0 1 
5000 409 0.056235 0.230657 0 1 
More than 5000 409 0.127139 0.333537 0 1 
 
 
 
 
116 
 
 
Table 11 – Sample composition by treatment 
Treatments Frequency Percentage 
Ingroup/ 
Outgroup 
Frequency Percentage 
Disease 230 42.83 
Outgroup 112 52.09 
Ingroup 118 47.91 
Explicit Death 149 27.75 
Outgroup 183 85.12 
Ingroup 32 14.88 
Implicit Death 158 29.42 
Outgroup 135 62.79 
Ingroup 80 37.21 
 
 
 
 
Table 12 – Dependent variables, sample statistics by treatment 
 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
DISEASE EXPLICIT DEATH IMPLICIT DEATH 
Obs Mean St. Dev. Obs Mean St. Dev. Obs Mean St. Dev. 
Outgroup 
WTD (dummy) 127 0.173228 0.379943 117 0.358974 0.481763 78 0.461539 0.501745 
Donation Choice (dummy) 127 0.11811 0.324017 117 0.102564 0.304694 78 0.051282 0.222 
Donation Amount 127 0.792126 3.905401 117 0.444872 2.07395 78 0.238462 1.2849 
Ingroup 
WTD (dummy) 103 0.504854 0.502421 32 0.28125 0.456803 80 0.175 0.382364 
Donation Choice (dummy) 103 0.165049 0.37304 32 0.03125 0.176777 80 0.05 0.21932 
Donation Amount 103 0.626214 1.674079 32 0.15625 0.883884 80 0.274875 1.349522 
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Table 13 – Giving choices dummies: Willing to Donate and Donation Choice, frequency and percentage 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 WTD (dummy) DONATION CHOICE 
TREATMENTS Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
DISEASE 
Ingroup 52 49.05 17 16.04 
Outgroup 22 20.75 15 14.16 
EXPLICIT DEATH 
Ingroup 9 14.06 1 1.56 
Outgroup 42 65.63 12 18.75 
IMPLICIT DEATH 
Ingroup 14 24.14 4 6.90 
Outgroup 36 62.06 4 6.90 
         Note: percentage is calculated to the number of participants in each treatment 
 
 
 
 
Table 14 – Donation Choice composition 
  DONATION CHOICE 
  WTD==1 & DC == 1 WTD==0 & DC == 1 
TREATMENTS Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
DISEASE 
Ingroup 17 16.04 0 0 
Outgroup 13 12.27 2 1.89 
EXPLICIT DEATH 
Ingroup 1 1.56 0 0 
Outgroup 8 12.5 4 6.25 
IMPLICIT DEATH 
Ingroup 4 4.44 0 0 
Outgroup 4 5.13 0 0 
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Table 15 - Ingroup bias in base group (Disease), t-test 
VARIABLE 
Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup = Ingroup 
Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. DIFFERENCE 
t-test 
(p-value) 
WTD 127 0.173228 0.033715 0.379943 103 0.504854 0.049505 0.502421 0.331626 0.0000 
DONATION CHOICE 127 0.11811 0.028752 0.324017 103 0.165049 0.036757 0.37304 0.0469383 - 
DONATION AMOUNT 127 0.792126 0.346548 3.905401 103 0.626214 0.164952 1.674079 -0.1659124 - 
Note: this table compares the base group means of the three dependent variables along ingroup and outgroup. In the last two columns, I report the difference that 
measures ingroup bias and results of the t-test. 
 
 
 
 
Table 16 - Ingroup bias in base group (Disease), Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test 
 Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup = Ingroup 
VARIABLE Obs Rank Sum Expected Obs Rank Sum Expected z Prob > |z| 
WTD 127 12499.5 14668.5 103 14065.5 11896.5 -5.342 0.0000 
DONATION CHOICE 127 14361.5 14668.5 103 12203.5 11896.5 -1.021 0.3074 
DONATION AMOUNT 127 14369.5 14668.5 103 12195.5 11896.5 -0.99 0.3219 
 Note: this table reports the results of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for the base group. 
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Table 17 - Linear Probability model: Dep. Var. is Willing to Donate 
 
 WTD WTD WTD WTD WTD WTD WTD WTD 
VARIABLES Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup 
         
Explicit Death -0.958** 0.983*** -0.921** 1.310*** -1.041** 1.016*** -2.032*** 0.966* 
(0.440) (0.304) (0.468) (0.327) (0.481) (0.373) (0.745) (0.505) 
Implicit Death -1.570*** 1.409*** -1.607*** 1.629*** -1.586*** 1.304*** -1.153* 1.231** 
(0.354) (0.326) (0.384) (0.352) (0.391) (0.393) (0.648) (0.533) 
         
Self-Esteem NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Demographic Characteristics NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Previous Donation NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Closeness To Victims NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Vaccination NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Household Income NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Observations 215 322 205 309 204 305 120 187 
EXPLICIT. DEATH =  
IMPLICIT DEATH 
p = 0.2129 p = 0.1534 p = 0.1859 p = 0.3133 p = 0.3118 p = 0.3733 p = 0.3044 p = 0.5873 
Note: dependent variable is willingness to donate (dummy) to charity recipients. This table shows the estimates of logistic regressions testing whether explicit and 
implicit death priming affect subjects’ willingness to donate (dummy) to recipients either belonging to subjects’ ingroup (WTDI - first column) or outgroup (WTDO - 
second column). In third and fourth columns, I control for the level of self-esteem, giving based and money based self-esteems, while the remaining columns add all 
the other controls to verify robustness of the estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 18 - Ingroup bias. Dep. Var. is Willing to Donate 
 WTD WTD 
DIFFERENCE 
Wald Test 
(Prob > chi2) VARIABLES  Ingroup Outgroup 
     
Explicit Death -0.958** 0.983*** -1.941 0.0000 
(0.440) (0.304)   
Implicit Death -1.570*** 1.409*** -2.979 0.0001 
(0.354) (0.326)   
Observations 215 322   
Note: dependent variable is willingness to donate (dummy) to charity recipients. This table shows the 
size of the ingroup bias (third column), induced by the two mortality manipulations (Explicit Death and 
Implicit Death). Ingroup bias is here measured as the difference between the estimated coefficients. 
Results of the postestimation Wald test are displayed in the last column. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Table 19 – Ingroup bias and controls. Dep. Var. is Willing to Donate 
  WTD WTD 
DIFFERENCE 
Wald Test 
(Prob > chi2) VARIABLES  Ingroup Outgroup 
      
Explicit Death  -2.032*** 0.966* -2.998 0.0004 
 (0.745) (0.505)   
Implicit Death  -1.153* 1.231** -2.384 0.0033 
 (0.648) (0.533)   
      
Self-Esteem  YES YES   
Demographic Characteristics  YES YES   
Previous Donation  YES YES   
Closeness To Victims  YES YES   
Vaccination  YES YES   
Household Income  YES YES   
      
Observations  120 187   
Note: dependent variable is willingness to donate (dummy) to charity recipients. This table checks the robustness of the 
estimated ingroup bias (third column), induced by the two mortality manipulations (Explicit Death and Implicit Death) 
to the inclusions of controls. Ingroup bias is here measured as the difference between the estimated coefficients. Results 
of the postestimation Wald test are displayed in the last column. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 20 - Interaction effects (Implicit Death/Self-esteem dummies) on Willing to Donate  
plus demographic controls 
p   WTD WTD WTD WTD WTD WTD 
INTERACTIONS VARIABLES Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup 
                
  EXPLICIT DEATH -0.986** 0.920** -0.954** 0.946** -0.944** 0.927** 
    (0.481) (0.365) (0.473) (0.368) (0.473) (0.364) 
                
IMPLICIT DEATH               
                
Control / Self-esteem High CONTR./SE_High -1.332*** -0.154         
    (0.388) (0.319)         
Implicit Death / Self-esteem Low ID/SE_Low -2.147*** 1.263**         
    (0.543) (0.495)         
Implicit Death / Self-esteem High ID/SE_High -2.402*** 1.030**         
    (0.546) (0.461)         
  SEG_High 0.466 0.826***         
    (0.347) (0.277)         
  SEM_High -0.658* -0.195         
    (0.350) (0.270)         
                
  CONTR./SE_High =ID/SE_High p = 0.0416 p = 0.0129         
  ID/SE_Low = ID/SE_High p = 0.6873 p = 0.6419         
                
Control / Giving Self-esteem High CONTR./SEG_High     0.376 0.926***     
        (0.384) (0.334)     
Implicit Death / Giving Self-esteem Low ID/SEG_Low     -1.883*** 1.400***     
        (0.628) (0.502)     
Implicit Death / Giving Self-esteem High ID/SEG_High     -1.134** 2.000***     
        (0.515) (0.526)     
  SE_High     -1.064*** -0.170     
        (0.333) (0.267)     
  SEM_High     -0.626* -0.194     
        (0.345) (0.270)     
        
  CONT/SEG_High =ID/SEG_High     p = 0.0035 p = 0.0201     
  ID/SEG_Low = ID/SEG_High     p = 0.2872 p = 0.2179     
                
Control / Money Self-esteem High CONTR./SEM_High         -0.685* -0.311 
            (0.391) (0.321) 
Implicit Death / Money Self-esteem Low ID/SEM_Low         -1.788*** 1.040** 
            (0.544) (0.472) 
Implicit Death / Money Self-esteem High ID/SEM_High         -2.202*** 1.114** 
            (0.554) (0.486) 
  SE_High         -1.068*** -0.182 
            (0.334) (0.267) 
  SEG_High         0.457 0.826*** 
            (0.344) (0.276) 
                
  CONT/SEM_High =ID/SEM_High         p = 0.0067 p = 0.0027 
  ID/SEM_Low = ID/SEM_High         p = 0.5450 p = 0.8789 
                
  Observations 204 305 204 305 204 305 
Note: dependent variable is willingness to donate (dummy) to charity recipients. This table delivers interaction effects of Implicit 
Death priming and self-esteem dummies on Willing to Donate. I display interactions with high self-esteem in the upper part of 
the table, and with high giving and money based self-esteems in the medium and bottom parts respectively. Below each group 
of interactions, I report the results of the postestimation Wald test. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
 
Anonymous Questionnaire 
 
We kindly ask you to answer anonymously to some simple and brief questions for 
scientific research purposes. 
If you have any questions or concerns, please raise your hand. The responsible of the 
initiative will answer your questions individually.  
Thank You again for Your cooperation. 
 
1 - Gender:   
2 - Age: ______ 
 
3 – Class:  
I year TrEc (Economics)   I year BA   
I year TrEc (Economics and Management)   II year BA   
II year TrEc (Economics)   I year MEF   
II year TrEc (Economics and Management)   II year MEF   
III year TEM   I year MED   
III year ECI   II year MED   
 
 
Please indicate the year and the course you are enrolled in if different from the alternatives displayed 
above: 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
M  F 
123 
 
4a – Province of residence: _________________________________________________________ 
4b – Province of origin:  ___________________________________________________________ 
 
5 – Please, indicate which amount is closest to the net monthly income of your family (sum up the 
total of income from all the members of the family). I must remind you that this test is absolutely 
anonymous and the data given will only be used for scientific research. (Just one answer) 
 
Less than  
 
 
 1.200 euro                                              4.000 euro 
 1.400 euro                                              5.000 euro                 
 1.600 euro                                              More than 5.000 euro 
 
 
 
6 – Have you ever donated before?  (We mean any type of donation: money, time - volunteering, 
blood, other).  
 
 
 
 
Please, answer to the following questions (7-11) only if your reply to the previous question (6) is 
"Yes". 
7 – What is the nature of your donation(s)? (You are allowed to mark more than one option). 
 
 
 
8a – When have you donated the last time? 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes    
  
No  
Money  Blood 
   
Time (Volunteering)  Other 
Few days ago  One month ago   Less than six months ago 
     
More than six months ago  More than one year ago   
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8b – How frequently do you use to donate? 
 
 
Please, answer to the following questions (9a-11) only if you have donated money before (you 
marked the option “money” in question 6). 
9a – How much have you donated (in euro) the last time? €________ 
9b – What is the average amount (in euro) of your donations? €________ 
 
10 – Have you donated to Unicef before?  
 
 
 
11 – Have you donated to other organizations before? 
               
 
 
12– On a scale from 1 to 10 (where 1 is the lowest and 10 the highest values), how much do you feel 
close to the people in need that this campaign is meant to help?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Monthly – at least one donation a month  
Occasionally – more than one donation a 
year without a precise frequency 
   
Yearly –  at least  one donation a year  Seldom – less than one donation a year 
Yes 
 
No 
Yes   Name of the organization: ________________________________________________ 
  
No  
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13a – Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about yourself. Please indicate 
how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement.   
  
STATEMENT Strongly Agree Agree Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
I feel that I'm a person of 
worth, at least on an equal 
plane with others 
    
I feel that I have a number of 
good qualities 
    
All in all, I am inclined to 
feel that I am a failure 
    
I am able to do things as well 
as most other people 
    
I feel I do not have much to 
be proud of 
    
I take a positive attitude 
toward myself 
    
On the whole, I am satisfied 
with myself 
    
I wish I could have more 
respect for myself 
    
I certainly feel useless at 
times 
    
At times I think I am no good 
at all 
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13b – Now, in the two following tables, you are asked to indicate how strongly you agree or disagree 
with each statement, by marking the number corresponding to your choice on a 7-point scale, ranging 
between 1 (“Stronly Disagree”) and 7 (“Stronly Agree”). 
 
STATEMENT Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree 
Giving brings out unwanted aspects 
of my character 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Giving hurts my social relationships 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Giving allows me to be part of a 
group 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Giving allows others to derogate me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Giving allows me to make a good 
impression on others 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Giving allows me to feel valued by 
others 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Giving damages my positive self-
image 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
While giving, I feel uncomfortable 
being with others 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Giving allows me to feel worthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Giving allows me to feel useful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Giving allows me to be proud of 
myself 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Giving allows me to be satisfied 
with myself 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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STATEMENT Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree 
Having money brings out unwanted 
aspects of my character 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Having money hurts my social 
relationships 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Having money allows me to be part 
of a group 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Having money allows others to 
derogate me 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Having money allows me to make a 
good impression on others 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Having money allows me to feel 
valued by others 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Having money damages my positive 
self-image 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
While showing to have money, I 
feel uncomfortable being with 
others 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Having money allows me to feel 
worthy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Having money allows me to feel 
useful 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Having money allows me to be 
proud of myself 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Having money allows me to be 
satisfied with myself 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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 In the following questions, you will be asked to express your opinion about vaccination. 
14a – Have you been vaccinated? 
  
 
 
14b – Do you believe that vaccination is necessary?  
 
 
 
 
14c – Do you believe that vaccines are effective? 
 
 
 
 
14d – Do you believe that vaccines are damaging? 
 
 
 
 
14e – If you had children, would you vaccinate them? 
 
 
 
 
Please, answer to the following questions (15) only if you have decided to not donate. 
 
15 – Why have you decided to not contribute with a donation? 
 
 
  
Yes  I don’t know -  I prefer not to answer 
   
No   
Yes  I don’t know -  I prefer not to answer 
   
No   
Yes  I don’t know -  I prefer not to answer 
   
No   
Yes  I don’t know -  I prefer not to answer 
   
No   
Yes  I don’t know -  I prefer not to answer 
   
No   
I have not enough cash  I do not believe in charity donations 
   
I do not trust charities  I think that vaccines are detrimental to health 
   
Other:  
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Appendix B - Treatments5 
 
                                                          
5
 For an English version of the treatments material, please send an e-mail to: patrizia.malaspina@studenti.unipd.it 
B1. ED-Outgroup (Explicit Death/Outgroup recipients 
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Appendix B - Treatments   
 
   
                                                          
6 I report only the slides that are varied to operationalize ingroup bias. Instructions are the same in all the treatments. 
B2 - ED-Ingroup (Explicit Death/Ingroup recipients)6 
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Appendix B - Treatments   
 
 
                                                          
7
 I report only the slides that are varied to manipulate death priming. Instructions are the same in all the treatments. 
B3 - DE-Outgroup (Disease/ Outgroup recipients)7  
        ID-Outgroup (Implicit Death/ Outgroup recipients) 
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B4 - DE-Ingroup (Disease/ Ingroup recipients)  
       ID-Ingroup (Implicit Death/ Ingroup recipients)  
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